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HABEAS CORPUS, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY,
AND CRYSTAL BALLS: PREDICTING THE
COURSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Kit Kinports*
"Ignorance of the law is no excuse" is a principle familiar to all first-year
law students and avid television viewers. The maxim means that criminal
defendants cannot avoid conviction by claiming that they did not realize their
conduct was illegal.' So long as the criminal prohibition was in effect at the
time the defendant acted? and was not unconstitutionally vague,3 the novelty or
ambiguity of the law is typically not a relevant factor in criminal cases.
The clarity of the law is, however, an importanqt consideration in three
types of constitutional litigation. In each of these areas, the federal courts have
forgiven erroneous interpretations of the law, imposing sanctions only on those
whose construction of the prevailing constitutional standard was unreasonable.
First, the qualified immunity defense in section 1983 suits4 protects public
officials from liability for constitutional violations if the rights they infringed
were not clearly established ones.5 Second, prisoners filing habeas corpus
petitions can rely on the novelty of a constitutional claim to explain their failure
to raise the claim at trial, thereby obtaining a hearing on the merits in federal
court despite the procedural default.6 Finally, the Supreme Court's recent
retroactivity rulings, which provide that new rules will not be announced or
applied on habeas, foreclose habeas relief if the state court's rejection of the
prisoner's claim was based on a reasonable, good-faith interpretation of
precedent, even though it turned out to be wrong in light of later Supreme
Court decisions. 7
* Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B., 1976, Brown
University; J.D., 1980, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Mark Brown, Willy
Fletcher, Kathy Goldwasser, Wayne LaFave, Sheldon Nahmod, Steve Ross, Ron Rotunda,
Suzanna Sherry, and Larry Yackle for their comments on earlier drafts of this article and to Beth
Gammie for her research assistance.
1. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 575-96
(1986).
2. See id. at 135-46.
3. See id. at 126-35.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
5. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
6. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 (1984).
7. See Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1217 (1990). For all practical purposes,
the new retroactivity doctrine moots the argument that the novelty of a claim can excuse a proce-
dural default. See infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text. The procedural default cases nev-
ertheless provide a useful comparative tool for evaluating the case law in the qualified immunity
and retroactivity contexts.
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Although in the abstract the qualified immunity and procedural default
doctrines may be appropriate means of furthering important policy concerns,
the Court's new approach to retroactivity is misguided. Instead of an attempt to
balance the competing interests in vindicating constitutional fights and pro-
tecting legitimate state governmental processes, the retroactivity cases are
designed to serve only the states' interests.
Even if all three doctrines were defensible in theory, their actual appli-
cation in many cases is completely unjustified by any relevant policy consid-
eration. Many federal courts have been exceedingly generous in interpreting
the qualified immunity defense, immunizing public officials unless direct prece-
dent from a court in their own jurisdiction obviously signalled the unconstitu-
tionality of their conduct. Similarly, the recent retroactivity rulings suggest
that the Court favors a very deferential standard for state judges, comparable to
that applied in qualified immunity cases. If the case law provided any support
for the state court's rejection of the prisoner's constitutional claim, the court's
erroneous ruling is deemed reasonable and thus immune from challenge on
habeas. By contrast, the courts have been unwilling to forgive procedural de-
faults in habeas cases even when the constitutional claim the prisoner and her
trial counsel failed to raise had been foreseen by only a few visionary attorneys
in other jurisdictions.
Rather than using such disparate standards in determining whether public
officials, defense attorneys, and state judges should have been aware of the
applicable legal principles, in all three contexts the courts should ask whether
the actor exercised reasonable care in interpreting the relevant cases.
Application of this standard may not yield precisely the same result in each of
the three settings: the reasonable defense attorney can be expected to raise
constitutional issues that the reasonable public official may not be aware of or
that the reasonable state judge may not accept. Nevertheless, the current level
of disparity among the cases does not further any legitimate policy and
therefore unnecessarily frustrates efforts to remedy violations of constitutional
rights.
After describing the basic legal and policy issues surrounding the quali-
fied immunity defenge and the use of novelty to explain procedural defaults in
habeas cases, Part I of this article advocates a standard for both types of cases
that asks whether a person exercising reasonable diligence in the same
circumstances would have been aware of the relevant constitutional principles.
With this standard in mind, Part II examines the qualified immunity defense in
detail, concluding that in many cases public officials are given immunity even
though they unreasonably failed to recognize the constitutional implications of
their conduct. Part III compares the courts' definition of "novelty" in the
habeas context and finds the opposite problem: most cases needlessly require
that prisoners and their trial counsel have an uncanny ability to predict future
developments in the law. Part IV then addresses the concept of "new rules"
introduced in the Supreme Court's recent retroactivity decisions to limit the
scope of habeas. While questioning the general wisdom of this new approach,
this part of the article also concludes that as applied the new retroactivity
doctrine precludes habeas relief even in cases when the state courts un-
reasonably interpreted existing precedent. Finally, Part V compares the three
sets of cases and criticizes the courts' differing expectations regarding the
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ability of public officials, defense attorneys, and state court judges to predict
developments in constitutional law.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT:
POLICIES AND PRECEDENTS
A. Qualified Immunity
1. The Relevant Law
Most state officials who find themselves defending section 19838 suits are
entitled to raise the affirmative defense 9 of qualified immunity.10 If successful,
the immunity defense protects public officials from liability for any damages
caused by the violation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights." The Supreme
8. Section 1983 creates a civil cause of action against "[e]very person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), the Court interpreted the "and laws" language
in section 1983 to permit suits alleging the violation of federal statutory rights, as well as those
guaranteed by the Constitution. See id. at 4-8. Because analysis of the defendant's entitlement
to qualified immunity does not differ depending on which type of right was allegedly violated,
see Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984), this article will not distinguish between
these two types of 1983 suits.
9. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639-41 (1980). Although Gomez put the
burden of pleading qualified immunity on the defendant, the Court has never indicated which
party has the ultimate burden of proof, see Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 n.24, and the federal courts
of appeals differ on that issue. See Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The
Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597, 634-42 (1989) (advocating placement of the bur-
den on the defendant).
10. Some state officials are protected by absolute immunity, which "defeats a [section
1983] suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions were within the scope of the immunity"
- that is, if the official was acting within the boundaries of the protected function. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976) (granting prosecutors absolute immunity). See,
e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (president); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators). For most executive
officials, however, "qualified immunity represents the norm." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
Both qualified and absolute immunity are available only when a public official is sued in
her individual capacity, making her personally liable for any damages awarded to the plaintiff.
These immunities are not defenses where the defendant is a state or municipality. See Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980). Nor are they available in a suit against a public employee in her official capacity, which
is in essence a suit against the defendant's governmental employer because the employer must
pay any damages assessed. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67.
11. Neither qualified nor absolute immunity normally protects state officials from suits
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief because such suits are not as likely to chill the defendant's
independent exercise of discretion and because the federal courts need some mechanism to pre-
vent state officials from violating constitutional rights. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522
(1984). When reformulating the qualified immunity defense in Harlow, the Court expressly
limited its holding to damages suits and left open the availability of injunctive or declaratory
remedies, see 457 U.S. at 819 n.34, and the courts of appeals have tended to find that qualified
immunity is not available in suits seeking these latter forms of relief. See, e.g., Lugo v.
Alvarado, 819 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1987); Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765, 772 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986); Harris v. Pemsley, 755 F.2d 338, 343 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 965 (1985); Hall v. Medical College of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299, 310
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1113 (1985); Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169,
1175-76 (9th Cir. 1984); Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 933 n.15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
19911
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Court articulated the prevailing definition of qualified immunity in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald: "government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." 12 Thus, public officials are entitled to
immunity even if they acted unconstitutionally, so long as the constitutional rule
they breached was not clearly established at the time of the violation. If the law
was clearly established, however, immunity is typically unavailable, subject to
an exception for "extraordinary circumstances." 13
Although Harlow did not define what the Court meant by "clearly
established" rights,14 three subsequent cases - Davis v. Scherer,15 Mitchell v.
Forsyth,16 -and Anderson v. Creighton17 - discussed the proper method of
ascertaining whether the constitutional right allegedly violated by the defendant
was clearly established at the relevant time. In Davis, an employee of the
Florida Highway Patrol charged that his termination without a formal hearing
violated the due process clause. In analyzing the defendants' request for
qualified immunity, the Court described the Harlow standard as a "wholly
objective" one.18 Thus, the only pertinent inquiry in that case was whether the
due process rights allegedly infringed by the defendants were clearly
established. The defendants did not lose their qualified immunity merely
because they might have violated a right (even a clearly established one) that
469 U.S. 1036 (1984). But cf. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446
U.S. 719,731-33 (1980) (observing that state legislator's absolute immunity is equally available
in section 1983 suits seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, although noting that, unlike im-
munity accorded executive and judicial officials, legislative immunity in section 1983 suits is
grounded in part on the speech or debate clause, which protects members of Congress from
injunctive suits).
12. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Prior to Harlow, defendants in section 1983 cases were
entitled to qualified immunity if they "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
[they] took within [their] sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights
of the [plaintiff], or if [they] took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the [plaintiff]" Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1975). Because Wood's subjective prong often created disputed questions of fact concerning
the defendant's good faith that could not be resolved on summary judgment, Harlow rewrote the
qualified immunity standard, deleting the subjective prong in order to "avoid excessive disrup-
tion of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judg-
ment." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. But cf. Kinports, supra note 9, at 607-18 (arguing that even
under Harlow, public officials who actually know they are acting unconstitutionally are not pro-
tected by qualified immunity).
Although Harlow was a suit against federal officials brought directly under the
Constitution pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), the scope of the qualified immunity defense is identical in both section
1983 and Bivens cases. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984). Therefore, this
article will not distinguish between them and will refer to both as section 1983 suits.
13. The exception comes into play if public officials can establish that they "neither
knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
14. See id. at 819-20 (remanding to allow district court to make that determination).
15. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
16. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
17. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
18. Davis, 468 U.S. at 191 ("[nlo other 'circumstances' are relevant to the issue of
qualified immunity" except the 'objective reasonableness of [the defendant's] conduct as mea-
sured by reference to clearly established law") (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
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emanated from some other source of law.19 The Court concluded that the
defendants had not breached any established due process rights because prior
Supreme Court decisions had required only "some kind of a hearing"20 before
state employees with a protected interest in their jobs could be fired and had not
specified what kind of hearing must be provided. Therefore, no precedent
established that the plaintiff was entitled to a more formal notice or opportunity
to respond than he had actually received.2'
In Mitchell, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a warrantless
domestic security wiretap authorized by former Attorney General John
Mitchell. Mitchell was entitled to qualified immunity, the Court held, because
the permissibility of such wiretaps was "an open question" when he acted. 22
Although some of the Justices had debated the issue in a case decided several
years before Mitchell authorized the wiretap the majority had expressly left
the question unresolved,2 4 and the later Supreme Court opinion requiring a
warrant in such circumstances was decided more than a year after the wiretap
was in place.25 In addition to the uncertainty generated by the Court's own
rulings, several district courts had approved similar warrantless wiretaps, and
two contrary district court opinions were not decided until after the wiretap
challenged by the plaintiff had been removed.26 Nevertheless, the Mitchell
Court indicated that it did not intend to immunize a public official simply
because the constitutional provision at issue had never expressly been held to
apply in a case involving identical circumstances.27 Rather, the Court felt that
Mitchell was entitled to immunity because there was "a legitimate question"
whether a warrant was required for domestic security wiretaps: he could not be
held liable simply because "he gambled and lost on the resolution of this open
question."28
In Anderson, the plaintiffs alleged that an FBI agent had conducted a
warrantless search of their home without probable cause to search, and without
exigent circumstances to justify the failure to obtain a warrant. In determining
whether the defendant had violated the plaintiffs' clearly established
constitutional rights, the Court held that the critical issue was "the objective
(albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed
19. In Davis, for example, the Court thought it irrelevant that the defendants may have
violated clear state administrative regulations specifying the procedures to be followed in dis-
charging Highway Patrol personnel. See id. at 193-97.
20. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972).
21. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 192 & n.10. But see id. at 205-06 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that defendants did violate clearly established rights
because they did not give plaintiff meaningful notice or any hearing whatsoever).
22. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535. Only four Justices joined this part of the Court's opin-
ion. The other three Justices participating in the decision did not reach the question of Mitchell's
entitlement to qualified immunity. See id. at 538-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 556 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 362-64 (White, J., concurring); see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 531-32.
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
25. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-21 (1972); see
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530.
26. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 533-34. The Court also noted that warrantless domestic
security wiretaps had been used since the 1940's. See id. at 530-31.
27. See id. at 535 n.12.
28. Id. at 535.
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[the defendant's] warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established
law and the information the searching officers possessed."2 9 The defendant
could not be denied immunity simply because, as a general matter, it had long
been established that the fourth amendment permitted warrantless searches of
private homes only if the police had both probable cause and exigent
circumstances. Rather, the constitutional right allegedly violated by the
defendant must have been clearly established "in a more particularized, and
hence more relevant, sense: [t]he contours of the right must [have been] suf-
ficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was]
doing violate[d] that right."30 As in Mitchell, the Court made clear, however,
that it was not extending qualified immunity to public officials simply because
no prior court decision had expressly found their precise acts unconstitutional;
rather, it was holding that they would lose their immunity if "in the light of
preexisting law" the unlawfulness of their conduct was "apparent." 31
2. The Relevant Policies
As thus interpreted by the Supreme Court, the qualified immunity de-
fense is not a matter of statutory construction, but instead is a creature of pol-
icy, designed to accommodate two conflicting concerns.32 The obvious purpose
of creating a civil damages remedy against public officials who violate the
Constitution is to remedy and deter deprivations of constitutional rights. 33
Imposing strict liability in section 1983 cases might best serve those goals, but
subjecting public officials to liability for every error of judgment might
29. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
30. Id. at 640. See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (in determining
defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity, the relevant question is "whether a reasonably
well-trained officer in petitioner's position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish
probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant").
31. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. For criticism of Anderson on the grounds that apply-
ing the Court's standard in fourth amendment cases makes no sense because a defendant who
violates the fourth amendment has, by definition, acted unreasonably, and that Anderson may
actually redefine substantive fourth amendment law, see Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity
Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 47-53 (1989).
32. The Court's decisions discussing the scope of absolute immunity, see supra note
10, purport to interpret the statute: the Court has determined that, despite section 1983's plain
language, see supra note 8, Congress could not have meant to subject all public officials to lia-
bility and therefore must have intended to incorporate common law immunities. See, e.g.,
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-21
(1976). Although the Court's earliest qualified immunity decisions likewise adopted this reason-
ing, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-57 (1967), today the Court no longer pretends that
the qualified immunity doctrine is a matter of statutory interpretation, but analyzes it strictly in
terms of policy concerns. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 645 (noting that Harlow
"completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common
law'); Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a
Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 526, 538-39 (1977); Gildin, The Standard of Culpability in
Section 1983 and Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the
Constitution, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557, 587 (1983). For an argument that Congress may ac-
tually have intended not to immunize any defendants in section 1983 suits, see Matasar, Personal
Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L.
REV. 741,765-81 (1987).
33. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 813-14; Owen, 445 U.S. at 651; Butz v.




unfairly penalize them for good faith mistakes, divert their attention from their
public duties, prevent them from independently exercising their discretion in
the public interest, and discourage qualified persons from seeking public office
at all.34 The qualified immunity defense attempts to reconcile these competing
concerns by protecting public officials who "could not reasonably be expected
to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor.., to 'know' that the law
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful." 35
The balance struck by the Court is appropriate only if qualified immunity
is restricted to cases where a reasonable public official in the defendant's shoes
would have thought that her conduct was constitutional.36 This objective
standard will not overdeter public officials, but will instead give them an
incentive to "pause to consider whether a proposed course of action can be
squared with the Constitution," which, the Court noted in Mitchell, is "precisely
the point" of qualified immunity.37 If the defense is available more widely to
defendants who should have known that their actions were constitutionally
suspect, it will immunize those who can and should be deterred and will deny a
remedy to those whose rights have been violated. 38 Requiring innocent
plaintiffs to bear the cost of constitutional wrongs is acceptable only if it
actually serves the policy interests underlying the qualified immunity defense.
34. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 813-14; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
319-21 (1975); Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 239-48.
Commentators have noted, however, that the Court has cited no empirical data to support
its overdeterrence concerns, and that some studies suggest that the specter of section 1983 suits
does not unduly intimidate public officials. See, e.g., Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without
Remedies: Executive Official Immunity, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 221, 248 (1983); Rudovsky, supra
note 31, at 31 n.43. Moreover, governmental indemnification policies, see infra note 99 and ac-
companying text, mitigate these concerns to a large extent. See, e.g., Kattan, Knocking on
Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damages Actions, 30
VAND. L. REV. 941, 986 (1977); Rudovsky, supra note 31, at 74,76 n.288. Cf. Owen, 445
U.S. at 652-56 (refusing to extend immunity to suits against municipal defendants because em-
ployees are less likely to be chilled if they are not personally liable).
35. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
36. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 (characterizing qualified immunity standard as one of
"objective reasonableness"). Malley held that a police officer who conducts a search pursuant to
a warrant is not necessarily entitled to qualified immunity if the magistrate mistakenly issued the
warrant without requiring sufficient probable cause; the officer is protected only if her reliance
on the magistrate was reasonable. See id. at 345-46. Cf. 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra
note 1, at 591-95 (mistake of law is a recognized defense in criminal cases if the defendant rea-
sonably relied on a statute, judicial decision, or official interpretation of law). If the police offi-
cer who had express judicial authorization for her conduct is not automatically entitled to im-
munity, the public official who unreasonably misinterpreted the relevant constitutional principles
without the aid of a judicial officer should likewise be liable.
37. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524. See also Malley, 475 U.S. at 343; Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 819; Owen, 445 U.S. at 656.
38. See Nahmod, supra note 34, at 248-49 (observing in addition that unremedied vio-
lations generate "disrespect for authority [and] for the constitution and laws generally," and also
contribute to the "erosion of fourteenth amendment values"); Developments in the Law -
Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1204 (1977). Cf. Freed, supra note
32, at 558-61 (advocating that focus on knowledge of settled law in qualified immunity cases be
replaced by general analysis of the reasonableness of defendant's conduct); Gildin, supra note




1. The Relevant Law
Prisoners who file federal habeas corpus petitions39 challenging their
convictions often confront the argument that the constitutional claims they are
asserting on habeas were not raised at trial, as required by the state's con-
temporaneous objection rule4o Such procedural defaults do not automatically
39. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82, gave the Supreme Court
and the federal district courts jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus to federal prisoners.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385, which was enacted during Reconstruction and
extended habeas corpus to "any person ... restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States," was construed to authorize the federal
courts to consider habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. For discussion of the controversy
surrounding this interpretation, see L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES 85-92 (1981).
The Judicial Code and Judiciary Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 869, 964-68, codified the federal habeas
statutes at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255. Congress amended several aspects of the statutes in 1966,
adding provisions dealing with successive petitions and evidentiary hearings, but has not
changed them since that time. See generally Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearings in Federal
Habeas Corpus Cases, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 134-54. In 1976, the Supreme Court pro-
mulgated procedural rules governing the federal courts' treatment of habeas cases. See Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. For an extensive treatment of the history
of habeas corpus, see L. YACKLE, supra, at 71-92, 151-58.
The general grounds for issuance of habeas corpus writs are set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(1988), and section 2254 authorizes state prisoners who are incarcerated in violation of the
Constitution or federal laws to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court, typically in the juris-
diction where they are in custody. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1988); L. YACKLE, supra, at 194-
95. For discussion of the few habeas cases raising nonconstitutional claims, see id. at 360-62,
419-22.
Section 2255, which authorizes federal prisoners to file postconviction motions to vacate
their sentences, was meant to provide federal prisoners with a remedy equivalent to habeas cor-
pus in the court where they were sentenced, rather than in the jurisdiction where they are con-
fined. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1969). Section 2254 and 2255
cases are treated almost identically, see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 541-42 (1976);
Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 227-28 & n.8 (noting, however, that federal courts have discretion to
refuse to consider section 2255 motions that raise claims previously decided by the trial or appel-
late court during the criminal proceeding); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963), and
the procedural default rules discussed in this article apply equally to petitions filed by state and
federal prisoners, see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 130, 152 (1982). Therefore, the article
will not distinguish between state and federal prisoners and will refer to both types of cases as
habeas cases.
40. A procedural default bars habeas review only if the last state court to render judg-
ment in the case refused to consider the constitutional claim because of the procedural error. If
that court disposed of the claim on the merits, the default does not prevent the federal court from
likewise considering the issue on habeas. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327-28(1985); County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 151-54 (1979). In Harris v.
Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989), the Court held that the state court must "clearly and expressly"
indicate that its decision is based on a procedural bar in order to foreclose habeas review.
Procedural defaults involve issues that are related to but distinct from those raised by the
exhaustion doctrine, which requires state prisoners to assert their constitutional claims in state
court prior to arguing them on habeas. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1988). The exhaustion
rule requires prisoners to fairly present their claims to the highest state court that will hear them,
but does not mandate that the claims be raised more than once, even if additional avenues of
review are available. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,435-38 (1963) (need not file certiorari pe-
tition to the Supreme Court after highest state court affirms conviction); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 447 (1953) (need not exhaust state collateral remedies). See generally L. YACKLE,
supra note 39, at 231-96.
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bar relief because a habeas petition marks the beginning of a new civil suit
independent of the criminal prosecution4' and authorizes the federal courts to
conduct de novo review of the relevant legal issues unfettered by the doctrine
of res judicata. 42 As the Court explained in Fay v. Noia, "conventional notions
of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest
federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be
denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."43
Nevertheless, Fay held that federal courts had discretion to refuse to hear
defaulted claims on habeas if the prisoner "deliberately by-passed the orderly
procedure of the state courts" - that is, if the prisoner, "after consultation with
competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forwent the
privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether
for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the
deliberate by-passing of state procedures."" Later, in Wainwright v. Sykes,
the Supreme Court retreated from Fay4 5 holding that the federal courts may
Like the rules governing procedural defaults, the exhaustion doctrine is based on notions
of equity and comity; it is not a jurisdictional requirement. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 424-26. But
the exhaustion requirement applies only to state remedies that are currently available, see id. at
434-35, and does not affect cases where the prisoner committed a procedural default by failing to
take advantage of an opportunity to raise a claim in state court that is now foreclosed. See Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982). As a result, the habeas court need not require ex-
haustion if it is clear that the state courts would simply rule that the prisoner's claim was barred
by an earlier default. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Harris, 489 U.S. at
263 n.9. Although analytically different from the exhaustion doctrine, the rules governing
procedural defaults are related because permitting habeas review of defaulted claims would un-
dermine the exhaustion requirement. See L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 297-98.
41. See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 75. But cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 176 &
n.* (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that section 2255, unlike 2254, is a
continuation of the criminal prosecution, so that the procedural rules governing criminal cases
can be applied to 2255 motions); id. at 181-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same). For a
discussion of this controversy over the nature of section 2255 proceedings, see L. YACKLE,
supra note 39, at 156-58.
42. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); Fay, 372 U.S. at 422.
Subject to a few exceptions, however, state court findings of fact are presumed to be correct if
they were made after a full and fair hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
43. 372 U.S. at 424.
44. Id. at 438-39. Thus, Fay held that federal courts have the power to review de-
faulted claims on habeas, but in the exercise of their equitable discretion may choose not to enter-
tain claims that prisoners deliberately bypassed. See id. Under Fay's approach, habeas juris-
diction thus functions differently from direct Supreme Court review of a state conviction. On
direct review, a state court's ruling that the defendant forfeited her claim by failing to comply
with a contemporaneous objection rule typically serves as an independent and adequate state
ground supporting the conviction and thus barring federal review. See, e.g., Sykes, 433 U.S.
at 81-85; Fay, 372 U.S. at 428-32. Fay reasoned that the adequate state ground doctrine, an ad-junct of the duty to avoid issuing advisory opinions, applies only on direct review, when the
Court is passing on the judgment of a state court that will stand even if the Court reverses on the
federal issue because it is equally supported by the adequate state ground. That theory is irrele-
vant on habeas, according to Fay, because the habeas court simply rules on the legality of the
prisoner's detention and has no power to revise the state court's judgment. See id. at 429-31.
But see id. at 463-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For discussion of the controversy surrounding
this reasoning, see L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 305-08.
45. The transition from Fay to Sykes was gradual. Kaufman held that a procedural de-
fault did not bar a federal prisoner from filing a section 2255 motion unless the default could be
characterized as a deliberate bypass. Reasoning that the interest in finality is identical for both
state and federal prisoners, the Court found no reason to give greater preclusive effect to a de-
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not consider defaulted claims on habeas absent proof of both cause for the
failure to object and prejudice arising from the alleged constitutional defect.4 6
Sykes did not attempt to define the term "cause," noting only that it was
narrower than the deliberate bypass standard set forth in Fay.4 7
fault by a federal prisoner than that given to a comparable default by a state prisoner. See 394
U.S. at 228.
In Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), however, the Court refused to apply
the deliberate bypass standard where a federal prisoner failed to file a pretrial motion challenging
the composition of the grand jury that had indicted him, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b)(2). Rule 12 provided that noncompliance constituted waiver that could be ex-
cused only "for cause shown." The Court distinguished Kaufman because it had not involved
such an express waiver provision and concluded that Congress could not have intended to apply
more liberal waiver rules on collateral review than at trial. See id. at 239-42.
The final step leading to Sykes was Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), a case
identical to Davis except that the prisoner had been convicted in state court. Turning Kaufman
on its head, Francis held that a showing of cause and prejudice was necessary to excuse the
prisoner's default. The Court reasoned that considerations of comity and federalism required the
federal courts to give no less preclusive effect to a state prisoner's default than that given to the
same default by a federal prisoner. See id. at 541-42. See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 508 n.3 (1976) (holding that defendant was not forced to dress in prison clothing during
trial because he never raised an objection with the trial judge; but then suggesting retreat from
Fay by distinguishing, in an ambiguous footnote, between the strict standard necessary to waive
fundamental rights and the lesser standard required with respect to strategic and tactical deci-
sions, which cannot be grounds for reversal absent an objection). For a critical analysis of this
progression, see Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Rights, and Procedural
Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 HoFSTRA L. REV. 617, 623-36 (1984).
46. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. The prisoner has the burden of showing cause and preju-
dice, see Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68, and the Court has expressly indicated that the Sykes test is
a conjunctive one, permitting consideration of defaulted claims on habeas only if both cause and
prejudice are shown. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 493-94 (1986); Engle, 456 U.S. at
134 n.43. But see Carrier, 477 U.S. at 502-03 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), the source of the cause and prejudice standard, does not treat cause and rej-
udice as separate hurdles, but instead requires only a showing of cause and considers prejudice a
relevant factor in determining whether cause has been shown).
47. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. Fay treated procedural default cases as cases raising
questions of waiver, which, like the waiver of constitutional rights, requires "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938); see Fay, 372 U.S. at 439. Sykes, on the other hand, viewed these cases as raising
questions of forfeiture, whereby rights can be lost unknowingly or inadvertently. See Spritzer,
Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 507-08
(1978).
Although the cases leading up to Sykes cut back on Fay, they did so as a matter of dis-
cretion rather than jurisdiction. They did not dispute Fay's holding that the federal courts had
the power to hear defaulted claims on habeas. See Francis, 425 U.S. at 538-39; Kaufman, 394
U.S. at 220 n.3.
Sykes' impact on the independent and adequate state ground doctrine was unclear, but
some believe Sykes overruled Fay and revived the doctrine in habeas cases. See Foley, The
New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal Habeas Corpus Claims in Capital Cases, 23
LOY. L.A.L. REV. 193, 204-05 (1989); Marcus, Federal Habeas Corpus After State Court
Default: A Definition of Cause and Prejudice, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 663, 675 (1985); Note,
Engle v. Isaac: The End of Innocence on CollateralReview, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1183, 1190 &
n.48, 1193 (1983) [hereinafter AM. U. Note]. But see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 96 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 100 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 341 (1984); 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4266.1, at 467 (1988); Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright
v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 1683, 1688 (1979). Even
after Sykes, the Court suggested that it continued to follow Fay and viewed the cause and preju-
dice test as a matter of policy rather than jurisdiction. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533(1986); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984); Engle, 456 U.S. at 135. Most recently, however,
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Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have provided more substance to the
cause standard, but nevertheless have failed to articulate a comprehensive
definition for all cases. 48 In Engle v. Isaac, three prisoners filed habeas peti-
tions challenging jury instructions that required them to prove their self-de-
fense claims by a preponderance of the evidence.49 The prisoners sought to
excuse their failure to object to the instructions at trial on two grounds: that the
relevant state law appeared settled against their claim, and that the constitutional
argument was a novel one at the time of their trials. The Court held that the
perceived futility of raising an objection in state court does not by itself
constitute cause; "[e]ven a state court that has previously rejected a
constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is
valid," the Court explained. 5°
Engle likewise rejected the prisoners' novelty argument. Without decid-
ing whether novelty could ever satisfy the cause requirement,5 the Court found
the prisoners' showing inadequate because "the tools to construct their
constitutional claim" were available at the time of trial. 52 In support of this
conclusion, the Court observed that In re Winship had laid the groundwork for
the prisoners' challenge more than four years before their trials by holding that
the due process clause requires the prosecution to prove every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.5 3 In the years following Winship, Engle
the Court appears to have resolved this controversy, reading Sykes as applying the adequate
state ground doctrine to the habeas context. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. But see id. at 267
(Stevens, J., concurring) (indicating that adequate state ground doctrine continues to be
inapplicable on habeas).
Nevertheless, the Sykes analysis seems to differ from the doctrine applied on direct
Supreme Court review. The latter is jurisdictional and can therefore be raised at any time, see R.
STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 168-70 (6th ed. 1986),
whereas the courts routinely overlook default arguments on habeas if the state does not raise
them in a timely fashion. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra, at 457; L.
YACKLE, supra note 39, at 144 n.78 (Supp. 1989). See also Marcus, supra, at 675-79 (arguing
that the Sykes balancing approach distorts the traditional adequate state ground doctrine).
Assuming that the adequate state ground doctrine does apply on habeas, federal courts
may be required to analyze in each procedural default case whether the state's contemporaneous
objection rule was in fact an independent and adequate state ground before evaluating the pris-
oner's showing of cause and prejudice. For discussion of both the controversy surrounding this
issue and the nature of the adequate state ground analysis that would be applied on habeas, see
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra, at 454-55; L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 155-56
(Supp. 1989); Goodman & Sallett, supra, at 1690-91 & n.40.
48. See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1988); Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527, 533-34 (1986); Reed, 468 U.S. at 13.
49. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
50. Id. at 130. See also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1986). By enforc-
ing the cause and prejudice standard in this case, Engle made clear that the Sykes requirements
apply to all defaulted constitutional claims, even when the alleged constitutional error calls into
question the reliability of the verdict. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 129 (noting, however, that "the
nature of a constitutional claim may affect the calculation" of cause and prejudice). See also
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495. Engle's extension of Sykes to claims that raise a question about the
accuracy of the conviction departed from the approach that had generally been taken by the lower
courts, see AM. U. Note, supra note 47, at 1195, and has been criticized by a number of com-
mentators, see, e.g., Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 660-61; Comment, Lundy, Isaac and Frady:
A Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 169, 209 (1982) [hereinafter
CATH. U. Comment].
51. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 131.
52. Id. at 133.
53. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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continued, "dozens" of other defendants in various jurisdictions had challenged
the constitutionality of rules requiring them to prove various elements of the
charge and affirmative defenses, and several commentators had perceived that
Winship might alter the traditional practice of placing the burden of proving
affirmative defenses on the defendant.54
Though rejecting the prisoners' claim of novelty, Engle did not suggest
that the constitutional challenge was so well established that "every astute
counsel" would have seen the connection between Winship and the allegedly
defective instructions.55 In fact, the Court recognized that "[c]ounsel might
have overlooked or chosen to omit respondents' due process argument while
pursuing other avenues of defense."56 Nevertheless, because the Constitution
"does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable
constitutional claim," the Court held that novelty will not excuse a procedural
default if, as was true in Engle, "the basis of a constitutional claim [was]
available, and other defense counsel ha[d] perceived and litigated that claim." 57
Two years later, in Reed v. Ross, the Court held that the cause re-
quirement is satisfied if the claim raised on habeas was so novel at the time of
trial that "its legal basis [was] not reasonably available to counsel."58 As in
Engle, the prisoner in Reed challenged state law that required him to shoulder
the burden of proving his affirmative defenses - in this case, North Carolina
law regarding self-defense and the absence of malice. This time, the novelty
argument was successful. The Court distinguished Engle on the ground that
Winship had not yet been decided when Ross went to trial,59 and in fact, Leland
v. Oregon had held years before his trial that a state could require the
defendant to prove an insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 60 The Court
also noted that questions concerning the constitutionality of the practice
challenged by Ross had not arisen in the North Carolina courts until five years
after his appeal.61 Two courts in other jurisdictions - the Eighth Circuit and
the Connecticut Superior Court - had struck down state rules requiring
54. Engle, 456 U.S. at 131-32 & n.40.
55. Id. at 133.
56. Id. at 133-34.
57. Id. at 134. In Frady, the companion case, the Court elaborated on the prejudice
prong of the Sykes test. The Court defined prejudice to impose a stricter standard than the "plain
error" rule applied on direct appeal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See Frady,
456 U.S. at 162-66. Specifically, the Court held that prejudice requires a habeas petitioner who
challenges erroneous jury instructions to prove that the instructions "worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at
170 (emphasis deleted).
58. 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). Both Engle and Reed were closely divided cases, with the
majority opinion in each case joined by only five Justices. Justices White and Powell were the
only members of the Court who voted with the majority on both occasions.
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988), analyzed the factual analogue to the novelty
argument at issue in Engle and Reed. Just as the cause requirement is satisfied when the legal
basis for a prisoner's claim is reasonably unknown, Amadeo held that it is satisfied when the
factual basis is not reasonably discoverable - as in that case, for example, when county offi-
cials concealed a memorandum that supported the prisoner's challenge to the composition of thejuries that had indicted and convicted him. See id. at 222. See also Marcus, supra note 47, at
724-25.
59. See Reed, 468 U.S. at 19.
60. 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952); see also Reed, 468 U.S. at 18.
61. See Reed, 468 U.S. at 18.
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defendants to prove, respectively, an alibi defense and a lawful excuse for
possession of burglar's tools. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that those two
opinions did not provide "a reasonable basis upon which Ross could have
realistically appealed his conviction" because they provided only "indirect
support" for his claim and "they were the only cases that would have supported
[his] claim at all."62 By contrast, the four Justices in dissent thought that those
cases, decided nine and four months prior to Ross' trial, indicated that defense
counsel had a reasonable basis for objecting to the defective instruction. 63
Subsequently, in Smith v. Murray, the Court compared Engle and Reed
and emphasized that the relevant question in evaluating claims of novelty is not
"whether subsequent legal developments have made [defense] counsel's task
easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was 'available' at all."64
Without defining "availability," the Court quickly rejected Smith's novelty
argument because "various forms" of his claim had been "percolating in the
lower courts for years" before his default. 65
In Dugger v. Adams, the most recent Supreme Court opinion to raise the
question whether novelty can excuse a procedural default, the Court did not
actually rule on the prisoner's contention that novelty provided cause for his
failure to object to comments by the trial judge that allegedly violated the
eighth amendment. 66 Instead, the Court noted that, even if the eighth am-
endment issue was novel, the cause requirement was not met because any
unconstitutional remarks by the judge would also have violated state law, and
Adams offered no excuse for his failure to object on state law grounds. 67
Related to these novelty cases are cases where prisoners seek to excuse
procedural defaults on grounds of attorney error, ignorance, or inadvertence.
In Murray v. Carrier, the Court held that such efforts to satisfy the cause
requirement are insufficient, 68 absent proof that defense counsel failed to
62. Id. at 19.
63. See id. at 25 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986).
65. Id. In support of its conclusion, the Court also noted that defense counsel had ob-jected to the testimony at trial, but had chosen not to appeal on that issue, and that an amicus
brief had argued the point on appeal. See id. at 534,537.
66. 489 U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989). The prisoner argued that the judge's comments vi-
olated the Court's ruling in Caldwell v. Mississippi. 472 U.S. 320 (1985), which had reversed a
capital sentence because the prosecutor had led the jury to believe that it did not have ultimate re-
sponsibility for the sentencing decision.
67. Adams, 489 U.S. at 408 ("the fact that it turns out that the trial court's remarks
were objectionable on federal as well as state grounds is not good cause"). The Court did not
hold, however, that a defendant's failure to preserve a claim on one possible ground always bars
subsequent habeas review of other claims arising from the same conduct. See infra notes 268-
69 and accompanying text.
68. 477 U.S. 478, 486-88 (1986). The Court reasoned that the costs of habeas de-
scribed in Engle, see infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text, are equally high when an unin-
tentional default is committed through defense counsel's ignorance or inadvertence. See Carrier,
477 U.S. at 487. Moreover. if unintentional procedural defaults were excused, the courts would
have to undertake the difficult task of determining whether or not a default was actually
unintentional. See id. at 488. See also Marcus, supra note 47, at 689 (prisoner and trial counsel
might make "self-serving characterizations of the trial forfeiture as inadvertent"); id. at 719 n.346
(attorney who wanted to protect her professional reputation would have incentive to describe
default as strategic, whereas attorney who wanted to assist client would claim the opposite).
12719911
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
provide effective assistance of counsel.6 9 Because the concept of cause typically
refers to "some objective factor external to the defense," the Court "discern[ed]
The Carrier dissent noted, however, that unintentional defaults do not involve attempts to
sandbag or to circumvent a state's procedural rules and therefore should not be subject to the
same severe penalty. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also
pointed out that default rules will not deter inadvertent mistakes by defense counsel. See id. See
also Goodman & Sallett supra note 47, at 1717 (questioning whether it is just to refuse to hear a
prisoner's habeas petition "in order to improve the performance of lawyers in general"); Marcus,
supra note 47, at 691 (arguing that barring habeas review is not likely to decrease the number of
inadvertent defaults by "[o]verburdened and underpaid attorneys," who "may be unwilling to
pay the personal or professional costs which would be required to reduce [their] caseload and
continue [their] legal education"). But cf. 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTf, supra note 1, at 329, 338
(describing debate as to whether criminal liability can deter negligent conduct).
69. A prisoner who claims ineffective assistance to satisfy the cause requirement must
first present the ineffective assistance claim to the state courts in order to comply with the ex-
haustion rule. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488-89. See also supra note 40. Because a prisoner
lacks the expertise to evaluate defense counsel's performance and to recognize ineffective assis-
tance on her own, and because no one reasonably expects an attorney to argue that her own per-
formance was inadequate, the state courts generally do not consider an ineffective assistance
claim defaulted unless the prisoner failed to raise the claim at some point in the proceedings after
the allegedly ineffective attorney ceased representing her. See 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 47, at 350 n.75; id. at 98 n.69.3 (Supp. 1990); Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73
MINN. L. REV. 247,325 (1988).
As defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim has two components. First, the defendant must prove that counsel's perfor-
mance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687, 688. In making this
first determination, Strickland instructs the courts to use a "highly deferential" standard,
"indulg[ing] a strong presumption" that the attorney's performance was adequate, and making
"every effort" to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. at 689. Second, the defen-
dant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
Carrier did not clarify the relationship between Sykes' requirement of prejudice, see
supra note 57, and the prejudice showing necessary to establish a sixth amendment violation. At
least one court has suggested that the prejudice requirements are equivalent, see Cook v.
Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1072, 1079 (5th Cir. 1987), but this approach has been criticized because it
"come[s] perilously close to demanding ineffective assistance (in the Sixth Amendment sense) in
every case controlled by Sykes." L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 210 n.90.15 (Supp. 1989).
Others believe that Strickland's definition of prejudice is no stricter than that required by Sykes,
see 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 97 (Supp. 1990), and may even be more
lenient, see Marcus, supra note 47, at 702-03 (arguing that the interest in finality is greater in de-
fault cases, thus justifying a heavier burden there, whereas Strickland found that the lesser inter-
est in finality in ineffective assistance cases called for a lighter burden that would apply on both
direct appeal and collateral review) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-98); Rosenberg,
Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 597, 618-19 (1985). But see id. at 619 (noting that the Court probably would not
have "created a substantial disparity in the standards of prejudice, since that would invite litigants
to mask procedural defaults as ineffective assistance claims").
Carrier's critics note that requiring a showing of ineffective assistance to prove cause
makes the defaulted claim irrelevant. A prisoner who was denied effective assistance of counsel
can raise that issue on habeas as an independent sixth amendment claim. She therefore has little
incentive to pursue the defaulted claim, except in the few cases - like those raising double jeop-
ardy claims - when relief would result in dismissal of the charges rather than a new trial. See 3
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 96-97 (Supp. 1990); Friedman, supra, at 300;
Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IOWA L. REV. 609, 658,
663 (1983). Cf. Note, Attorney Error as "Cause" Under Wainwright v. Sykes: The Case for a
Reasonableness Standard After Washington v. Downes, 67 VA. L. REV. 415, 425 (1981)(characterizing as "unduly harsh" the requirement that habeas petitioners demonstrate ineffective
assistance and thus "prove two constitutional violations" in order to obtain a remedy for one).
For discussion of the relationship between cases attempting to justify a procedural default on the
ground that the issue was novel and those arguing ineffective assistance, see infra note 263.
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no inequity in requiring [defendants] to bear the risk of attorney error that
results in a procedural default."70
Applying the effective assistance of counsel standard in the companion
case, Smith v. Murray, the Court ruled that defense counsel's failure to appeal
an issue because of his perception that it had little chance of success in the state
courts did not render his representation ineffective.7 1 In fact, the Court
seemingly applauded the attorney's default, characterizing the "process of
'winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on' those more likely
to prevail" as "the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy." 72 The fact that
counsel may have chosen unwisely did not establish ineffective assistance, for
"[lt will often be the case that even the most informed counsel will fail to
anticipate a state appellate court's willingness to reconsider a prior holding or
70. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. The Court gave two examples to illustrate what it meant
by "objective factor[s] external to the defense": proof that the factual or legal basis for the pris-
oner's claim was not reasonably available at the time of trial; and interference by state officials
that prevented compliance with the contemporary objection rule.
Carrier also held that the policies underlying the cause and prejudice standard, see infra
notes 75-80 and accompanying text, apply not only when defendants failed to comply with rules
requiring contemporaneous objections at trial, but also when they omitted issues on appeal. See
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489-92. See also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Several of
the policies relied on in Sykes, however, seem relevant only to defaults at trial. For example,
concerns about undermining the significance of the trial, ensuring full development of the trial
record, and giving the trial judge an opportunity to cure the defect without necessitating a retrial
are not applicable to appellate defaults. Moreover, defense counsel acts under less severe time
constraints when making strategic decisions on appeal than she does at trial. As a result, she has
more opportunity to consult with her client, making it less important to bind the defendants to
their attorneys' decisions. See, e.g., Carrier, 477 U.S. at 506 (Stevens, J., concurring in thejudgment); L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 338-39; Note, Procedural Defaults at the Appellate
Stage and Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 38 STAN. L. REV. 463 (1986). Nevertheless, the
Carrier Court rejected these efforts to distinguish appellate defaults. Carrier left open, how-ever,
the possibility that Fay's deliberate bypass standard might continue to apply when a prisoner
failed to appeal the conviction at all, as was the case in Fay. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492. For
discussion of the controversy concerning whether the deliberate bypass standard retains any
validity, see 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 344-46; id. at 94-96 (Supp. 1990);
L. YACKLE supra note 39, at 145-49 (Supp. 1989).
71. 477 U.S. 527, 534-36 (1986). Defense counsel's perception seemed to be quite
reasonable given recent state law on the issue. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
72. Smith, 477 U.S. at 536 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)).
One commentator suggested, however, that not much "winnowing" occurred in Smith given that
defense counsel raised thirteen issues on appeal, while ignoring the one claim that later proved
successful and that another participant in the case thought to raise. See Friedman, supra note 69,
at 345. See also id. at 343-44 (arguing that if, as the Court indicated, the claim was not novel
and counsel acted properly in not raising it on appeal, the 'default' occurred only because the
state supreme court adhered to an evidently unconstitutional state precedent even after the matter
was brought to its attention," making the state rather than the prisoner or his attorney responsible
for the default).
The Court's commendation of the "winnowing" process becomes even more troubling
given its holding in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 745 (1983), that an attorney is not required
to present every nonfrivolous argument on appeal that the defendant wants to raise. Jones ex-
pressly declined to decide whether the attorney's refusal to raise an issue would automatically
satisfy the cause requirement, see id. at 754 n.7; if it does not, the combined effect of Smith and
Jones could deprive a prisoner of a constitutional claim even though she did her best to convince
her attorney to assert that claim. Cf. id. at 755 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)
(cause and prejudice requirement should be satisfied in such cases). See generally Note, Federal
Habeas Corpus Review of State Forfeitures Resulting from Assigned Counsel's Refusal to
Raise Issues on Appeal, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 850, 878-85 (1984).
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will underestimate the likelihood that a federal habeas court will repudiate an
established state rule. '73
2. The Relevant Policies
Like the qualified immunity doctrine, the rules governing procedural
defaults are based on policy considerations, rather than an interpretation of the
habeas statutes. 74 The Court has suggested that the cause and prejudice re-
quirement serves a number of policy goals: (1) showing respect for state pro-
cedural rules;75 (2) contributing to the finality of criminal convictions; 76 (3)
73. Smith, 477 U.S. at 536.
74. The Court's decisions in this area do not rely on statutory language or legislative
history, and in Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, the Court admitted that the cause and prejudice stan-
dard "may lack a perfect historical pedigree." See also Engle, 456 U.S. at 135 (noting that cause
and prejudice "are not rigid concepts," but "take their meaning from... principles of comity and
finality"). As a result, some have criticized the procedural default rules as inconsistent with
congressional intent. See, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 548-50 (1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("I fail to see how 'considerations of comity and federalism' - vague concepts
that are given no content by the Court - grant this Court the power to circumscribe the scope of
congressionally intended relief for state prisoners") (emphasis deleted); Foley, supra note 47, at
206-07; Friedman, supra note 69, at 290; Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective
Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1, 41-42(1978).
75. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 129; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88. But see id. at 111 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (pointing out that Fay did not invalidate any such rules, and that the state courts
"remain entirely free to enforce their own rules as they choose"); Fay, 372 U.S. at 432 ("the
only concrete impact' habeas has on the state's interest in enforcing its procedural rules is that "it
prevents the State from closing off the convicted defendant's last opportunity to vindicate his
constitutional rights"; "[s]urely this state interest in an airtight system of forfeitures is of a differ-
ent order from that... in the autonomy of state law within the proper sphere of its substantive
regulation").
76. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 126-27 & n.32; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88-89. See also, e.g.,
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV.L
REV. 441, 451-53 (1963) (arguing that finality is important to conserve "the intellectual, moral,
and political [as well as economic] resources involved in the legal system"; to achieve the deter-
rent, educational, and rehabilitative functions of the criminal justice system; and as "a psycholog-
ical necessity in a secure and active society"); Friedman, supra note 69, at 341-42 ("[a] skilled
attorney reviewing a transcript after any trial can undoubtedly identify unadjudicated constitu-
tional claims"); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CH. L. REV. 142, 149 (1970) (finality is important because of the "human desire that things
must sometime come to an end" and because it is "difficult to urge public respect for the judg-
ments of criminal courts in one breath and to countenance free reopening of them in the next').
But see Engle, 456 U.S. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (wondering why "society should be
eager to ensure the finality of a conviction arguably tainted by unreviewed constitutional error
directly affecting the truthfinding function of the trial'); Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 228 ("exalt[ing]
the value of finality in criminal judgments at the expense of the interest of each prisoner in the
vindication of his constitutional rights" is "contrary to the most basic precepts of our system of
post-conviction relief"); Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J.,
specially concurring) (although "there must be an end to criminal litigation," "[o]ur duty asjudges ... is to ensure that the ending is a constitutional one"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865(1983); Supreme Court Review, Habeas Corpus-Limiting the Availability of Habeas Corpus
After a Procedural Default, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1612, 1633 (1982) (concerns
about finality are overstated because so few prisoners file habeas petitions, and the vast majority
of them are unsuccessful) [hereinafter J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY Supreme Court Review];
Comment, "Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice": The Supreme Court's Version of the 'Truly
Needy" in Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371, 380 (1983)(pointing out that in many cases defendants' arguments were unsuccessful until habeas, and ar-
guing that "it is not merely the opportunity to be heard that is important; what is paramount is the
correct resolution of the federal constitutional right') [hereinafter SAN DIEGO Comment].
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discouraging defense counsel from "sandbagging" by eliminating the incentive
to hold some constitutional claims in reserve in order to increase the chances of
reversal and a second shot at acquittal should the jury convict; 77 (4) preserving
comity and federalism by minimizing "[f]ederal intrusions into state criminal
trials," which "seriously undermine the morale of our state judges";7 8 (5)
The finality concern is based in part on the theory that habeas undermines the rehabilita-
tive ideal because "[r]ehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant realize 'that he is justly
subject to sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation,"' Engle, 456 U.S. at 127 n.32
(quoting Bator, supra, at 452). But see Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 253 (1973)(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that prisoners are "more amenable to rehabilitation when they
know that all their claims of unfairness have been considered'); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PERSPECrIVES ON PRISON LEGAL SERVICES: NEEDS, IMPACT AND THE POTENTIAL
FOR LAW SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT, SUMMARY REPORT 14 (1972) (empirical evidence indicates
that habeas is itself rehabilitative by 'reducing inmate tensions caused by unresolved legal prob-
lems" and by "decreasing inmate hostility toward the institution"); Schaefer, Federalism and
State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (1956) (arguing that availability of habeas
remedy enhances rehabilitation because "prisoners whose energies are directed to getting out of
the prison by judicial process are not so likely to be concentrating on other methods of getting
out which may be less socially acceptable").
77. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 129 n.34; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89; Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973). See also Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 695 n.426 (sandbagging will
occur if defense counsel does not want to be bound by state court's determination of the facts or
if there is no advantage to litigating an issue prior to trial).
In Fay, by contrast, the Court thought that the deliberate bypass test, combined with the
loss of all state court remedies even for inadvertent defaults, was sufficient to deter sandbagging.
The Court therefore concluded that "no stricter rule is a realistic necessity": a prisoner "has an
obvious inducement to do his very best to keep his state remedies open, and not stake his all on
the outcome of a federal habeas proceeding which, in many respects, may be less advantageous
to him than a state court proceeding." Fay, 372 U.S. at 433. See also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 98
(White, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that Fay's deliberate bypass standard adequately
prevented sandbagging). The Court's fear of sandbagging thus seems unrealistic, given that
habeas review will still be available for constitutional claims that are raised in the state courts.
By contrast, choosing to postpone claims increases the likelihood of conviction, forfeits all state
appellate remedies, and also risks the loss of habeas unless defense counsel can convince the
federal court that no deliberate bypass occurred. See id. at 103 & n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In fact, the Court's argument "assumes a fantastically risk-prone pool of defendants and attor-
neys" because the success rate on habeas is lower than it is at trial or on appeal, and "the odds of
victory" must be "discountted] ... by the years of incarceration pending adjudication." Resnik,
Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 897 (1984). See also, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 338
n.8 (appointed attorneys rarely continue to represent prisoners on habeas, and therefore are un-
likely to reserve arguments for the federal courts); Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 694-96 & n.422
(criticizing the Court for citing no authority or evidence to support its assumption that
sandbagging occurs, and arguing that attorneys are unlikely to lie to habeas court in order to help
client); Tague, supra note 74, at 46 (most defaults result from "inattention," "ignorance of either
the applicable law or the facts," or "inability to appreciate the tactical value or constitutional
worth of an objection," rather than deliberate decision to sandbag). Moreover, the sandbagging
argument is based on the unrealistic presumption that defense attorneys have perfect knowledge
of the available constitutional claims and their relative chances of success in the state and federal
courts. See Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 695 n.423; Resnik, supra, at 897. Finally, even if
sandbagging regularly occurs, the forfeiture of habeas claims is not likely to be an effective
deterrent because it punishes the innocent prisoner rather than the attorney who made the tactical
decision to hold arguments in reserve. See Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 696-97.
78. Engle, 456 U.S. at 128 & n.33. See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534-35
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
344 (4th ed. 1983) ("[tlhere is an affront to state sensibilities when a single federal judge can
order discharge of a prisoner whose conviction has been affirmed by the highest court of a
state"); Bator, supra note 76, at 451 (there is "nothing more subversive of ajudge's sense of re-
sponsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult
and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots
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decreasing the burden that habeas petitions place on the federal courts;79 and (6)
ensuring that the trial in state court is "'the main event"' rather than a 'tryout
on the road' for what will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing.'O
will always be called by someone else"); Marcus, supra note 47, at 680-81 (habeas review of
defaulted claims is more intrusive on state courts because it involves de novo review, whereas a
plenary hearing in federal court often will be unnecessary if the prisoner received a full and fair
hearing on the issue in state court). But see Brown, 344 U.S. at 510 (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.) (habeas corpus "is not a case of a lower court sitting in judgment on a higher court"; rather,
"[ilt is merely one aspect of respecting the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution whereby fed-
eral law is higher than State law" -'"Congress has authorized the district courts to be the organ
of the higher law rather than a Court of Appeals or exclusively this Court"); L. YACKLE, supra
note 39, at 299-300 (habeas cases involving procedural defaults might create less federal-state
friction than other habeas cases because in default cases the federal courts are not passing judg-
ment on a substantive decision made by the state courts); id. at 150-51 (Supp. 1989) (threshold
procedural issues analyzed under Sykes may involve federal courts "in the very sort of abrasive
appraisal of state court proceedings that the Noia approach avoided'); Hoffman, Retroactivity
and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV.
183, 204 (state trial court judges are much more likely to be reversed on appeal than on habeas);
Resnik, supra note 77, at 1024 (habeas is unlikely to demoralize state judges because
"hierarchical arrangements ... are premised upon the belief that supervision and review enhance
the quality of both the work and the result"); SAN DIEGO Comment, supra note 76, at 379
(comity concerns are adequately served by the exhaustion doctrine; moreover, state courts that
do not protect constitutional rights have no "valid interest in preventing a federal court from
stepping in").
79. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 487-88; Reed, 468 U.S. at 26 n.3 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result)
("[h]e who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle
is not worth the search'); Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 1982). But see
Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641,
693 & n.212 (1987) (between 1975 and 1984, federal court filings by prisoners, including both
habeas petitions and civil rights suits, increased at about half the rate of total civil filings);
Resnik, supra note 77, at 939-47, 958 n.558, 1031-35 (percentage of prisoners filing habeas
petitions has decreased, while the number of federal judges has increased; because most habeas
petitions are dismissed at the prehearing stage, they constitute only a small part of the district
courts' workload); id. at 957-61 (creating additional procedural barriers to habeas relief has ex-
panded the list of issues that must be resolved for each habeas petition, thereby perhaps increas-
ing the amount of time federal judges must devote to habeas cases); Weisselberg, supra note 39,
at 160-68; CATH. U. Comment, supra note 50, at 217-18 & n.314; SAN DIEGO Comment, supra
note 76, at 394 (default rules give defense attorneys an incentive to object more frequently in
state court, so that prisoners might ultimately find more issues on which to base habeas peti-
tions). See generally Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59
(1983) ("it is crystal clear from the records of the [Constitutional] Convention, contemporaneous
writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency"); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) ("the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency"; in fact, the Bill of Rights was "designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy").
80. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90. The Sykes majority also reasoned that the Fay test
might discourage state courts from enforcing their own contemporaneous objection rules in order
to give themselves an opportunity to rule on defaulted constitutional claims before they reached
the federal courts, see id. at 89-90, and that the cause and prejudice standard provided an incen-
tive for making a record when the witnesses' memories were fresh before trial judges who could
observe the demeanor of those witnesses, rather than later, when memories had faded and retrial
might be difficult. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 127-28; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88; Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973). But see Engle, 456 U.S. at 147-48 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (if habeas relief is granted, "it is at least as reasonable to blame the State" for "the logistical
and temporal difficulties arising from retrial" because the state did not comply with constitutional
norms at the outset); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (in many
cases, a witness' prior testimony can be used at the second trial if the witness has become
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These may be worthy policy considerations, but (as is true in the quali-
fied immunity context) they must be balanced against the goals of remedying
and deterring constitutional errors. 81 In fact, the prisoner's interest in obtain-
ing a hearing on a defaulted constitutional claim is particularly strong because
otherwise no court will consider the claim on the merits. In other habeas cases,
by contrast, the prisoner at least obtained a ruling on the question in state
court.82
The Reed Court properly recognized the importance of accommodating
the relevant policies, concluding that procedural defaults of novel claims can be
excused without undermining the legitimate goals underlying the cause and
prejudice doctrine. As the Court explained, requiring defense counsel to raise
novel objections at trial would serve little purpose: "[a]lthough there is a remote
possibility that a given state court will be the first to discover a latent
constitutional issue and to order redress if the issue is properly raised, it is far
more likely that the court will fail to appreciate the claim and reject it out of
hand."83 Accordingly, permitting prisoners to present claims on habeas that
were novel at the time of trial will not exacerbate the intrusion caused by fed-
eral review of state court decisions - if the prisoner had raised the claim, the
state court would most likely have rejected it, and ultimately habeas review
would still be necessary. In fact, refusing to excuse defaults of novel claims
encourages defense counsel to raise all sorts of frivolous issues for fear that
otherwise they might be barred on habeas. As a result, attorneys have no in-
centive to engage in the process of "winnowing out weaker arguments" that the
Court has commended,84 but instead have reason to raise meritless claims that
increase the length of the trial and consume additional state court resources, and
therefore perhaps aggravate rather than alleviate federal-state tensions.85
Moreover, defense counsel's failure to make a truly novel challenge at trial is
likely to be inadvertent rather than a deliberate attempt to sandbag, and
considering those claims on habeas therefore does not detract from the
importance of the trial or encourage disrespect for contemporaneous objection
rules. Concerns about finality and the burden on the federal courts are
somewhat undermined, but that is true any time habeas review is granted;
giving these considerations paramount importance would lead to the wholesale
elimination of habeas jurisdiction. As the Court observed in Reed, therefore,
"finality, standing alone," cannot provide "a sufficient reason for federal courts
to compromise their protection of constitutional rights" in habeas cases.86
unavailable); Resnik, supra note 77, at 960 n.565, 957 (statistics indicate that most habeas peti-
tions are filed within two years after conviction and are disposed of in less than six months).
81. But cf. Friedman, supra note 69, at 269-70 (the Court attempts to balance two very
different things when it weighs prisoner's interest in raising constitutional claim against state's
interest in procedural rules, and its refusal to balance on case-by-case basis "increas[es] the diffi-
culties inherent in balancing dissimilar interests").
82. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Reed, 468 U.S. at 15.
84. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986); see supra text accompanying note
72.
85. See, e.g., Reed, 468 U.S. at 15-16; L YACKLE, supra note 39, at 187 (Supp.
1989). Cf. Engle, 456 U.S. at 131 (Court "might hesitate to adopt a rule that would require trial
counsel... to object to every aspect of the proceedings in the hope that some aspect might mask
a latent constitutional claim").
86. Reed, 468 U.S. at 15.
1991] 133
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
These same reasons that justify recognition of novelty as cause
demonstrate that Engle and Smith v. Murray wrongly suggested that futility87
can never satisfy the cause requirement. 88 Requiring counsel to raise claims
that settled law indicates are futile is not necessary to further the legitimate
policy concerns underlying Sykes. In Reed, for example, defense counsel failed
to present an argument that became valid only after a subsequent Supreme
Court opinion overturned "'a near-unanimous body of lower court
authority."' 89 The Court concluded that the default should not bar habeas relief
because no attorney could reasonably have been expected to "urge] a state court
to adopt the position that this Court... ultimately adopted."90 The prisoner
who fails to raise an objection in the face of overwhelming adverse precedent is
not flouting state procedural rules or attempting to detract from the importance
of the trial.91 Punishing her for failing to object contemporaneously does little
87. In theory, the novelty as cause argument differs from the futility argument in that
the latter involves a deliberate decision to ignore a known claim that defense counsel believes is
unlikely to succeed, whereas the former involves an unintentional failure to recognize an un-
known claim. See Note, Reed v. Ross: Does 'Wovelty" as Sykes "Cause" Signify New Hopefor Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Procedurally Defaulted Constitutional Claims?, 14 CAP.
U.L. REV. 269, 297 (1985) [hereinafter CAP. U. Note]. By describing futility cases as cases
involving a conscious decision to forego a constitutional claim, both Engle and Smith v. Murray
seemingly endorsed this distinction. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1986);
Engle, 456 U.S. at 130. In fact, Engle analogized futility cases to deliberate bypasses, see id. at
130 n.36, even though arguments thought to be futile are not omitted in order to gain a tactical
advantage.
In many situations, however, this theoretical distinction breaks down. Cases where
claims are not made because of a perception of futility are similar to cases where the legal argu-
ment was novel at the time of the default because often some subsequent change in the law
makes the claim seem less futile by the time of habeas. See L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 202
n.56.15 (Supp. 1989). Given that both types of cases may therefore involve changes in the law,
the only way to distinguish them is to ask the habeas court to determine whether defense counsel
thought about raising the issue but decided not to, or simply failed to perceive the claim.
Although the courts may be able to use inferential reasoning to make this determination if the
objection was either very familiar or completely unknown at the time of the default, the many
cases in the middle of the spectrum will require the courts to make the difficult findings con-
cering individual motives that the Court wished to avoid in Carrier, 477 U.S. at 487-88. See
supra note 68.
88. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1986); Engle, 456 U.S. at 130.
Relying on Engle's statement that "perceived futility alone cannot constitute cause," id. at 130
n.36, however, some commentators question whether the Court really has foreclosed the use of
futility to satisfy the cause requirement in all cases. See Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 651 n.182
(observing that Engle addressed only the issue of perceived futility, and not questions of actual
futility, where state courts are in fact bound by precedent from a higher court that rejected the
constitutional claim); Yackle, supra note 69, at 655-56 & n.219, 651 n.197 (pointing out that
Engle dealt only with deliberate decisions to withhold claims deemed futile and that the Court
held only that futility "alone" was insufficient to satisfy cause requirement; arguing that this
language must be read in light of the Court's earlier suggestion that futility can excuse a pro-
cedural default) (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 n.12 (1981)).
89. Reed, 468 U.S. at 17 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551
(1982)).
90. Id. The argument made in the text is supported by this language in Reed, but is not
required by the actual holding in that case. The jury instructions at issue in Reed had been used
for more than a century in North Carolina, but the constitutional challenge to the instructions was
not raised, much less rejected, in the state courts until years after Ross' trial. See id. at 18.
Apparently, therefore, the default did not occur because counsel consciously reasoned that a
challenge to the instructions was unlikely to succeed.
91. The failure to object should not be excused, of course, if defense counsel believes
that state law is adverse to her client but hopes that the federal courts will recognize the claim on
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to serve comity or federalism, to contribute to the early correction of error, or
to minimize the intrusion on the state courts: although the court might have
been persuaded to change its mind,92 more likely it would have summarily
rejected the argument. In fact, encouraging prisoners to repeatedly urge state
judges to rethink old precedents shows little respect for state courts and their
decisions, but instead encourages defense counsel to raise issues the state courts
consider settled, thereby wasting judicial time and resources and perhaps
exacerbating federal-state tensions.93 Again, any limitation on habeas review
contributes to finality and reduces federal judicial burdens, but these concerns
alone cannot support the otherwise unjustified narrowing of the concept of
cause.
The proper balance between protecting constitutional rights and promot-
ing comity and finality is thus achieved only if habeas courts excuse procedural
defaults when the reasonable defense attorney94 would not have been aware of
the claim subsequently raised on habeas, or would have had no reasonable basis
to believe that any court would accept the claim. If defendants and their
attorneys are required to predict the course of constitutional law with greater
accuracy, meritorious habeas claims will'be denied and constitutional violations
will go unremedied without contributing substantially to the policy interests
underlying the cause and prejudice test.
C. Comparing Qualified Immunity and Procedural Default
Although both public officials and defense attorneys should therefore be
presumed to be reasonably familiar with relevant constitutional standards, the
two groups should not necessarily be required to have the same level of legal
expertise. Rather, they should be asked only to exercise reasonable diligence
for one in their circumstances. In comparing what can reasonably be expected
in the two situations, the courts should focus on two factors: the actor's access
habeas. Futility satisfies the cause requirement only if the constitutional claim reasonably
appears futile under both state and federal law.
92. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 130.
93. See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 187 (Supp. 1989); Guttenberg, supra note
45, at 655-56.
94. Most procedural defaults occur during the trial or first appeal, when defendants
have a constitutional right to counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). If a default occurs while the defendant is exercis-
ing her sixth amendment right to represent herself at trial, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806 (1975), or is acting pro se during later stages of the criminal process when she has no con-
stitutional right to appointed counsel, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), some courts
refuse to require proof of cause and prejudice and instead apply Fay's deliberate bypass test.
See, e.g., 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 95 n.60, 98 (Supp. 1990); L.
YACKLE, supra note 39, at 150-51 n.10.15 (Supp. 1989). Cf. Reed, 468 U.S. at 11 n.7
(expressing no opinion on the applicability of the cause and prejudice standard in such cases).
Given that a defendant who chooses to proceed pro se cannot later claim that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46, perhaps the
defendant who represents herself and fails to comply with a contemporaneous objection rule
should be held to the same standards of cause and prejudice as the defendant who was
represented at trial. Thus, novelty would not excuse a pro se defendant's failure to object unless
the reasonable attorney would have been unaware of the claim. If, on the other hand, the
prisoner had no choice but to represent herself at the time of the default because she had no right




to legal information, and the consequences of punishing inaccurate predictions
of constitutional norms.
The accessibility of legal information varies depending on the status of
the public official claiming immunity. For example, a police officer is
probably less familiar with the relevant precedents than a criminal defense
attorney. But a state attorney general, with a staff of advisors and time to
evaluate the constitutionality of her decisions, can be expected to know more
about constitutional doctrine than a lower level government official who has
neither legal training nor ready access to legal advice.95 In fact, a defense
attorney may operate under greater time constraints in deciding whether to
voice objections than an attorney general does when deciding whether to
authorize conduct with constitutional implications. The defense attorney may
therefore have less time to digest the relevant constitutional principles. 96
95. Concerns that public officials "possess no unique competency in divining the law"
therefore do not serve to distinguish defense attorneys in procedural default cases from those
defendants in section 1983 cases who are attorneys or have access to legal advice. Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 331 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See also, e.g., Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 774-75 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1010 (1989); Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1987); Ward v. County of
San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986); Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 719 (1st
Cir. 1984), affd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159,
1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983); Kattan, supra note 34, at 979-81.
See generally Kinports, supra note 9, at 622-25.
For a general discussion of the circumstances that should be used in section 1983 cases
to evaluate whether a public official in similar circumstances would have been aware of the rele-
vant constitutional norms, see id. at 622-30.
96. In addition to the inherent constraints of trial practice, which often require defense
counsel to make instantaneous decisions about possible objections, the economic realities of
criminal litigation make it difficult for many attorneys to devote the time or resources necessary
to research legal issues that are not apparent at first glance. A number of defense attorneys man-
age very large caseloads or receive inadequate compensation and therefore cannot justify spend-
ing the time required to do a thorough job. As one commentator noted, "[r]esource constraints
on the public side and market incentives on the private side result in the divergence of attorneys'
and clients' interests at discrete and identifiable points." Resnik, supra note 77, at 1008. See
also N. LEFsTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 56-60 (1982); Benner,
Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on Defense Services, 12 AM. CRIM.
L REV. 667 (1975); Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 YALE LJ. 1035, 1080-83 (1977); J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY Supreme Court Review,
supra note 76, at 1636-37 & nn.167-70; Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of
Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 981,996-98 (1982).
Given the wide disparity in the quality of legal services available to different defendants,
the standard proposed in the text would ideally take into account circumstances like the extent of
the attorney's prior criminal trial experience and the amount of time and resources available to
her in determining whether a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances would have raised
the defaulted constitutional claim. Cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 652-53, 663
(1984) (refusing to presume ineffective assistance based on attorney's inexperience and lack of
time to prepare and investigate, but concluding that such factors are "relevant to an evaluation of
a lawyer's effectiveness in a particular case"). But a more generic reasonable attorney standard,
although less precise, is obviously much easier to apply. Even under a generic approach, how-
ever, the courts should not assume that all defendants receive the same thorough representation
as defendants like John Hinckley and John DeLorean. Using those cases as the benchmark
would limit habeas to "the highly educated, the intelligent, and the wealthy who can hire the
finest legal service" to ensure that all avenues of potential defense are explored. Jones v. Estelle,
722 F.2d 159, 173 (5th Cir. 1983) (Williams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976
(1984). Instead, the reasonable attorney standard must be more realistic, taking into account the
constraints under which many defense lawyers function. This standard will not be completely
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Comparing the consequences of punishing erroneous interpretations of
constitutional norms may suggest that the courts should extend qualified im-
munity in section 1983 cases more quickly than they excuse procedural defaults
in habeas cases. In the qualified immunity context, the government official who
makes the wrong choice is personally liable for any damages resulting from the
constitutional breach.97 Although the fear of damages may give her an
incentive to avoid violating the Constitution in close cases, it may also chill the
independent exercise of her discretion and inhibit the effective discharge of her
duties. By contrast, the defense attorney, anxious to avoid a mistake that will
forfeit her client's constitutional rights on habeas, may tend to object too
frequently and raise insubstantial claims. As a result, her attention may be
diverted from the main task at hand, and she may waste the court's time and
perhaps aggravate the judge.98 But these risks seem less detrimental to societal
interests than the impact of overdeterrence in the qualified immunity context.
On the other hand, a defense attorney's miscalculation may forfeit a
constitutional claim that would entitle her client to a new trial, and perhaps
even to an acquittal or a prison term instead of the death penalty. Awarding
money damages against the public official seems less drastic in comparison,
especially if, as is often true, the governmental entity reimburses its employees
for damages assessed in section 1983 suits.99 Moreover, in the qualified im-
munity context, the government official is responsible only for her own mis-
taken interpretations of constitutional requirements. 100 In habeas cases, the
innocent client pays for the mistakes of her attorney - in many cases, an
attorney she did not even select.101 The equities may therefore justify readier
accurate when a defendant receives exceptionally able representation, but absolute precision is
not as important here as it is in the qualified immunity context, where failing to consider the cir-
cumstances confronting the defendant in determining whether she should have known of the rel-
evant constitutional principles will either unfairly subject some public officials to liability or
improperly deny damages to some aggrieved plaintiffs. See Kinports, supra note 9, at 618-22.
97. Public officials will not ultimately have to pay, however, if their employer indem-
nifies them for section 1983 damage awards. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
98. See Honeycutt v. Mahoney, 698 F.2d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 1983) (Mumaghan, J.,
dissenting) ("[i]mpatience or undisguised incredulity on the part of the judge all too easily may
be translated in the minds of the jury into a suggestion of insubstantiality of defense and of
grasping at straws"); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1071 n.25 (4th Cir.) (Mumaghan, J.,
dis enting) ( It]here are judges who could be affected subconsciously, if not consciously, by
what they regard as attempts to get them to depart from clearly established law," so that objecting
might be "worse than futile" because the trial judge might conclude that "if the defendant had to
assert such a far-out or apparently preposterous claim, his other contentions were of less merit
than they might otherwise appear to be"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
99. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 79, at 686 & n.186; Gildin, supra note
32, at 561 n.20; Jeffries, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance
of Fault, 88 MICH. L REV. 82, 88 n.31 (1989); Rudovsky, supra note 31, at 76 n.288. See
generally P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 85-
88 (1983).
100. See, e.g., S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIEs LITIGATION: THE
LAW OF SECTION 1983, at 170-75 (2d ed. 1986) (supervisor may not be held liable for consti-
tutional wrongs of her subordinates without some personal involvement on her part).
101. A large percentage of criminal defendants charged with felonies are indigent, and
are therefore entitled to appointed counsel at trial. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUsTICE 75 (2d ed. 1988) (more
than 40% of felony defendants are indigent); Benner, supra note 96, at 668 (putting the figure at
65%, for a total of four million a year). These defendants have no right to choose their own
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forgiveness of erroneous constitutional interpretations in procedural default
cases than in section 1983 suits.
Nevertheless, the Court seems to have made the choice to hold defense
counsel to the stricter standard. By rejecting Fay's deliberate bypass test and
changing the focus in procedural default cases from the defendant's personal
choices to the attorney's decisions, Sykes permitted the courts to bind criminal
defendants to their attorneys' actions.102 In theory, the stricter standard may be
warranted, given the Court's repeated warning that the cause and prejudice test
should not be applied if it would lead to a miscarriage of justice. 10 3 If the
miscarriage of justice exception is interpreted to permit habeas review of
defaulted claims that might have affected the verdict or sentence, it could
alleviate some of the inequity that results from binding defendants by the
counsel, see 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 34, or even to have "a meaningful
relationship" with their attorneys, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983).
102. Compare Fay, 372 U.S. at 439 ("[a] choice made by counsel not participated in by
the petitioner does not automatically bar relief"), with Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91 n.14 (referring to
"the burden on a defendant to be bound by the trial judgments of his lawyer"). See also Carrier,
477 U.S. at 485; Reed, 468 U.S. at 13.
The Court has articulated two justifications for binding criminal defendants to their attor-
neys' choices: that the deliberate bypass standard was not designed to apply to errors committed
during trial because in that context "decisions must, as a practical matter, be made without con-
sulting the client," Sykes, 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, CJ., concurring), and that any other
approach would "undermine the entire representational system," Fay, 372 U.S. at 471 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
Both rationales have been criticized. First, although interrupting a trial to allow the
defendant to consult with her attorney about every evidentiary objection would obviously be dis-
rnptive, giving defense counsel free rein in making trial decisions does not necessarily mean that
the defendant should inevitably be penalized for erroneous decisions. See Goodman & Sallett,
supra note 47, at 1710 (noting that in civil cases, damage awards for malpractice can compensate
for attorney negligence, whereas in criminal cases, a malpractice action cannot remedy unjust
imprisonment). Second, the representational system cannot accurately be analogized to a
principal-agent relationship because defendants do not have the expertise necessary to assume
the role of principal in supervising their attorney-agents. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial
Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 NW.
U.L. REV. 289, 297 (1964). See also Resnick, supra note 77, at 895-98 (Sykes is based on
unrealistic assumption that defendants exercise control over their attorneys). Moreover, to the
extent that the representational system is flawed due to the economic realities of criminal litiga-
tion, see supra note 96, the agency rationale breaks down either because the attorney may not
have the same interests as her client, see Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 707-08; Seidman, Factual
Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 467-68 (1980); see also Marcus, supra note 47, at 685 n.141(procedural default should not bar habeas when defendant objects to attorney's decision); supra
note 72, or because the attorney may not do an adequate job in representing the client, see
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 118 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (if defendants are to be bound by counsel's
decisions, the courts "will have to reconsider whether they can continue to indulge the comfort-
able fiction that all lawyers are skilled or even competent"); Comment, The Burger Court and
Federal Review for State Habeas Petitioners After Engle v. Isaac, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 605,
624 (1983) ("[a] habeas standard that gives paramount importance to attorney competence cre-
ates an anomalous result given that Chief Justice Burger criticizes one-third to one-half of all trial
attorneys as being improperly qualified") (citing Burger not all that wrong?, 64 A.B.A. J. 832
(1978)).
103. In Carrier, for example, the Court expressed "confiden[ce] that, for the most part,
'victim of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard '; in
the "extraordinary case" where that is not true, "where a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent," the Court continued, the courts may
grant habeas relief even without a showing of cause. 477 U.S. at 495-96 (quoting Engle, 465
U.S. at 135). See also Harris, 489 U.S. at 262; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
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decisions of their attorneys.10 4 Unfortunately, however, in practice the Court
does not seem committed to strict enforcement of the exception.105
104. Relying on the miscarriage of justice exception, however, is likely to lead to more
ad hoc decisionmaking and therefore more inconsistent results than simply recognizing that de-
fendants should not be penalized for their attorneys' mistakes.
105. For example, the Court refused to find a potential miscarriage of justice in Dugger
v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989), even though the trial judge's improper comments might have
undermined the accuracy of the capital sentencing decision and the judge had found an equal
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court explained that "[diemonstrating
that an error is by its nature the kind of error that might have affected the accuracy of a death
sentence is far from demonstrating that an individual defendant probably is 'actually innocent' of
the sentence he or she received." Id. at 411 n.6. Similarly, in a separate opinion in Harris, 489
U.S. at 271 (O'Connor, J., concurring), three Justices characterized the exception as a"narrow"
one, requiring "a strong showing of probable factual innocence." See also Smith v. Murray,
477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986) (no miscarriage of justice involved in admission during capital
sentencing hearing of testimony of court-appointed psychiatrist obtained in violation of fifth
amendment); Engle, 456 U.S. at 129 (applying cause and prejudice requirements even in cases
where constitutional claims implicated accuracy of verdict).
By suggesting that a miscarriage ofjustice has not occurred despite a substantial possi-
bility that the constitutional error affected the jury's verdict, and thus limiting the exception to
prisoners who are probably innocent, the Court is apparently endorsing an approach associated
with Judge Friendly, who advocated restricting habeas relief to those who could make "a col-
orable showing of innocence." Friendly, supra note 76, at 150. See also Jeffries & Stuntz,
Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CH. L. REV.
679 (1990). But even Judge Friendly's standard seems less extreme, requiring only "a fair
probability that, in light of all the evidence, ... the trier of the facts would have entertained a
reasonable doubt." Friendly, supra note 76, at 160.
The emphasis on factual innocence leads to an exceedingly narrow view of the scope of
habeas that is inconsistent with the Court's prior opinions. See, e.g., Kimmeliman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1986) (allowing habeas petitioner to raise ineffective assistance claim
based on counsel's failure to object to illegally seized evidence, even though that evidence is
often a reliable indicator of guilt); Rose v. Mitchell 443 U.S. 545, 560-61 (1979) (permitting
prisoners to challenge selection of nonvoting foreperson of grand jury even though claim was
not guilt-related); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (barring fourth amendment claim
on habeas only if the prisoner received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state
court). More important, this emphasis on factual innocence conflicts with habeas' traditional
role in remedying all fundamentally unconstitutional incarcerations. See L. YACKLE, supra note
39, at 395-98 (also noting that Congress has repeatedly rejected attempts to limit habeas to
claims related to guilt); Hoffman, supra note 78, at 213-14. Additionally, the emphasis on fac-
tual innocence contradicts the established notion that habeas is not supposed to serve as an
appeal, see, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-06 (1989), and therefore is more con-
cerned with reviewing the procedures used at trial than with determining the defendant's guilt or
innocence, a function that can be left to the state courts. See L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 353-
54; Friedman, supra note 69, at 320. Finally, the focus on actual innocence fails to recognize
that even the guilty have a constitutional right to a fair trial, see, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527, 544-45 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 524 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); L YACKLE, supra note 39, at 396, and creates a hierarchy of constitutional
rights that finds no support in either the Constitution or the habeas statutes, see id. at 409-10;
Friedman, supra note 69, at 320. See generally Peller, In Defense of Habeas Corpus
Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 579 (1982).
Accordingly, the miscarriage of justice exception should apply whenever the defaulted
claim substantially affected the accuracy of the trial or sentencing process. See Foley, supra note
47, at 211. But cf. L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 398-99 (arguing that it is difficult to determine
whether some claims - such as the right to speedy trial and prohibition of double jeopardy -
are guilt-related).
For examples of the limited circumstances in which the courts of appeals have found a
potential miscarriage of justice, see Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 231 (6th Cir.
1989) (suggesting that the cause requirement may not apply to defaulted claim based on a new
Supreme Court opinion that had repudiated the intangible rights theory used to convict the de-
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Even assuming that it is appropriate to overlook constitutional errors in
some section 1983 cases when they would not be forgiven in procedural default
cases, the federal courts tend to interpret the qualified immunity standard much
more leniently and the cause standard much more strictly than necessary to
properly accommodate the competing interests. They grant qualified immunity
in circumstances when the reasonable public official should have recognized the
constitutional implications of her decisions, and they deny habeas review when
the reasonable defense counsel could not reasonably have been aware of a novel
constitutional claim. The following two sections examine the case law in these
areas.
IX. DEFINING "CLEARLY ESTABLISHED" RIGHTS IN
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CASES
Four issues arise in defining clearly established constitutional rights for
purposes of ruling on a public official's request for qualified immunity. First,
what courts - at what level, from what jurisdictions, and in what number -
must speak in order to establish a constitutional right? What significance
should be attached to divided opinions, dicta, and conflicts among the courts?
Second, must some period of time elapse before the relevant precedents clearly
establish a right? Third, how similar must the plaintiff's case be to the prior
case law that articulated the applicable constitutional norms? And finally, are
the defendant's violations of other legal standards relevant in evaluating her
entitlement to qualified immunity? As will become obvious, the courts of
appeals take different approaches in answering most of these questions. In
doing so, some make qualified immunity an almost impossible hurdle for a
section 1983 plaintiff to overcome, refusing to consider the law settled unless
courts in the defendant's own jurisdiction have issued a number of decisions
directly on point.
A. Number, Weight, and Consistency of Precedents
Harlow expressly declined to decide whether lower court case law can
clearly establish a constitutional right.106 The Court did, however, cite its
earlier opinion in Procunier v. Navarette, which concluded that the right al-
legedly infringed by the defendants in that case was not clearly established
whether the Court looked to precedents from the Supreme Court, the courts of
appeals, or the local district court.107 Moreover, in ruling that the defendants
in Davis v. Scherer and Mitchell v. Forsyth had not violated clearly established
rights, the Court observed that decisions from, respectively, the local court of
appeals and two district courts in other jurisdictions had sanctioned similar
conduct. 108
Nevertheless, some courts of appeals suggest that Supreme Court
precedent may be necessary to clearly establish a constitutional right. These
courts have granted qualified immunity either on the ground that the Supreme
fendants of mail fraud), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990); United States v. Shelton, 848
F.2d 1485, 1490 n.4 (10th Cir. 1988) (same).
106. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32.
107. 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978); see Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 & n.32.
108. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 533; Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 (1984).
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Court issued the controlling decision after the violation occurred,109 or that the
Supreme Court left the issue open in an earlier opinion." 0 In Affiliated Capital
Corp. v. City of Houston, for example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
relevant law was not established prior to a dispositive Supreme Court decision,
even though a plurality of the Supreme Court and several other federal courts,
including the Fifth Circuit itself, had issued opinions favorable to the plaintiff
by the time the defendant acted. 1 1 Likewise, in Schlothauer v. Robinson, the
Eighth Circuit granted qualified immunity in the face of its own precedent
prohibiting the defendants' conduct because the Supreme Court did not resolve
the issue until the following year and had expressly refused to rule on the
question on previous occasions.112
Requiring Supreme Court precedent to clearly establish a constitutional
principle is unnecessarily restrictive. Supreme Court opinions are much less
frequent than lower court decisions,1 3 and holding out for a Supreme Court
ruling may therefore be as productive as waiting for Godot. In fact, if the
lower courts reach a consensus on a particular issue, the Supreme Court has no
particular reason to grant review to clarify something that should already be
clear to everyone - including government officials. 114 Therefore, other
courts of appeals have been satisfied that Supreme Court cases are not required
to clearly establish a constitutional right. These courts have denied immunity
even though the Supreme Court previously refused to resolve the question or
did not rule on the issue until after the defendant acted." 5
In some cases, however, these courts suggest that precedent from the
court of appeals in the defendant's own jurisdiction is required, refusing to find
a right clearly established by decisions from other courts of appeals or even the
local district or state courts." 6 In Knight v. Mills, for example, the First
109. See, e.g., Howe v. Baker, 796 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1986); Johnson by
Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1211 (7th Cir. 1983); Trejo v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482, 484
(5th Cir. 1982). Cf. Gargiul v. Tompkins, 790 F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) (granting immu-
nity because the Supreme Court had never ruled on the issue).
110. See, e.g., Knight v. Mills, 836 F.2d 659, 667 (1st Cir. 1987); Borucki v. Ryan,
827 F.2d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1987); Daniel v. Taylor, 808 F.2d 1401, 1403 (11th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam); Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1342 (7th Cir. 1985).
111. 735 F.2d 1555, 1569-70 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053
(1986).
112. 757 F.2d 196, 197 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
113. The Court allots time for only about 160 oral arguments each year. See R. STERN,
E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 5.
114. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2835 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ig); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 115 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. Mitchell, 472
U.S. at 534 (suggesting that Supreme Court grants certiorari when it finds a question
"sufficiently doubtful"); R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 199 n.30(at times, the Court denies certiorari even when the relevant cases conflict, hoping that a consen-
sus or "a satisfactory majority view among the lower courts" will emerge).
115. See, e.g., Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 830 (1st Cir.
1987); Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 657-58 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 959 (1988); LeClair v. Hart, 800 F.2d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 1986); Patzner v. Burkett, 779
F.2d 1363, 1370 (8th Cir. 1985); Joseph v. Brierton, 739 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1984);
Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1984). See also Kattan, supra note 34, at
984.
116. See, e.g., Davis v. Holly, 835 F.2d 1175, 1180, 1182 (6th Cir. 1987); Hawkins
v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1987) ("district court decision does not 'clearly
establish' the law even of its own circuit, much less that of other circuits"); Garcia by Garcia v.
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Circuit dismissed certain cases cited by the plaintiff because, even if indistin-
guishable on their facts, they originated from other jurisdictions. Such cases,
the court said, cannot clearly establish rights "binding on this Court."11 7
Likewise, in granting the defendant qualified immunity in Gagne v. City of
Galveston, the Fifth Circuit observed that "the possible existence and scope" of
the right asserted by the plaintiff "has only very recently begun to attract
attention in this circuit."118
Although the reasonable public official may not be aware of every dis-
trict court opinion issued in distant jurisdictions, 19 in some circumstances it is
reasonable to expect her to respect a constitutional right recognized in nu-
merous other jurisdictions or in the federal district court or state court in her
own jurisdiction. Public officials should not be absolved of liability when they
choose to ignore those decisions and wait for the local court of appeals to rule
on the issue, unless they reasonably believe that that court is likely to disagree
with the other courts and sustain the constitutionality of their conduct. A num-
ber of courts agree, relying on opinions from other courts of appeals 120 and
Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Howe v.
Baker, 796 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1986); Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301, 1302(7th Cir. 1986); Hall v. Medical College of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299,309 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1113 (1985); Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 963, 967, 969 & n.7 (4th Cir.
1984). Cf. Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1112-13 (9th Cir.
1988) (court admits that absence of Ninth Circuit precedent might not lead it to grant immunity in
other types of cases, but concludes that it must do so here, where there was no "indication of
what analysis this circuit would employ"; court thus grants immunity despite six federal cases
supporting plaintiff and none to the contrary), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); Ohio Civil
Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988) (cases from other courts
may establish rights, but only in "extraordinary" cases where they "point unmistakably to the un-
constitutionality of the conduct complained of and [are] so clearly foreshadowed by applicable
direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct...
would be found wanting"); Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 352 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring
case law from Supreme Court, local court of appeals, or local state supreme court); Savidge v.
Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 908 & n.48 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing D.C. Circuit opinion, but noting
that it is not binding precedent); Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 941 n.5 (11th
Cir. 1987) (noting that prior state court decision striking down identical statute was "an appar-
ently unpublished decision of a trial court in a state judicial circuit that did not encompass
Clearwater," where the arrest had occurred); Daniel v. Taylor, 808 F.2d 1401, 1404 (11th Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (citing Fourth Circuit case, but noting that it is not binding precedent);
Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 134 (3d Cir. 1986) (refusing to look to law of other cir-
cuits in the absence of Supreme Court precedent or a consensus among the courts of appeals);
Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 575 n2 (1st Cir. 1985) (Aldrich, J., dissenting) (referring
to case relied on by majority as "a mere district court case from another circuitf'.
117. 836 F.2d 659, 668 (1st Cir. 1987). See also id. at 667.
118. 805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021(1987).
119. See Raffone v. Robinson, 607 F.2d 1058, 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting plain-
tiff's reliance on district court opinion from another jurisdiction because "one district court does
not alone clearly establish a right"; defendants cannot "fairly be required, upon pain of money
damages, to stay abreast of district court caselaw from across the country").
120. See, e.g., Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, N.A., 830 F.2d
1487, 1492-93 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1001 (1988); Borucki v. Ryan, 827
F.2d 836, 845-48 (lst Cir. 1987); Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 830
G(st Cir. 1987); Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1039 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing cases from otherjurisdictions in finding right clearly established), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1001 (1987); Weber
v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987); Bonitz v.
Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 171 & n.8 (1st Cir. 1986); LeClair v. Hart, 800 F.2d 692, 695 (7th Cir.
1986); Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986) (in absence of
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from the local district courts12' and state courts122 in evaluating the defendant's
entitlement to immunity.
In addition to ignoring cases from outside the defendant's jurisdiction,
some courts of appeals have granted immunity despite case law favoring the
plaintiff because the number of cases was insufficient,123 or because the
language supporting the plaintiff's claim appeared in dictum. 24 The Seventh
binding precedent, courts should look to all available cases, including those from other circuits,
to determine whether right was clearly established), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987);
Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1216, 1217 (1st Cir. 1986); Davis v. -Mansfield Metro.
Hous. Auth., 751 F.2d 180, 187 (6th Cir. 1984); Bilbrey by Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462,
1466 (9th Cir. 1984) (denying qualified immunity despite absence of Supreme Court or Ninth
Circuit precedent because cases from other courts settled the law); Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d
970,973 (4th Cir. 1984).
121. See, e.g., Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 171 (1st Cir. 1986); Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 1986); Culbreath v. Block, 799 F.2d 1248, 1250 (8th
Cir. 1986); Adams v. Brierton, 752 F.2d 546, 547-48 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1010 (1985); Davis v. Mansfield Metro. Hous. Auth., 751 F.2d 180, 187 (6th Cir.
1984); Harris v. Young, 718 F.2d 620,623 (4th Cir. 1983). For examples of cases considering
district court opinions from other jurisdictions, see Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 846 (1st
Cir. 1987); Culbreath v. Block, 799 F.2d at 1250; Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d
1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987); Blackburn v. Snow, 771
F.2d 556, 570 (1st Cir. 1985); Davis v. Mansfield Metro. Hous. Auth., 751 F.2d at 186;
Bilbrey by Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1984); Crowder v. Lash, 687
F.2d 996, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1982).
122. See, e.g., Horwitz v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners of State of Colo., 822 F.2d
1508, 1517-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d
1363, 1370 (8th Cir. 1985); Bilbrey by Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir.
1984). For examples of cases considering state court opinions from other jurisdictions, see
Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1020 (1987); Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1984). But cf. Hershey v. City
of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 941 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987) (granting qualified immunity despite
local state court decisions recognizing constitutional right because the state supreme court had
not ruled on the issue and courts in other states had reached the contrary conclusion); Williams
v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 1986) (questioning whether one local state trial court
decision can clearly establish federal constitutional rights).
123. See, e.g., Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1113 (9th
Cir. 1988) (referring to three federal court of appeals decisions and three federal district court
decisions as only a "few cases"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); Ohio Civil Serv.
Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988) ("a mere handful of decisions
of other circuit and district courts, which are admittedly novel"); Davis v. Holly, 835 F.2d 1175,
1181-82 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[a] single idiosyncratic" court of appeals decision from another cir-
cuit); Thome v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1277 (5th Cir. 1985) (one district court opinion from
another jurisdiction), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Raffone v. Robinson, 607 F.2d
1058, 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) (one district court opinion from another jurisdiction). See also
Kattan, supra note 34, at 984 ("paucity of decisions on an issue would suggest that the issue
was not so settled as to preclude state officials from acting because of it'). Cf. Affiliated Capital
Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1569 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (cases supporting
plaintiff "were breaking new ground and were not clearly established!), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1053 (1986).
124. See, e.g., Cox v. Cook, 420 U.S. 734, 737 n.3 (1975) (per curiam) (dismissing
opinion from another circuit as dictum); Craft v. Wipf, 836 F.2d 412, 416-17 (8th Cir. 1987)
(dismissing South Dakota Supreme Court decision because although one portion of the opinion
suggested plaintiffs had a protected property interest, another part declined to address the due
process claims on ripeness grounds); Hall v. Medical College of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299,
309 (6th Cir. 1984) (dismissing opinions from Sixth Circuit and district court in another
jurisdiction as dictum), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1113 (1985).
Some courts have also immunized a public official in the face of case law supporting the
plaintiff because the relevant decisions were on appeal, see, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d
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Circuit has adopted the most extreme position on this front, requiring "caselaw
which clearly and consistently recognized the constitutional right."'125 The
court may be right that "[a] reasonable government official cannot necessarily
be expected to recognize the significance of a few scattered cases from disparate
areas of the law for a right that is just evolving."' 26 Nevertheless, it went too
far when it suggested that a single Seventh Circuit opinion cannot clearly
establish a constitutional right - even when there are no contrary rulings from
other courts. 127
Other courts of appeals have granted qualified immunity despite prece-
dent supporting the plaintiff because divided courts, 28 or a plurality of the
Supreme Court,129 issued the relevant decisions. If the judges hearing the prior
cases could not agree, these courts have explained, the right at issue could not
be considered clearly established.130 The Fourth Circuit succinctly rejected this
319, 322 (2d Cir. 1986), or were unpublished opinions, see, e.g., Hershey v. City of
Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 941 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987); Ward v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 1098, 1112(4th Cir. 1982) (en banc). But cf. Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 808 F.2d 1435, 1442 (11th Cir.)(even assuming that "private defendants cannot reasonably be held accountable for unpublished
opiniono," it indicates that they should have realized that their conduct was unconstitutional
based on Supreme Court decisions relied on in the opinion), vacated on other grounds on reh'g,
822 F.2d 998 (11th Cir. 1987), affd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1988) (en
bane), vacated, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989).
125. Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 730 n.15 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Lojuk v.
Johnson, 770 F.2d 619, 628, 631 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Coleman and granting qualified im-
munity because plaintiff could cite only one district court opinion and one court of appeals deci-
sion from other jurisdictions, and several other "distantly related" cases), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1067 (1986).
126. Lojuk, 770 F.2d at 628.
127. See Danenberger v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1987) (alternative
holding).
128. See, e.g., Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 941 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987);
People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1984)(noting that four judges on D.C. Circuit voted to grant rehearing en bane in case relied on by
plaintiff because they found the panel's decision a "'startling proposition") (quoting Sholly v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 651 F.2d 792, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (statement of
Tatum, J., on denial of rehearing en banc), vacated, 459 U.S. 1194 (1983)); Hall v. Medical
College of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that relevant Supreme
Court opinion was issued by divided Court), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1113 (1985); Harris v.
Young, 718 F.2d 620, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1983); Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172, 178 (5th Cir.
1975). Cf. Horwitz v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners of State of Colo., 822 F.2d 1508, 1518
(10th Cir.) (noting that relevant state supreme court decision finding no constitutional violation
was unanimous), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987).
129. See, e.g., Danenberger v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 1987); Affiliated
Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1569 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1053 (1986); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1092-93 (4th Cir.) (Hall, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 948 (1984).
130. See, e.g., Harris v. Young, 718 F.2d 620, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1983). C. Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 329 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("One need only look to the decisions of this Court - to our reversals, our recognition of
evolving concepts, and our five-to-four splits - to recognize the hazard of even informed
prophecy as to what are 'unquestioned constitutional rights."'); Koch v. City of Hutchinson,
814 F.2d 1489, 1496 (10th Cir. 1987) (district court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in favor of municipal defendant and "the close call" presented by plaintiff's first amend-
ment claim "indicate the murky nature of this claim's viability" and thus support qualified im-
munity), affd, 847 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988);
Chapman v. Pickett, 801 F.2d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing
that law could not have been clearly established when defendants acted because his dissent in
this case and distrct court opinion in defendants' favor indicate that "judges still disagree about
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line of reasoning in Arebaugh v. Dalton: "It is hard not to look askance at the
contention [that because] the Supreme Court vote on the point... [was] 'only'
6-3, there was some justification for a failure to comply with fully established
constitutional law as authoritatively laid down by our highest judicial
authority."131
Most courts of appeals conclude that a constitutional right is not clearly
established if the relevant cases in the defendant's own jurisdiction 132 or in
other jurisdictions 33 are conflicting. Although the law may not be settled when
the plaintiff and defendant can cite a roughly equal number of precedents
supporting their respective positions, public officials should be subjected to
the constitutional standards"), vacated, 484 U.S. 807 (1987); Gargiul v. Tompkins, 790 F.2d
265, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that district court's ruling against plaintiff in this case indicates
law was not clearly established); McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 100 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam) (concluding that constitutional right could not have been clearly established in 1967
because in 1976 half of the ten members of the court of appeals thought the defendants' conduct
was lawful), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985); Albers v. Whitley, 743 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Wright, J., dissenting) (arguing that disagreement among the panel in this case indi-
cated that constitutional right was not clearly established), rev d on other grounds, 475 U.S. 312(1986); Ward v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 1098, 1112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (granting qualified
immunity because a prior Fourth Circuit case upholding similar conduct indicated that judges
who decided that case did not think the constitutional right was clearly established).
131. 730 F.2d 970, 972 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984). See also LeClair v. Hart, 800 F.2d 692,
694 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986) (referring to defendants' observation that controlling Supreme Court
case was decided on divided vote as "a curious argument," and noting that "[tihe obvious re-
sponse is that six members of the Court took the position that the recordings were seizures");
Arebaugh, 730 F.2d at 972 n.2 ('we do not condone a suggestion that a judgment of a split
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals three judge panel may be disregarded").
132. See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 486 U.S. 183, 203-05 (1984) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that majority found the relevant due process principles
unclear based on precedent from defendant's circuit so holding, despite prior opinion from same
circuit specifying the due process protections required); Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 309
(7th Cir. 1987); Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1342-43 (7th Cir.
1985); O'Hagan v. Soto, 725 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Ward v. Johnson,
690 F.2d 1098, 1112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
133. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 563 (1978); Borucki v. Ryan,
827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir. 1987); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1139 (9th
Cir. 1986); Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir. 1986); Benson v. Allphin, 786
F.2d 268, 275 n.16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986); Snyder v. Kurvers, 767
F.2d 489, 497 (8th Cir. 1985); People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs,
747 F.2d 139, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1984); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d
1555, 1569 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986); Crowder v. Lash,
687 F.2d 996, 1003-04 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Kattan, supra note 34, at 984; The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 224 (1975) ("prior to an authoritative Supreme Court
decision on an issue, disagreements among courts ... about the applicable law should be suffi-
cient to bar liability") [hereinafter The Supreme Court, 1974 Term]. Cf. Hershey v. City of
Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 940-41 n.5 (1lth Cir. 1987) (immunizing defendants because cases
from local state courts supporting plaintiff conflicted with cases from other jurisdictions);
Culbreath v. Block, 799 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (8th Cir. 1986) (granting immunity where local
precedent favoring defendant conflicted with ruling in another jurisdiction). But see Garcia by
Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987) (conflict between Fourth and Fifth Circuits
is relevant, but not controlling, because "[t]o give preclusive effect to a conflict among the cir-
cuits would effectively bind this circuit by the decisions of others"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959(1988); Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1986) ("the pronounce-
ment of one state court on a constitutional issue does not necessarily shield a government offi-
cial" when other federal decisions have found similar conduct unconstitutional), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1020 (1987). But cf. Arebaugh v. Dalton, 730 F.2d 970, 973 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1984)
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liability when they refuse to comply with constitutional norms adopted by a
majority of the federal courts or by the courts in their own jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, a few courts have granted immunity even under those circum-
stances.134 Extending qualified immunity to every case where the defendant can
point to a conflict in the cases improperly protects public officials who de-
liberately ignore constitutional principles until they receive express judicial
orders to the contrary, so long as they can point to some case law supporting
their actions.135
Some courts go even further, immunizing defendants on the theory that
disagreement between the parties or their attorneys indicates that the right is
not clearly established. 136 In Ross v. Reed, for example, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the dispute between the plaintiff's attorney, on one side, and the
defendants' attorney and the state attorney general, on the other, over the le-
gality of the defendants' treatment of the plaintiff "indicate[s] that, at the least,
from the layman's perspective with which we are concerned, the constitutional
rights claimed here were not 'clearly established' at the critical time."'137 The
obvious response is that the self-interested views of litigants and their attorneys
should not dictate a court's legal conclusion about the settled state of the
(denying immunity despite conflict among circuits because Supreme Court opinion issued 12
days earlier had resolved the conflict).
134. See, e.g., Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1112-13(9th Cir. 1988) (granting immunity despite admitting that case law favored plaintiff; six federal
decisions supported plaintiff with none to the contrary), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989);
Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1987) (granting immunity despite acknowledging
that majority view favored plaintiff); Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (9th Cir.
1985) (same); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1569-70 (5th Cir.
1984) (en banc) (granting immunity even though one of the six cases supporting plaintiff was
Fifth Circuit opinion and another was Supreme Court plurality opinion, and the only decision
favoring the defendants was a case from another jurisdiction that had been contradicted by a later
ruling from that court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986); Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 609 (3d Cir. 1975) (en banc) (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting)(advocating immunity despite two Third Circuit opinions recognizing constitutional right because
other courts conflicted). Cf. Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 275 n.16 (7th Cir.) (concluding
that rights can never be clearly established ff circuits conflict until the Supreme Court resolves
the issue), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
135. See Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 959 (1988).
136. See, e.g., Tubbesing v. Arnold, 742 F.2d 401, 406 (8th Cir. 1984) (dispute
between parties as to whether personnel policy manual creating property interest in employment
applied to plaintiff's job suggested that law was not clearly established). Cf. Hartley v. Fine,
780 F.2d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1985) (disagreement between state personnel advisory board and
trial court as to whether plaintiff's job was nonpolicymaking position subject to protection from
politically motivated dismissals supported grant of qualified immunity); Okeson v. Tolley School
Dist. No. 25, 766 F.2d 378, 379-80 (8th Cir. 1985) (McMillian, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority for basing immunity on defendants' reliance on attorney's advice that contradicted
Eighth Circuit precedent supporting plaintiff); Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 981,
982 (9th Cir. 1985) (given that reasonable attorneys could disagree whether defendants had
probable cause to arrest, immunity is appropriate because "[w]e... should not expect[defendants] to have determined independently whether probable cause existed"), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1010 (1986); Green v. White, 693 F.2d 45, 48 (8th Cir. 1982) (granting qualified
immunity despite Eighth Circuit precedent supporting plaintiff because defendant relied on con-
trary prison regulations), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1111 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term,
supra note 133, at 224 (suggesting that disagreement among commentators may suffice to justify
qualified immunity).
137. 719 F.2d 689, 696 n.8 (4th Cir. 1983).
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relevant constitutional principles. Moreover, the fact that a lawyer erred in
interpreting well-established law does not make her judgment reasonable. 138
The rigorous scrutiny to which some courts subject the precedents sup-
porting the plaintiff's case seems particularly inappropriate because the same
courts would likely grant qualified immunity to a public official who could
point to any case that suggested her conduct was constitutional.13 9 If the defen-
dant can cite lower court decisions, cases from other jurisdictions, and opinions
issued over strong dissents to demonstrate the reasonableness of her
interpretation of constitutional standards, the plaintiff should be able to rely on
such cases to help prove the contrary. Denying immunity on the presumption
that the public official knew of precedents from other jurisdictions recognizing
a constitutional right seems no different from granting immunity on the theory
that she relied on similar precedents reaching the opposite conclusion.14o
Nevertheless, qualified immunity is available in some cases when a
constitutional issue is unsettled, not because the defendant was presumptively
aware of and relied on case law that supported the constitutionality of her ac-
tions, but because of the concern that she will be chilled when she knows she
can be exposed to liability if some district court opinion somewhere has sug-
gested that her conduct is unconstitutional - even if she is not actually familiar
with that decision. 141 Thus, qualified immunity should not necessarily be
unavailable merely because one court has recognized a constitutional right: the
reasonable public official cannot be expected to be aware of every such
decision, and she needs a margin of error within which to operate. It does not
follow, however, that case law from other jurisdictions or from lower courts
138. See Harden v. Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1166 n.3 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1007 (1985). The force of Harden's reasoning is further supported by section 1983 cases
holding that qualified immunity is not automatically available simply because the police con-
ducted a search pursuant to a warrant that a judge had mistakenly issued withoutprobable cause,
see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986), or because an attorney erroneously Advised
a public official that her conduct was constitutional, see, e.g., Watertown Equip. Co. v.
Norwest Bank Watertown, NA., 830 F.2d 1487, 1495-96 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1001 (1988); Shank v. Naes, 773 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 1985); Tanner v. Hardy,
764 F.2d 1024, 1027 (4th Cir. 1985); Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 982 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986); Wentz v. Klecker, 721 F.2d 244, 247 (8th Cir.
1983). See generally Kinports, supra note 9, at 624-25. Cf. 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTW, supra
note 1, at 595-96 (attorney's advice that conduct is legal is not recognized as defense in criminal
cases).
139. See, e.g., Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 533 (two district court decisions from other juris-
dictions); Hershey v. City of Clearwater, 834 F.2d 937, 940-41 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987) (two court
of appeals opinions from other states, which conflicted with local state court rulings recognizing
constitutional right); McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1325 (4th Cir. 1987) (dictum in
Fourth Circuit opinion that three other courts adopted), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988);
Horwitz v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 822 F.2d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir.) (local state
supreme court opinion), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987); Augustine v. McDonald, 770 F.2d
1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 1985) (local state court of appeals opinion and federal court of appeals
decision from another jurisdiction); Batiste v. Burke, 746 F.2d 257, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1984)
(one court of appeals opinion from another jurisdiction).
140. Cf. Kattan, supra note 34, at 1003 (advocating that the unsettled nature of the law
should be a defense only if the defendant was aware of the uncertainty); Rudovsky, supra note
31, at 80 (arguing that qualified immunity should not protect defendant who was "aware of a
constitutional ambiguity").
141. Mitchell's observation that a defendant should not lose her immunity merely
because she "gambled and lost" on an "open question" suggests, however, an awareness of the
relevant precedents on the part of the defendant. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535.
1471991]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
can never help demonstrate that a right is clearly established. A lone district
court decision from another jurisdiction may be insufficient to put the reason-
able public official on notice of applicable constitutional principles, but it is as
relevant to the qualified immunity inquiry as the one district court opinion re-
jecting the constitutional claim.
B. Timing of Precedents
A second issue that divides the courts of appeals in qualified immunity
cases involves the timing of the relevant precedents: is the right clearly estab-
lished as soon as a court issues a dispositive opinion, or must some period of
time elapse before the reasonable public official learns of the court's decision?
Some courts of appeals give public officials an inordinate amount of time
to bring their conduct into compliance with controlling case law. In Harris v.
Young, for example, the Fourth Circuit granted qualified immunity to defen-
dants accused of denying a prisoner access to an adequate law library even
though the Supreme Court had guaranteed such access fourteen months before
the events in question. 142 Although the court of appeals rightly noted that "a
law library cannot be built in one day,"143 it did not discuss what steps the
defendants had taken to collect library materials during the fourteen-month
period, or why they had not relied on some alternative mechanism to satisfy
their constitutional obligations in the interim.'" Moreover, in one sense, the
Harris defendants had more than fourteen months to find a way to provide
adequate access to legal materials. In Arebaugh v. Dalton, the same court
pointed out that because the Supreme Court had granted certiorari almost a
year before it issued the controlling decision, "[tlwelve days may ... have been
sufficient time for someone with a direct interest to have learned of, read and
digested" the opinion. 145 Completing the spectrum between the two Fourth
Circuit rulings, other courts of appeals have reached conflicting results in
ruling on qualified immunity claims when the defendant had several months to
learn of the dispositive case law. 146
142. 718 F.2d 620, 624 (4th Cir. 1983).
143. Id.
144. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 830-31 (1977), the Court suggested several
alternative ways of providing prisoners with access to legal materials: using law students,
working either as volunteers or in clinical programs; organizing volunteer attorneys through bar
associations; and hiring lawyers as part-time consultants or full-time staff attorneys.
145. 730 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1984). See also Muzychka v. Tyler, 563 F. Supp.
1061, 1065 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (three weeks is sufficient time for police officers to learn of
Supreme Court opinion). But cf. Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 350 (6th Cir. 1988) (four
days may not have been sufficient time for average police officer to learn of controlling Supreme
Court ruling); Schlothauer v. Robinson, 757 F.2d 196, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)(granting qualified immunity in the face of dispositive Eighth Circuit decision handed down 11
days before plaintiff's arrest, without expressly indicating whether the short lapse of time was
crucial to the decision).
146. Compare Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 657 n.10 (10th Cir. 1987)(five-month interval sufficient to put defendants on notice of Tenth Circuit decision), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988), and Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1975) (Gee,
J., specially concurring) (advocating denial of qualified immunity when Fifth Circuit opinion
had been issued two months prior to defendant's conduct), with Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d
319, 322 (2d Cir. 1986) (reasonable prison official would not have been aware of local state trial
court decision issued almost two months earlier), and Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of
Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1569-70 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (granting immunity despite Fifth
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Supreme Court rulings are available via computer research services the
same day they are decided, and other federal and state court opinions typically
follow within a week.147 Although the cost of those services may be prohibitive
for some government employers, United States Law Week provides access to all
Supreme Court opinions within approximately one week of their release and to
selected significant lower court opinions within two to four weeks. Supreme
Court opinions usually appear in advance sheets within a month; although there
is some variation, federal court of appeals decisions are typically available in
advance sheets within two to three months, and federal district court decisions
within two to five months. Therefore, it seems reasonable to require at least
those government officials with ready access to legal advice to comply
promptly with relevant constitutional precedents.
C. Similarity of Precedents
A third issue that divides the courts of appeals in defining clearly estab-
lished rights in qualified immunity cases is the extent to which the precedents
recognizing a constitutional right must be factually similar to the particular case
at issue. 148 In both Mitchell v. Forsyth and Anderson v. Creighton, the
Supreme Court emphasized that a public official was not entitled to immunity
merely because the relevant constitutional provision had never expressly been
held to apply in identical circumstances. 49 If the Court had adopted that
approach, qualified immunity would almost always be granted because clever
defense counsel could usually point to some factual difference to distinguish
prior cases. As one commentator noted, "[a]t the fringes, even the most well-
settled doctrines lapse into vagueness and unpredictability."' 50
On the other hand, Anderson made clear that courts could not deny
qualified immunity simply because a constitutional right like free speech or due
process is clearly established when stated as an abstract proposition outside the
context of a specific case.' 5 ' Otherwise, the Court feared, plaintiffs could
overcome the defendant's qualified immunity defense by broadly stating the
right that needed to be clearly established. Anderson held, therefore, that
courts can deny qualified immunity only if "in the light of preexisting law" the
unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct was "apparent" - that is, if a rea-
Circuit opinion decided almost five months before defendant took final action, and two district
court opinions from same state issued about eight months and six weeks before defendant acted,
along with two other opinions from other courts issued during the same time period), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986).
147. Telephone interviews with Dorothy Molstad, Westlaw Public Relations
Department, West Services, Inc. (August 8, 1990), and Michelle Love, Lexis Public
Communications Department, Mead Data Central (August 9, 1990).
148. For a general discussion of this issue, see Comment, Harlow v. Fitzerald: The
Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 901, 922-34 (1984) [hereinafter U. PA. Comment].
149. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535 n.12. But cf. Nahmod,
supra note 34, at 251-52 & n.168 (interpreting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984), and
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), as in effect requiring a "case on point").
150. Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School
Official, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1322, 1341 (1976). See also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
367-68 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Kattan, supra note 34, at 981.
151. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40.
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sonable public official would have recognized that her actions violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.152
By rejecting the two extremes and focusing the inquiry on public offi-
cials' "ability 'reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to
liability for damages,"'1 53 the Court has properly avoided determining precisely
how close a connection is required between the case at hand and the preceding
cases recognizing a constitutional right. Although some factual resemblance is
obviously necessary, Harlow's reasonableness standard can only be resolved on
a case-by-case basis. In determining how much similarity is required, the
courts of appeals vary in their fidelity to the Supreme Court's attempt to
protect constitutional rights while also minimizing the chilling effect on
legitimate governmental conduct.
Some courts impose an overly demanding standard, requiring precedent
that makes the unconstitutionality of the defendant's conduct "a foregone
conclusion."154 In Azeez v. Fairman, for example, the Seventh Circuit con-
ceded that it was well-recognized that "prisoners retain their constitutional
rights to the extent compatible with prison discipline and safety."' 55
Nevertheless, the court granted immunity because that general principle had not
clearly been applied to a prison's refusal to recognize an inmate's religiously
motivated name change "in circumstances like those of the present case."1 56
Likewise, in granting immunity in Horwitz v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, the Tenth Circuit suggested that none of the due process cases cited
by the plaintiff were relevant because they did not involve "suspensions of
licenses of medical practitioners under 'emergency' determinations of the
governing board" and therefore were not sufficiently similar to the challenged
conduct. 57 These cases come too close to requiring precedent with identical
facts, the very approach rejected in both Mitchell and Anderson.
Likewise, some courts improperly refuse to require public officials to
reason by analogy and apply existing precedents to cases with somewhat dif-
152. Id. at 640.
153. Id. at 646 (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).
154. Howe v. Baker, 796 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1986). See also Dartland v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 1989) ("inevitable conclusion");
Lojuk v. Johnson, 770 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring "case law in a closely analo-
gous area"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1067 (1986). Cf. Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 308(7th Cir. 1987) ("We must be wary ... of imagining that public officials have the training and
experience in extracting legal rules from case law that appellate judges have.').
155. 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir. 1986).
156. Id.
157. 822 F.2d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987). See also
Lappe v. Loeffelholz, 815 F.2d 1173, 1180 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1987) (granting immunity because
even if defendants knew of the state statute on which plaintiff's due process argument was
premised, it was not clear whether they knew "how it applied to an inmate in these circum-
stances"; "[a] defendant who knows the appropriate legal standard... does not necessarily
know how to apply that standard when faced with a unique situation"); Howe v. Baker, 796
F.2d 1355, 1360, 1359 (11th Cir. 1986) (dismissing Supreme Court decision cited by plaintiff
because it "set forth a general test" that "had to be interpreted and applied in any given situation,"
and noting that "[n]o decision of either the Supreme Court or this court... addressed the effect
of 'cause' limitations on a State's ability to transfer or temporarily suspend one of its employ-
ees'); Gargiul v. Tompkins, 790 F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) (granting immunity because the
Supreme Court had never held that the constitutional right to privacy includes the right to refuse
an examination by a doctor of the opposite sex).
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ferent facts. For example, in Lojuk v. Johnson, the Seventh Circuit granted
immunity to a psychiatrist who allegedly violated a patient's due process rights
by subjecting him to involuntary electroshock therapy. In concluding that the
relevant constitutional standards were unclear, the court distinguished prior
cases forbidding forced treatment of prisoners because those rulings had been
based on the eighth amendment rather than the due process clause 58 - even
though the due process clause extends at least as far as, and usually further than,
the eighth amendment.159 In a similar case, Johnson by Johnson v. Brelje, the
same court immunized employees of a state mental health facility whose
restrictive telephone policy unconstitutionally denied access to the courts to a
group of criminal defendants found unfit to stand trial. The court recognized
that the constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts was clearly
established, but found "no prior case that has relied on this right to [invalidate]
a regulation of a mental health facility."' 60 In Harris v. Young, the Fourth
Circuit granted immunity to prison officials who were sued for failing to
provide the plaintiff access to an adequate law library because prior cases
recognizing that right had involved state rather than local prisons.161 And in
Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, the Ninth Circuit granted immunity
even though six other federal courts had found similar zoning ordinances
violative of the first amendment when they failed to set up alternative locations
for adult businesses. The court explained that the prior cases "necessarily
turned upon the particular geographical characteristics of the city involved"'162
158. 770 F.2d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1067 (1986). Cf.
Davis v. Holly, 835 F.2d 1175, 1180 n.1, 1181 (6th Cir. 1987) (cases involving prisons cannot
clearly establish the rights of mental patients; also distinguishing other cases because they in-
volved right to protection from harm caused by others, not from self-inflicted injury).
159. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 358 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Garrett v.
Rader, 831 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir. 1987) (denying qualified immunity to state hospital offi-
cials because .'[i]f it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe
conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed - who may not be
punished at all - in unsafe conditions") (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16
(1982)).
160. 701 F.2d 1201, 1210 (7th Cir. 1983). The court had no trouble finding the tele-
phone policy unconstitutional because prisoners have a right to "a reasonable opportunity to seek
and receive the assistance of attorneys," and the plaintiffs, who were facing criminal charges,
were entitled to that right.even though they were housed in a maximum security mental health
facility rather than a prison. Id. at 1207.
161. 718 F.2d 620, 623 (4th Cir. 1983). The court drew the distinction on the theory
that constitutional requirements for prisoners in local jails might differ from those applicable to
inmates in state jails, both because the types of crimes for which the inmates are incarcerated are
different and because the average length of commitment is longer for the latter group.
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that the plaintiff had been convicted of grand larceny and
had spent two-and-one-half years in the local jail, nine months of which had occurred after his
appeal was completed and he was no longer represented by counsel. Id.
162. 861 F.2d 1102, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
See also Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 320-21 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting immunity
because Supreme Court opinions barring politically motivated discharges did not clearly estab-
lish the law "with respect to every governmental position" and none of the cases cited involved
an administrative law judge or similar position; distinguishing case involving liquor control
board hearing examiner because hearing examiner only finds facts and does not exercise any dis-
cretion); Howe v. Baker, 796 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1986) (although plaintiff had a
clearly established constitutional right to due process protections prior to discharge and it was
clear that state law prohibited suspension or transfer without cause, it was not clearly established
that transfer and suspension implicated due process concerns).
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- a distinction that could be made with respect to almost every ruling on the
constitutionality of zoning ordinances and variances.
Obviously, the qualified immunity defense should protect public officials
who failed to anticipate unforeseeable changes in the law. But the Supreme
Court has refused to immunize defendants simply because the plaintiff could not
point to a case with identical facts, thereby imposing a duty on public officials
to apply existing case law to analogous situations. As one commentator aptly
noted, "[i]t is one thing to be held liable for failure to predict entirely new
constitutional rules, and quite another to be held liable when a constitutional
holding is entirely foreseeable and the court is more accurately 'finding' a pre-
existing rule than creating a new one."163 Immunizing defendants in the latter
situation essentially gives public officials "one liability-free violation." 164 Thus,
other courts of appeals recognize that a "slight uncertainty" about the
legitimacy of one's conduct, 65 or the fact that the current case presents a "new
factual wrinkle," 66 is an insufficient basis for immunity.
For example, in Blackburn v. Snow, the First Circuit relied on cases
holding strip searches unconstitutional in the school and border search contexts
when denying qualified immunity to prison officials who had a policy of strip-
Nevertheless, some courts have not hesitated to reason by analogy in granting qualified
immunity based on precedent involving different facts. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d
1330, 1341 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting immunity in case involving indiscriminate magnetometer
searches for weapons at political rally based on case law upholding similar searches in prisons,
military bases, and airports), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1034 (1988); Donta v. Hooper, 774 F.2d
716,721 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (defendants arrested plaintiff after receiving teletype from
out-of-state police requesting that plaintiff be picked up because there was information that he
was in possession of stolen firearms; although the court distinguishes the most analogous
Supreme Court case because there the radio bulletin received from the other department indicated
that a warrant had been issued for the suspect's arrest, the court nevertheless grants immunity
based on another Supreme Court opinion permitting police to detain suspect temporarily, not to
arrest, based on a "wanted flyer" if the flyer is premised on reasonable suspicion sufficient tojustify the stop), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1019 (1987). See also supra notes 139-41 and accom-
panying text.
163. Freed, supra note 32, at 554 n.139 (emphasis deleted). See also U. PA.
Comment, supra note 148, at 929-30.
164. People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 145(3d Cir. 1984). If the courts rule on the defendant's request for qualified immunity prior to
evaluating whether the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right, public officials may actu-
ally receive an infinite number of "liability-free violations." See infra note 314.
165. McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 125 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Bauer v.
Bosley, 802 F.2d 1058, 1068 (8th Cir. 1986) (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("some uncertainty" or
"some question" is not enough), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
166. People of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 148(3d Cir. 1984). See also Lappe v. Loeffelholz, 815 F.2d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir. 1987); Hicks v.
Feeney. 770 F.2d 375, 380 (3d Cir. 1985); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 173 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (requiring "real and substantial" distinctions rather than "trivial" ones to justify qualified
immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).
For other cases requiring public officials to apply existing case law to analogous factual
situations, see, e.g., McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1325 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1006 (1988); Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. School Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th
Cir. 1987); Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1001(1987); McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1434 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S.




searching all visitors to the prison.167 Similarly, in Sourbeer v. Robinson, a
prisoner awaiting sentencing argued that perfunctory periodic reviews of the
decision to confine him in administrative custody denied him a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. The Third Circuit found his due process rights clearly
established by prior cases that required formal procedures before prisoners
who had already been sentenced could be transferred to administrative custody
for the first time.168 And in Savidge v. Fincannon, the Fifth Circuit denied
qualified immunity where a retarded child's parents claimed that officials at the
school where the child lived had violated his constitutional right to adequate
care and treatment. The court reasoned that prior cases involving involuntarily
committed mental patients clearly established the child's right to treatment' 69
Courts often take the contrary, more restrictive approach in cases in-
volving constitutional provisions, like the first amendment and due process
clause, whose application depends on balancing the interests of the state against
those of the plaintiff. 70 In fact, a number of courts have indicated that
167. 771 F.2d 556, 570 (1st Cir. 1985). Although greater limits on the authority to
search might reasonably be imposed in the school setting than in prisons, where the security
risks are greater, the same distinction cannot be made between prison searches and border
searches, where government officials enjoy "plenary authority to conduct routine searches and
seizures." United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
168. 791 F.2d 1094, 1103 & n.7, 1104 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1032 (1987). The court could think of no reason for a reasonable prison officer to assume that
"an unsentenced inmate is entitled to less process than sentenced inmates," or that "less process
is due to prisoner[s] facing a second or third 'term' in restrictive housing than is due upon initial
placement." Id.
169. 836 F.2d 898, 908-09 (5th Cir. 1988). The court rejected the notion that the
defendants might have reasoned, "'[w]e can safely give Jonathan Savidge inadequate treatment;
he was not committed... through formal judicial proceedings and so the rationale in [earlier
cases involving plaintiffs who had been so committed] may not apply to him."' Id. at 909. The
court could not "envision reasonable doctors and administrators calibrating their responsibility to
each child on the basis of such narrow distinctions." Id. See also Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d
723, 733 (3d Cir. 1987) (dismissing defendants' argument that prior cases established the im-
propriety only of politically motivated discharges and transfers, but not of demotions); Wade v.
Hegner, 804 F.2d 67, 71-72 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying qualified immunity to defendant who
warned black schoolchildren's parents of racial unrest in the public schools because similar sub-
tle tactics used to perpetuate segregated schools had previously been held unconstitutional);
LeClair v. Hart, 800 F.2d 692, 694-95 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying qualified immunity where IRS
agents photocopied plaintiffs' records because prior cases involving tapping of telephones and
taking notes of serial numbers indicated that the fourth amendment prohibits more than the
physical removal of property); Freeman v. Blair, 793 F.2d 166, 178-79 (8th Cir. 1986)
(denying qualified immunity to defendants who allegedly retaliated against plaintiffs for exercis-
ing their fourth amendment rights because punishing those who assert their first amendment
rights had previously been held unconstitutional), vacated, 483 U.S. 1014 (1987); Bilbrey by
Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1984) (relying in part on Supreme Court
cases recognizing students' due process and first amendment rights in denying qualified immu-
nity to school officials whose search of students allegedly violated fourth amendment); Bever v.
Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (4th Cir.) (denying immunity despite defendants' attempt
to distinguish prior decisions striking down politically motivated discharges on the ground that
this case involved reduction in force necessitated by economic constraints; prior decisions estab-
lished unconstitutionality of using political criteria to choose which employees to select for fis-
cally motivated reduction in force), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 948 (1984).
170. See, e.g., Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1111-12
(9th Cir. 1988) (granting immunity in first amendment case after noting that constitutionality of
zoning ordinances often depends on factors such as the need for the ordinance, the motivations
underlying it, and the extent to which alternative sites for protected speech are available), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); Juarbe-Angueira v. Arias, 831 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1987)
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qualified immunity should be granted almost automatically in such cases:
because the outcome of a balancing test is heavily dependent on the facts of a
particular case, prior case law applying the test cannot clearly establish much of
anything for future cases.' 7 '
The balancing tests applied in due process and first amendment cases do
not seem much different, however, from the analysis used in fourth amendment
cases to determine whether the search was unreasonable 72 or the amount of
force excessive,173 or in fifth amendment cases to evaluate whether police
tactics in eliciting the confession were unduly coercive. 174 Therefore, if the
case law is clear enough to suggest that the balancing will come out in the
plaintiff's favor in a specific situation, qualified immunity should not be
(be ause public employees can constitutionally be discharged on the basis of their political party
affiliation in some circumstances, and because the Supreme Court has not defined which jobs
may legitimately be conditioned on party affiliation, qualified immunity is appropriate in the ab-
sence of precedent governing this particular plaintiffs job), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960 (1988);
Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir. 1987) (assuming a clearly established constitu-
tional right to privacy is implicated by unwanted disclosure of medical information, "the facts of
decided cases did not provide sufficient indication of how that right would be weighed against
competing interests in a case such as this"); Bilbrey by Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1472-
73 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (because fourth amendment reasonableness stan-
dard requires balancing students' interests against those of the school, school officials are enti-
tled to qualified immunity "absent controlling case authority"); Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 963,
969-70 (4th Cir. 1984) (granting immunity because using mace on prisoner is not per se
unconstitutional, but depends on factors such as provocation, amount of gas used, and purposes
for which gas was used). Cf. Preston v. Smith, 750 F.2d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 1984) (Kru-
pansky, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the "somewhat vague
standards" used to analyze eighth amendment claims - evolving standards of decency, wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain, punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime - make qualified immunity appropriate in many such cases). But cf. Albers v. Whitley,
743 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1984) (qualified immunity is by definition unavailable if defen-
dant violates eighth amendment by acting with deliberate indifference), rev'd on other grounds,
475 U.S. 312 (1986); Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 841 (1984); Rudovsky, supra note 31, at 59 n.210 (same). But see Chapman v.
Pickett, 801 F.2d 912, 925 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), vacated, 484 U.S.
807 (1987).
171. See, e.g., Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir.
1989); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1213 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
968 (1988); Noyola v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (5th Cir.
1988); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276, 277-78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848(1986); Benson v. Scott, 734 F.2d 1181, 1184-85 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019(1984).
172. See Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1986)(denying qualified immunity in fourth amendment case even though reasonableness of search
depends on balancing competing interests), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987).
173. See Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1217 (1st Cir. 1986) (denying quali-
fied immunity in excessive force case even though reasonableness of seizure turns on balancing
competing interests). See also Vizbaras v. Prieber, 761 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 n.3 (4th Cir. 1985)(Winter, CJ., concurring and dissenting) (majority's decision to grant immunity in excessive
force case in the absence of precedent specifying "the exact quantum of force that constitutes
excessive force" "render[s] Harlow a virtual nullity and mistakenly 'turn[s] qualified into abso-
lute immunity' because "many, perhaps most, constitutional deprivations involve questions of
degree where the precise contours of the constitutional protections have not been drawn')(quoting Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084(1985)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
174. See Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 844 (10th Cir.) (denying qualified immunity
because the law governing involuntary confessions was clear), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 967(1985).
154 [VOL. 33
PREDICTING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
available. As the Sixth Circuit observed in Stern v. Shouldice, qualified
immunity is inappropriate even in a first amendment case requiring a balancing
of competing factors if "a straightforward application" of the relevant
considerations indicates that the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated.175
Other courts have agreed, showing no hesitation in denying immunity in similar
cases.
176
Courts that are generous in granting qualified immunity sometimes
combine the various factors described above, leading to results like those in
Danenberger v. Johnson177 and Noyola v. Texas Department of Human
Resources.78 In Danenberger, a public employee brought a section 1983 suit
claiming that the defendants had denied her a promotion because she had
refused to support their political party. In concluding that the relevant consti-
tutional principles were not clearly established, the Seventh Circuit dismissed
the plaintiff's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Elrod v. Burns179
because it was a plurality opinion, and distinguished the Court's ruling in Branti
v. Finkel'80 because it prohibited only politically motivated discharges and
therefore did not necessarily apply to a promotion case.18' The court re-
sponded to the plaintiff's citation of a favorable Seventh Circuit opinion by
noting that it had been decided several months after the events at issue, and also
by suggesting that one case was insufficient to indicate that the constitutional
right alleged by the plaintiff had been "clearly recognized in existing case
law.
In Noyola, the Fifth Circuit granted immunity to defendants who had al-
legedly discharged the plaintiff in violation of the first amendment. Because
the scope of the constitutional protection depended on balancing the plaintiff's
interests against those of the employer, the court noted that "[t]here will rarely
be a basis for a priori judgment that the termination or discipline of a public
employee violated 'clearly established' constitutional rights."183 After
suggesting that the plaintiff in a first amendment case will rarely be able to find
any precedent sufficiently similar to her case, the court went even further,
finding immunity appropriate because "[n]o Fifth Circuit case as of 1981 had
found a first amendment violation on facts like these." 84 This type of rea-
soning forces innocent plaintiffs to bear the cost of constitutional violations,
175. 706 F.2d 742,749 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983).
176. See, e.g., Southside Pub. Schools v. Hill, 827 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir. 1987)(defendants violated plaintiffs' clearly established first amendment right to speak on matters of
public concern); Harden v. Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1166 n.3 (11th Cir.) (denying qualified
immunity after finding no ambiguity concerning first amendment protections owed to faculty
members), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985); Fujiwara v. Clark, 703 F.2d 357, 360-61 (9th
Cir. 1983) (defendant violated clearly established rights by firing plaintiff for exercising her first
amendment right to speak on issues of public importance); Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909,
912-13 (11th Cir.) (rejecting immunity defense in first amendment case even though protection
owed public employee's speech depended on balancing competing interests), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 893 (1983). See also Rudovsky, supra note 31, at 60-61.
177. 821 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1987).
178. 846 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1988).
179. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
180. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
181. See Danenberger, 821 F.2d at 364.
182. Id. at 365. See also supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
183. Noyola, 846 F.2d at 1025.
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while doing nothing to deter unconstitutional conduct or to protect the legiti-
mate exercise of public employees' discretion.
D. Relevance of Other Sources of Law
In Davis v. Scherer, the Supreme Court held that the only relevant
question in ruling on a qualified immunity claim is whether the constitutional
right on which the section 1983 suit is based was clearly established at the time
the defendant allegedly violated that right. 8 5 The Court therefore rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the defendants lost their immunity by violating clear
state regulations specifying the procedures to be followed prior to discharging
an employee.18 6 Because state regulations contain "a plethora of rules, 'often so
voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such flux that officials can
only comply with or enforce them selectively,"' the Court explained, it is not
"always fair, or sound policy, to demand official compliance with statute[s] and
regulation[s] on pain of money damages."'187 Therefore, the Court concluded
that government employees should not be "liable in an indeterminate amount"
for damages resulting from a constitutional violation "merely because their
official conduct also violated some statute or regulation."188 Obviously bound
by that ruling, the courts of appeals consistently immunize defendants who
184. Id. at 1026 (emphasis added).
185. 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984).
186. See id. at 193-97. Cf. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (W.
Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (describing similar controversy in tort law as to whether negligent defen-
dant may be held liable for unforeseeable risks, or whether liability is instead limited to risk as to
which defendant was negligent).
Davis distinguished cases where the violation of state law is somehow related to the
plaintiff's constitutional claim - for example, where state law determines whether the plaintiff
has a property interest protected by the due process clause. See 468 U.S. at 193 & n.11. For
examples of cases picking up on this distinction and therefore looking to other sources of law to
resolve the defendant's entitlement to immunity, see, e.g., Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368,
1373 (9th Cir. 1987); Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930,933-34 (10th Cir. 1987); Lappe
v. Loeffelholz, 815 F.2d 1173, 1178-80 (8th Cir. 1987); Washington v. Kirksey, 811 F.2d
561, 563, 565 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987); Howe v. Baker, 796 F.2d 1355,
1358-60 (11th Cir. 1986); Shouse v. Ljunggren, 792 F.2d 902, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1986); Huron
Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 792 F.2d 563, 568-70 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
885 (1986); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 510-11 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1054 (1986).
187. Davis, 468 U.S. at 196 (quoting P. SCHUCK, supra note 99, at 66). The Court
also reasoned that qualified immunity should not turn on interpretations of state regulations
because often federal judges might be unable to resolve such questions on summary judgment.
See id. at 195-96. If the Court meant to suggest that state law issues pose difficult interpretive
problems for federal courts, it seems to have ignored the fact that federal judges are often
required to interpret state law in both diversity and section 1983 cases. See City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125-26 (1988) (plurality) (predicting that federal courts will not "face
greater difficulties here than those that they routinely address in other contexts," and thus
instructing courts to look to state law to determine whether municipal employees had policymak-
ing authority sufficient to make city liable for their conduct in section 1983 suit); Shapiro, Public
Officials' Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Its
Progeny: A Critical Analysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 249, 263 & n.103 (1989). Alternatively,
if the Court was suggesting that resolving immunity questions at the summary judgment stage
might be more difficult when state law is relevant, it provided no explanation for the assumption
that state law questions are any more likely to involve disputed issues of fact and are therefore
less susceptible to summary judgment than questions of constitutional law.
188. Davis, 468 U.S. at 195.
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violated constitutional norms that were not yet settled, but who should have
known that their actions were impermissible under some other source of law.189
The Davis decision does not appear to take into account the purpose of
immunizing public officials for constitutional errors that do not violate clearly
established law - to avoid chilling government employees in the exercise of
their discretion. Denying immunity to the defendant who fails to comply with
clearly established law of whatever source does nothing to undermine that goal.
In such cases, the defendant behaved in a way that a reasonable public official
would have recognized as improper. Even if the defendant is subjected to
section 1983 liability, other government officials can act with the assurance that
they will not suffer the same fate so long as their conduct is consistent with
established law. State regulations may well be contradictory or ambiguous, as
the Court feared in Davis, but a defendant who breaches those regulations is not
violating settled law. On the other hand, there is no apparent reason to
immunize a public official who acts contrary to established state law and, in the
process, also fails to fulfill her constitutional obligations. 190 Imposing liability
in such cases may not deter future constitutional violations, if the constitutional
principles remain unclear, but it will compensate the plaintiff for damages
caused by the violation without jeopardizing any of the goals qualified
immunity was designed to serve.
III. DEFINING "NOVEL" CLAIMS IN PROCEDURAL
DEFAULT CASES
The federal courts tend to adhere to a more consistent path in evaluating
whether a constitutional principle was sufficiently novel at the time of a
prisoner's trial to provide cause for the failure to make a contemporaneous
objection. Following the Supreme Court's lead, they consistently reject habeas
petitioners' efforts to establish cause for procedural defaults. Apparently, if
any other defendant had raised the defaulted claim in any court in the country
before the prisoner's trial, the prisoner forfeits her right to habeas review
when her attorney failed to foresee the validity of the claim. The courts are
thus far less forgiving when defense attorneys inaccurately predict the course of
the law than they are when public officials seek the protection of a qualified
immunity defense. Although the same results are not necessarily appropriate in
both contexts, public officials and criminal defense attorneys should each be
required to exercise a reasonable amount of diligence in ascertaining the
relevant constitutional standards. Instead, the courts are reluctant to subject
government employees to liability for conduct that the reasonable public
official should have known was unconstitutional, but refuse to excuse
procedural defaults when the reasonable defense attorney would not have
189. See, e.g., Davis v. Holly, 835 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 1987); Childress v.
Small Business Admin., 825 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Whatley v. Philo,
817 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1987); Rodriguez v. Munoz, 808 F.2d 138, 141-42 (1st Cir. 1986);
Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 559, 560 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1021 (1987); Lojuk v. Johnson, 770 F.2d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1067 (1986); Ricci v. Key Bancshares of Maine, Inc., 768 F.2d 456, 467 (1st Cir. 1985);
Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1985).
190. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 187, at 263-64 (arguing that public officials should be
liable whenever they had reason to know their actions were improper).
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recognized the validity of the forfeited claim. Comparing the same four issues
that arise in defining clearly established rights in the qualified immunity context
demonstrates the point.
A. Number, Weight, and Consistency of Precedents
The courts properly recognize that an issue is not novel merely because
the Supreme Court has yet to resolve it.191 It may well be reasonable to expect
defense counsel to raise a claim that has been recognized in a number of other
jurisdictions or in the federal or state courts in her own jurisdiction.192 Thus,
in evaluating whether the prisoners had the tools to challenge jury instructions
requiring them to shoulder the burden of proving their self-defense claims in
Engle v. Isaac, the Supreme Court did not confine its analysis to rulings from
the federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts or to cases from the
prisoners' own jurisdiction.193 Likewise, in Smith v. Murray, the Court
rejected a claim of novelty on the ground that "various forms" of the prisoner's
constitutional challenge had been "percolating in the lower courts for years" at
the time of his default.' 94
In Reed v. Ross, however, the Court observed that one of the factors
courts should consider in determining whether a prisoner had a reasonable basis
for objecting to a procedure that the Supreme Court had arguably approved is
"how well entrenched the practice was in the relevant jurisdiction at the time of
defense counsel's failure to challenge it."195 One reason the Court ultimately
found the cause requirement satisfied in Reed was that the North Carolina
courts had used the challenged jury instruction for more than a century, and no
question as to its constitutionality had arisen in that state until five years after
Ross' appeal.196
Despite Reed's language, the courts of appeals do not consider a consti-
tutional claim novel simply because the Supreme Court or the courts in the
prisoner's jurisdiction have yet to recognize the claim. Thus, the courts refuse
to excuse defaults of claims whose validity was left open by the Supreme Court
191. As noted above, see supra note 113 and accompanying text, Supreme Court opin-
ions are relatively scarce. During the 1989 Term, for example, the Court issued 151 opinions,
only 45 of which came in criminal or habeas cases. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, 104
HARV. L. REV. 40, 363, 365-66 (1990). In addition, the Court often sees no reason to grant
review if the lower courts have reached a consensus on a particular issue. See supra note 114
and accompanying text.
192. Cf. Marcus, supra note 47, at 723 & n.368 (defense attorneys should be familiar
with cases from all federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts, but not with those from
federal district courts or lower state courts in other jurisdictions); CAP. U. Note, supra note 87,
at 300-01 (defense attorneys should usually be aware of cases within their own state system and
federal circuit).
193. See 456 U.S. at 131-32 & nn.39-40.
194. 477 U.S. at 537.
195. 468 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added). Cf. CAP. U. Note, supra note 87, at 288 n.122
(interpreting Reed's reference to "the relevant jurisdiction" to refer only to state court system and
not to federal courts).
The other relevant considerations, the Court said, were "how direct this Court's sanction
of the prevailing practice had been" and "how strong the available support [was] from sources
opposing the prevailing practice." 468 U.S. at 17-18. The latter factor may refer to opposition
both inside and outside the prisoner's jurisdiction. See Marcus, supra note 47, at 722-23.




in prior cases. 197 Similarly, they do not hesitate to rely on opinions from other
jurisdictions'9 8 or from lower courts1 99 to justify the conclusion that the
relevant constitutional principles were not novel when the prisoner went to
trial. In Roman v. Abrams, for example, the Second Circuit cited an
intermediate court of appeals decision from another state that was later
reversed on appeal to support its finding that the prisoner's constitutional claim
was available at the time of his appeal.200
Although defense attorneys should have some familiarity with case law
from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court has apparently recognized that
they cannot reasonably be expected to be aware of every such decision. In
Engle, the Court rejected the prisoners' novelty argument because "dozens" of
other defendants had objected to jury instructions similar to those challenged
there.20' The Court then reached the contrary conclusion in Reed, despite two
rulings from other courts adopting the prisoner's constitutional argument, in
part because "they were the only cases that would have supported Ross' claim at
all.' 2 2
Nevertheless, many federal courts define novelty much more narrowly
than the Supreme Court, refusing to characterize an issue as novel if it was
raised by any other defendant or even by a commentator in a legal or social
science journal.20 3 This approach differs substantially from that taken in the
197. See, e.g., Landry v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1117, 1122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 900 (1988); Briley v. Booker, 594 F. Supp. 1399, 1405-06 (E.D. Va.), affd, 746 F.2d
225 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
198. See, e.g., Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1242 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1000 (1988); Leggins v. Lockhart, 822 F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 907 (1988); Bryan v. Warden, Ind. State Reformatory, 820 F.2d 217, 222(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867 (1987); United States v. Bonnette, 781 F.2d 357, 361
(4th Cir. 1986); Rault v. Louisiana, 772 F.2d 117, 134 n.29 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1178 (1986); Briley v. Booker, 746 F.2d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Watters
v. Hubbard, 725 F.2d 381, 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); United States ex
rel. Hudson v. Brierton, 699 F.2d 917, 921-22 & n.8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833(1983). But cf. Selvage v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1988) (observing that the "legal
basis" for habeas petitioner's claim "enjoyed virtually no support in this circuit" until six years
after his trial), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Selvage v. Collins, 110 S. Ct. 974 (1990)
(per curiam); Frye v. Procunier, 746 F.2d 1011, 1013 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding cause require-
ment satisfied because Fourth Circuit ruling on which habeas claim was based was not decided
until after prisoner's trial), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1010 (1985).
199. See, e.g., Leggins v. Lockhart, 822 F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 907 (1988); United States v. Bonnette, 781 F.2d 357, 361-62 (4th Cir. 1986);
Johnson v. Blackburn, 778 F.2d 1044, 1047-4 (5th Cir. 1985); Briley v. Booker, 594 F.
Supp. 1399, 1403 (E.D. Va.), affd, 746 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
200. 822 F.2d 214,223 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989). The court
also relied on two state court rulings from other jurisdictions, which had cited federal constitu-
tional precedents to support their decision to recognize similar claims under their own state con-
stitutions. See id.
201. 456 U.S. at 131-33 & n.40 (citing twenty-five cases).
202. 468 U.S. at 19. The Court also concluded that the two cases provided only
"indirect" support for the prisoner's claim, presumably because they involved somewhat differ-
ent issues. Id.
203. See, e.g., Moore v. Kemp, 824 F.2d 847, 874 (11th Cir. 1987) (Tjoflat, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), vacated sub nom. Zant v. Moore, 489 U.S. 836 (1989)
(per curiam); Bates v. Blackburn, 805 F.2d 569, 577 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
916 (1987); Johnson v. Blackburn, 778 F.2d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 1985); Briley v. Booker,
746 F.2d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). See also Engle, 456 U.S. at 132 nAO (noting
that commentators had recognized defaulted claim).
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qualified immunity cases, where the federal courts generally do not expect
public officials to be aware of a few scattered opinions from other jurisdic-
tions.204 Nevertheless, some courts have refused to excuse procedural defaults
in habeas cases after finding only one2o5 or two 206 decisions from other
jurisdictions where defendants presented similar constitutional claims. In fact,
the four Justices who dissented in Reed would have rejected the prisoner's
novelty argument, in part because of the two rulings - from the Eighth Circuit
and the Connecticut Superior Court - recognizing the validity of his claim.2 o7
Determining how many prior decisions suffice to put the reasonable de-
fense attorney on notice of a constitutional issue presents a difficult line-
drawing problem. But it does seem, as one commentator noted, "a bit far-
fetched" to require a defense attorney in North Carolina to be familiar with a
Connecticut trial court ruling issued a few months earlier.
It is reasonable to assume that most diligent counsel make
efforts to keep abreast of new developments in the law through
legal publications, seminars, and the like. However, the position
adopted by the [Reed] dissent would require a public defender in a
New York Superior Court to present a previously unheard
constitutional claim recently adjudicated on the merits by one state
court in South Dakota.0 8
Another difference between the qualified immunity and procedural de-
fault cases is that no court in the latter context apparently accords any signifi-
cance to the fact that a divided court issued the prior opinion accepting the
validity of the defaulted claim. In fact, some courts - including the Supreme
Court in Engle209 - have even cited helpful language in dissenting opinions to
support a finding that the issue was reasonably available to defense counsel.210
204. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Bryan v. Warden, Ind. State Reformatory, 820 F.2d 217, 222 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867 (1987); Rault v. Louisiana, 772 F.2d 117, 134 n.29 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178 (1986); Briley v. Booker, 594 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (E.D.
Va.), affd, 746 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Cf. Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464,
1479-80 (1lth Cir. 1988) (Hill, J., specially concurring) (arguing that the prisoner's claim was
reasonably available at time of his trial even though no other defendant had raised the issue
because there was "a simpler explanation for the scarcity of such claims, namely, the scarcity of
... violations"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
206. See, e.g., Briley v. Booker, 594 F. Supp. 1399, 1402-03 (E.D. Va.), affd, 746
F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Cf. Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1242 (4th Cir.)
(per curiam) (one local state supreme court opinion and one case from another jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1000 (1988).
207. Reed, 468 U.S. at 25 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Engle, 456 U.S.
at 131 n.39.
208. CAP. U. Note, supra note 87, at 299-300 & n.201. See also Marcus, supra note
47, at 723 (requisite number of decisions depends on which courts issued them); CAP. U. Note,
supra note 87, at 299-300 (same).
209. See 456 U.S. at 132 n.40.
210. See, e.g., Leggins v. Lockhart, 822 F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 907 (1988); Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1052 (1989).
In Delo v. Stokes, 110 S. CL 1880, 1881 (1990) (per curiam), the Supreme Court
likewise cited a dissenting opinion in support of its finding that the claim raised by the prisoner
in his fourth habeas petition was not novel at the time he filed his first petition. Accordingly, the
Court dismissed the petition as an abase of the writ.
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Similarly, other courts have relied on dictum in opinions from courts within
the prisoner's jurisdiction, as well as from other courts, in rejecting attempts to
use novelty to excuse a procedural default. 211 Although defense attorneys
should not ignore defenses recognized only by divided courts or in dictum, it
does not necessarily follow, as the Fourth Circuit concluded in Briley v.
Under the common law, the principle of res judicata did not apply to habeas cases, and
prisoners were not barred from bringing successive habeas petitions. See Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963). The Supreme Court endorsed the common law view in
Sanders, reasoning that "[tihe inapplicability of res judicata to habeas... is inherent in the very
role and function of the writ"- to ensure that .'government... [is] always [to] be accountable
to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment.' Id. at 8 (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 402).
According to Sanders, a federal court could refuse to consider a second habeas petition that
raised an issue already presented in an earlier habeas petition only if the courts had resolved the
first claim against the prisoner on the merits and "the ends of justice would not be served by
reaching the merits of the subsequent application." Id. at 15. Successive petitions raising differ-
ent claims could be dismissed, however, only if the prisoner had abused the writ by, for exam-
ple, deliberately withholding the second claim "in the hope of being granted two hearings rather
than one," or deliberately abandoning one of the claims during the first proceeding - although
Again the federal courts had discretion to consider such claims on the merits. Id. at 18. In
defining an abuse of the writ, Sanders instructed the courts to follow the deliberate bypass test
announced the prior month in Fay. Id. Congress later codified the Sanders rules in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b), Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts, and Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States
District Courts. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521 (1982); L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at
550.
Since the Court rejected the deliberate bypass test for procedural default cases, it has
been unclear whether the new cause and prejudice test and its definition of novelty now govern
abuse of the writ cases as well. Some courts of appeals have applied standards very similar to
those currently used in procedural default cases to determine whether the prisoner's failure to
raise a claim in her first habeas petition can be excused because the claim was novel at that time.
See, e.g., Moore v. Blackburn, 774 F.2d 97,98 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curian) (issue must be in-
cluded in first petition "if a competent attorney should have been aware of the claim[]"), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986). Cf. Moore v. Zant 885 F.2d 1497, 1506-08 & n.11 (11th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (adopting reasonably competent attorney standard analogous to Engle for pris-
oners who were represented by counsel during first habeas proceeding). Others, however, have
favored continued use of the more lenient deliberate bypass test in this context. See, e.g., Witt
v. Wainwright, 470 U.S. 1039, 1043-44 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); L. YACKLE, supra
note 39, at 563-64. The Supreme Court recently resolved this debate, opting to apply the cause
and prejudice requirements in abuse of the writ cases. See McCleskey v. Zant, 59 U.S.L.W.
4288 (U.S. Apr. 16, 1991). Cf. infra note 315 (discussing recent efforts to enact legislation that
would limit the number of habeas petitions that could be filed in capital cases).
Even before McCleskey made clear that the courts should treat procedural default and
abuse of the writ cases identically, those court of appeals decisions that relied on Sykes and
Engle to resolve abuse of the writ questions involving prisoners who attempted to use novelty to
explain their failure to present a claim during the first habeas proceeding were obviously relevant
in determining when novelty would excuse the failure to object contemporaneously at trial. Even
in circumstances where the courts applied Fay's more lenient deliberate bypass standard in the
abuse of the writ context, those cases where the courts rejected novelty arguments and dismissed
second petitions were also relevant to the procedural default cases: by definition, those courts
would likewise have rejected the prisoner's attempt to use novelty to show cause. Therefore,
this article does not distinguish between these two categories of pre-McCleskey abuse of the writ
cases and the procedural default cases.
211. See, e.g., Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1242 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1000 (1988); Breest v. Cunningham, 784 F.2d 435, 436 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 842 (1986); Dietz v. Solern, 677 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1982); Breest v.
Perrin, 655 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981). Cf. Moore v. Kemp, 824
F.2d 847, 872 n.31 (11th Cir. 1987) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (fact
that prior discussion occurred in plurality opinion irrelevant), vacated sub nom. Zant v. Moore,
489 U.S. 836 (1989) (per curiam).
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Booker, that the prisoner's claim was "well known" at the relevant time because
it had been raised in various legal and sociological journals and in dictum in
one Fifth Circuit opinion.212
Likewise, habeas petitioners have not succeeded in arguing that a conflict
concerning the validity of the constitutional claim demonstrates that the issue
was novel at the time of trial.213 In rejecting the novelty argument in Engle,
the Court admitted that some courts had not been receptive to the prisoners'
constitutional claim in the "dozens" of instances where other defendants had
raised the issue prior to the prisoners' trials.214 Nevertheless, the Court
observed, "[e]ven those decisions rejecting the defendant's claims" suggested
that the challenge was not novel because they "show[ed] that the issue had been
perceived by other defendants and that it was a live one in the courts at the
time."215
Obviously, defense attorneys should be expected to raise a defense that
has been accepted by half the courts that have reached the issue, even though
qualified immunity may be appropriate to prevent chilling the independent
exercise of public employees' discretion when the relevant cases are evenly
split. Nevertheless, the existence of a conflict should be relevant in deter-
mining how a reasonable defense attorney would have acted in the procedural
default cases, just as it is relevant in evaluating how a reasonable public official
would have acted in the qualified immunity cases. If a constitutional challenge
has been summarily rejected by the overwhelming majority of courts, defense
counsel's failure to raise the issue may be reasonable even though one court in
another jurisdiction has accepted the claim.
Not only are the courts unsympathetic to novelty claims when the rele-
vant precedents conflict, but some courts of appeals take an even more extreme
position, finding that a claim was not novel at the time of the prisoner's trial
even though no court had ever accepted the claim.2 16 In fact, some courts
refuse to consider a claim novel even though the court in which the trial
occurred was bound by precedent rejecting the claim.2 17 In Jones v. Butler,218
212. 746 F.2d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
213. See, e.g., Leggins v. Lockhart, 822 F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 907 (1988); United States v. Bonnette, 781 F.2d 357, 361-62 (4th Cir. 1986); United
States ex reL. Hudson v. Brierton, 699 F.2d 917, 921-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833
(1983). Cf. United States v. Gaylor, 828 F.2d 253, 256-57 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The law is often
in a state of flux. The mere fact that certain legal principles are unsettled does not deprive a
competent attorney of a 'reasonable basis' for asserting a claim").
214. 456 U.S. at 131-33.
215. Id. at 133 n.41.
216. See, e.g., Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1242 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1000 (1988); Landry v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1117, 1122 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988); Selvage v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Selvage v. Collins, 110 S. Ct. 974 (1990) (per curiam); Bass v.
Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); Ford v. Strickland,
696 F.2d 804, 817 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
217. See, e.g., Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1242 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1000 (1988); Landry v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1117, 1122 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988); Selvage v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Selvage v. Collins, 110 S. Ct. 974 (1990) (per curiam); Roman v.
Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); Bass v.
Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); Ford v. Strickland,
696 F.2d 804, 817 (1lth Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
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for example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that objections to the prosecution's use
of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from juries were familiar at the
time of the prisoner's trial because other defendants had made the argument and
because the Supreme Court had laid the basis for the claim in Swain v.
Alabama.219 The court reached this conclusion even though it acknowledged
that Swain had expressly held that a defendant could not establish a
constitutional violation simply by relying, as the prisoner had in Jones, on the
prosecutor's behavior at her trial,220 and that Batson v. Kentucky, 2 1 the case
that overruled this aspect of Swain, thus constituted '"an explicit and substantial
break with prior precedent."'=
These decisions may be exactly what Engle had in mind when it said that
procedural defaults cannot be excused "[w]here the basis of a constitutional
claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived and litigated that
claim."2 23 Nevertheless, the policies underlying the cause and prejudice
standard are not undermined if habeas review is permitted when defense
counsel failed to raise an issue because of a reasonable perception of futility.
The state court would most likely have rejected the claim, and objecting
contemporaneously therefore would not have contributed to comity and
federalism or resulted in early correction of the error.224 Accordingly, the
cause requirement should be satisfied in a case like Smith v. Murray, when
defense counsel failed to appeal an issue that the state supreme court had
"decisively barred" just two years earlier. 25 Defense attorneys should not be
asked to continue fighting old battles when they reasonably believe they are not
risking loss of a meritorious claim.2 26
218. 864 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075 (1989).
219. 380 U.S. 202 (1965); see Jones, 864 F.2d at 364.
220. See 864 F.2d at 364 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-26).
221. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
222. Jones, 864 F.2d at 363 (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986)).
223. 456 U.S. at 134. The year before the Engle petitioners went to trial, the state legis-
lature passed a new criminal code, which most Ohio courts assumed made no change in the tra-
ditional practice requiring defendants to prove self-defense and other affirmative defenses. See
id. at 110-11. At the time of the prisoners' trials, no court had published an opinion suggesting
that the statute altered the common law rule, and the code's legislative history suggested no such
change. See Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1133 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'd, 456 U.S.
107 (1982). In fact, two months before the last of the three Engle prisoners went to trial, the
Ohio Supreme Court issued a decision noting that "self-defense is an affirmative defense, which
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St. 2d 28,
30, 330 N.E.2d 674, 676 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976). Nonetheless, the Court
refused to excuse the prisoners' default. But cf. supra note 88 (suggesting that Engle might not
have intended to preclude use of futility to satisfy cause requirement in all cases).
224. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
225. 477 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at
187 (Supp. 1989); Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 646 (suggesting that default should be excused
when the forfeited claim had been rejected by the state's highest court within some limited time
frame with no significant intervening circumstances).
226. Cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535 (granting qualified immunity to the Attorney General
when he "gambled and lost" on an open question, even though various members of the Supreme
Court had debated the constitutionality of similar actions in prior concurring opinions, and he




Some courts of appeals have agreed, excusing defaults when the local
courts had previously rejected the claim later raised on habeas.2 27 As the
Second Circuit noted in Ingber v. Enzor, "[w]ere we to penalize [prisoners] for
failing to challenge such entrenched precedent, we would ascribe to attorneys
and their clients the power to prognosticate with greater precision than the
judges of this court."' 2m
B. Timing of Precedents
Unlike the qualified immunity cases, the procedural default cases contain
almost no discussion of timing issues. There is no indication that any time must
elapse after issuance of the precedents laying the groundwork for a
constitutional challenge before the argument becomes reasonably available to
defense counsel. Rather, the courts seem to assume that, so long as the other
decisions preceded the prisoner's trial, the claim was not a novel one.
The four dissenters in Reed, for example, thought that the four- and
nine-month intervals between the prisoner's trial in North Carolina and prior
decisions issued by the Connecticut Superior Court and the Eighth Circuit were
"certainly... enough time" to justify a finding that "the legal basis for making
[the prisoner's] claim was reasonably available to him.'229 Likewise, in Engle,
the Court cited a number of cases to support its assertion that "dozens" of other
defendants were making the argument that the prisoners in Engle failed to
raise, but apparently thought it irrelevant that some of those cases were decided
after the Engle petitioners' trials 2 30 Following that lead, the Eleventh Circuit
held in Smith v. Kemp that defense counsel's unawareness of a Supreme Court
decision issued only six days before trial did not excuse a procedural default.231
Similarly, in Briley v. Booker, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
227. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 231 (6th Cir. 1989) ("the
cause requirement... should not be applied in a way that would encourage efforts to relitigate
well settled points of law, and the fact that the point appeared to be settled constituted cause for
not raising it") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816 (1990); Dalton v. United States,
862 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1988); Bridge v. Lynaugh, 860 F.2d 162, 163-64 (5th Cir.
1988) (per curiam); United States v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1988); Hargrave
v. Dugger, 832 F.2d 1528, 1531-33 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1353
(1989). Cf. Songer v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 1133, 1141 n.14 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (cause requirement satisfied because defense counsel reasonably
interpreted state law to foreclose objection).
In three of the six court of appeals decisions cited above, however, the prisoners failed to
raise a claim later recognized by the Supreme Court in a 'blockbusting"' decision that was
'wholly unexpected"' and contrary to settled law in every circuit that had previously considered
the issue. Callanan, 881 F.2d at 231 (quoting United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 521 (1st
Cir. 1988)). The Supreme Court opinion, McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987),
held that the mail fraud statute prohibited only acts intended to deprive others of tangible rights.
The mail fraud conviction in Callanan was based on the theory that the defendants had schemed
to deprive others of intangible rights, an obviously impermissible basis for conviction after
McNally. See also Dalton, 862 F.2d at 1308; Shelton, 848 F.2d at 1487. It is not obvious that
these courts would have used the same standard if the defaulted claim had involved an issue that
did not similarly point to the prisoners' innocence.
228. 841 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir. 1988). See also O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 93
(1966) (per curiam).
229. 468 U.S. at 25 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
230. Of the twenty-five cases cited by the Court, six were decided after all three prison-
ers were convicted, one was decided after petitioner Hughes' trial, and two others were decided
only the month before Hughes' trial. See 456 U.S. at 132 nn.39 & 40.
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finding that the prisoner should have been aware of a district court decision
issued the previous month in another jurisdiction. 232
As discussed above in the qualified immunity context, federal court
opinions are available relatively quickly through computer research tools,
looseleaf services, and advance sheets.2 33 It therefore seems reasonable to
presume that criminal defense attorneys - like public officials with ready ac-
cess to legal advice - will be familiar with relevant opinions soon after they
are decided.23 Nevertheless, a defense attorney in the midst of preparing for
trial cannot reasonably be expected to be aware of a case that discusses a
previously unknown legal argument the moment that decision is issued.
The courts' failure to recognize the timing issue in the procedural default
cases is thus an unwarranted departure from Reed's reasonableness standard: it
impedes the protection of constitutional rights without significantly promoting
the interests underlying the cause and prejudice test. Expecting defense counsel
to be familiar with an opinion immediately after its release, without allowing
reasonable time for her to learn of the case, does not serve the goals of comity
and federalism. The attorney who fails to make an argument discussed in a
newly decided case is not showing disrespect for the state courts or attempting
to hold the issue in reserve; rather, she is probably not yet aware of the
decision. Moreover, forgiving procedural defaults and granting habeas review
in such cases will not intrude on the state courts more so than any other
exercise of habeas jurisdiction.
C. Similarity of Precedents
In addition to asking defense counsel to be aware of relevant cases as
soon as they are decided, the courts of appeals often conclude that an issue was
reasonably available at the time of the prisoner's trial despite the absence of
precedent on point. The courts therefore expect attorneys to draw analogies
from similar - and sometimes not so similar - cases. In Engle, for example,
231. 715 F.2d 1459, 1470-71 (11th Cir. 1983).
232. 746 F.2d at 226-27; see Briley v. Booker, 594 F. Supp. 1399, 1402 (E.D. Va.),
affd, 746 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). See also Presnell v. Kemp, 835 F.2d 1567,
1582 (11th Cir. 1988) (seven months sufficient to learn of Supreme Court decision), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989); Bates v. Blackburn, 805 F.2d 569, 577 (5th Cir. 1986) (basing
refusal to excuse default in part on Fifth Circuit opinion issued three weeks before prisoner's
trial), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987); Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 745 F.2d 1332, 1341 (11th
Cir. 1984) (one of the major cases that provided a basis for the prisoner's claim was a Supreme
Court ruling decided seven months before default), affd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 1514 (11th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393(1987); Gibson v. Spalding, 665 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1981) (four months sufficient to learn
of Supreme Court decision), vacated and remanded sub nom. Washington v. Gibson, 456 U.S.
968 (1982). Cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 168 n.16 (although the Court did not reach the question of
cause, the government argued that the prisoner's constitutional claim was not novel at the time of
his trial because D.C. Circuit opinion issued two years after prisoner's appeal, which was the
first case to reject similar instructions, seemed to consider the law clearcut).
233. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. In addition to the sources cited there,
the Criminal Law Reporter publishes selected state and federal decisions on criminal law topics,
typically within three to six weeks after they are released.
234. As is true for public officials, however, the cost of computer research tools may
prevent some criminal defense attorneys from taking advantage of that service, see supra note
96. Cf. Marcus, supra note 47, at 723 (suggesting that a constitutional claim is reasonably
available once supportive cases have been published in advance sheets).
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the Court cited twenty-five cases to support its assertion that "dozens" of
defendants were making challenges similar to the defaulted claim, but none of
the cases both preceded the prisoners' trials and involved challenges to in-
structions requiring defendants to prove self-defense claims.235
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the prisoners' constitutional
challenge was not novel because In re Winship's requirement that the prose-
cution prove "every fact necessary to constitute the crime" beyond a reasonable
doubt236 provided a basis for their claim.23 7 Although Engle disclaimed any
intent to require defense counsel to "exercise extraordinary vision,"'3 Winship
had said nothing about the burden of proving affirmative defenses, as opposed
to elements of the crime, and traditionally that burden had been placed on the
defense.239 In fact, at the time of the three trials in Engle, the most recent
Supreme Court decision on affirmative defenses had permitted the states to
require the defendant to prove an insanity defense beyond a reasonable
doubt.240
Moreover, some ingenuity was necessary to foresee the possibility that
Winship might apply when the affirmative defense of self-defense arguably did
not rebut any element of the crime. In Engle, for example, two of the prison-
ers were charged with aggravated murder, which was defined as "purposely,
and with prior calculation and design, caus[ing] the death of another."24 1
Defense counsel might reasonably have assumed that the prosecutor could
satisfy Winship by proving that the defendant acted purposely, leaving it to the
defense to prove that the killing, though intentional, was an act of self-
defense.242 In fact, in a number of the cases cited by the Engle majority, the
courts had upheld statutes requiring defendants to prove various defenses on the
theory that the defenses did not negate any element of the crime.243 As one
commentator noted, later Supreme Court opinions that ultimately imposed
235. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 131-32 & nn.39 & 40.
236. 397 U.S. at 364.
237. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 131.
238. Id.
239. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235 (1987); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d
1055, 1065 (4th Cir.) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
240. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
241. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (1975), quoted in Engle, 456 U.S. at 112 n.5.
The third was charged with felonious assault, which was defined as "knowingly [c]aus[ing]
serious physical harm to another" or "knowingly ... [c]aus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physi-
cal harm to another by means of a deadly weapon." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (1975),
quoted in Engle, 456 U.S. at 114 n.12.
242. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1987) (relying on this theory in
upholding Ohio's requirement that defendant prove self-defense claim). But cf. Dripps, The
Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1665 (1987) (advocating
that prosecution should have burden of proving all facts that make a substantial difference in
punishment, whether elements of the crime or affirmative defenses).
243. See, e.g., In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 931-32, 519 P.2d 1073, 1087 (1974) (en
banc) (entrapment); Woods v. State, 233 Ga. 347, 348-49, 211 S.E.2d 300, 301-02 (1974)(authority to sell narcotics), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975). Likewise, the courts that
had accepted burden of proof challenges had reasoned that the issue the defendant was required
to prove negated some element of the crime and therefore was not an affirmative defense. See,
e.g., Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. Supp. 577, 585-86 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (consumer
reporting agency must maintain reasonable procedures to ensure accuracy of investigative con-




limits on the states' ability to require defendants to prove affirmative defenses
"represent[ed] a sophisticated extension of the concepts articulated in
Winship."
In Reed, however, the Court appeared to adopt a different, less
demanding approach. Finding that the prisoner did not have the tools to chal-
lenge the state's requirement that he prove his affirmative defenses, the Court
distinguished Engle on the ground that the prisoners in Engle had had the
benefit of Winship at their trials.245 Although Winship may have been the first
Supreme Court decision to hold clearly that the Constitution imposes a
reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases,246 the ruling merely clarified, as
the Reed dissent pointed out, what had "long been assumed." 247 Accordingly,
Reed's efforts to distinguish Engle may signal more realistic expectations on the
part of the Court regarding the reasonable defense attorney's predictive
capabilities.248
Nevertheless, the courts of appeals tend to follow the stricter Engle ap-
proach, requiring criminal defendants and their attorneys to read precedents
with a good deal of imagination and then use them to make innovative consti-
tutional arguments in related contexts. In Leggins v. Lockhart,49 for example,
the prisoner argued that the jury should not have been permitted to sentence
him to life imprisonment after the more lenient sentence imposed by the first
jury had been reversed on appeal. In support of his claim, the prisoner relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in Bullington v. Missouri that the double
jeopardy clause bars imposition of the death penalty at a second capital murder
trial after the first jury sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment 25 One of
the tools the Eighth Circuit thought defense counsel could have used to raise
this issue prior to Bullington was the Supreme Court's holding in Burks v.
United States that a defendant may not be retried if her conviction is reversed
on grounds of insufficient evidence. 25' However, the Court had never applied
Burks to sentencing decisions. In fact, prior Supreme Court opinions had
suggested that the double jeopardy clause did not preclude a harsher sentence -
including even the death penalty - when a defendant was reconvicted after a
second trial252 and four Justices therefore characterized the majority's decision
244. Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 617. See also Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055,
1070-71 (4th Cir.) (Mumaghan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); Allen, The
Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After
Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 63 (1977). But see Reed, 468 U.S. at 26
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (characterizing later cases as following "a fortiori" from Winship).
245. See Reed, 468 U.S. at 19.
246. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting).
247. Winship, 397 U.S. at 362 (citing numerous cases); see Reed, 468 U.S. at 22-23
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the only novel issue in Winship was whether the rea-
sonable doubt requirement applied in juvenile trials). See also 1 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,
supra note 1, at 68-69 (Supreme Court had no opportunity prior to Winship to rule on the consti-
tutional implications of the placement of the burden of proof in criminal cases because reasonable
doubt standard was in place in all jurisdictions).
248. Alternatively, the tension between Engle and Reed may simply reflect the divisions
on the Court. See supra note 58.
249. 822 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907 (1988).
250. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
251. 437 U.S. 1 (1978); see Leggins, 822 F.2d at 766-67.
252. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-20 (1969) (increased prison
term); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919) (death penalty).
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in Bullington as "irreconcilable in principle with the precedents of this
Court."253
Similarly, in Bates v. Blackburn,2 4 the Fifth Circuit refused to excuse
the prisoner for failing to attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction, even though the default occurred more than a year prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Virginia. Jackson had made clear, for
the first time, that constitutional challenges to burden of proof requirements
were not limited to cases where the jury received improper instructions con-
cerning the reasonable doubt standard, but could also be made when no rational
factfinder would have convicted.255 Nevertheless, the court of appeals
determined that the Jackson issue was not novel, in part because Winship
already required the prosecution to prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.256 The court relied on Winship even though three Justices
had criticized the Jackson majority for extending Winship and creating "a new
rule of law" by requiring evidence sufficient to persuade not only the trier of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt, but also the appellate and habeas judges.257
In Thompson v. Lynaugh,258 the same court refused to excuse the
prisoner's failure to object contemporaneously to the prosecutor's introduction
of a victim impact statement in a capital case, which the Supreme Court pro-
hibited five years later in Booth v. Maryland.259 The court of appeals reasoned
that this argument had been available at the prisoner's trial because several
Supreme Court decisions had already emphasized that the eighth amendment
requires death penalty hearings to focus on the individual character of the
defendant and the circumstances of the crime.260 The court of appeals thus
expected defense counsel to draw the connection between the generalized goal
of individualized sentencing and the inadmissibility of evidence concerning the
crime's impact on the victims, even though the four Booth dissenters thought it
obvious that "the amount of harm one causes does bear upon the extent of his
'personal responsibility."'2 61
253. 451 U.S. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
254. 805 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987).
255. 443 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1979).
256. See Bates, 805 F.2d at 575. The court also noted that the state supreme court had
indicated that it would reverse a conviction if there was no evidence to prove an essential element
of the charge. See id.
257. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 330-31 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
258. 821 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1035 (1987).
259. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
260. See Thompson, 821 F2d at 1082.
261. Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d
1497, 1510-12 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (prisoner had the tools to argue that fifth and sixth
amendments barred admission during death penalty hearing of statements he had made to proba-
tion officer during presentence interview because due process protections had been extended to
capital sentencing hearings; likewise, claim that admission of presentence report violated con-
frontation rights was available because "[t]he clear trend ... was toward expanding the full
panoply of Sixth Amendment rights, including confrontation rights, into new contexts," such as
probation revocation hearings); Landry v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1117, 1119-20 (5th Cir.)(prisoner argued that hypotheticals used by prosecutor during voir dire to illustrate cases where
the requirement in death penalty statute that defendant have acted "deliberately" was not met
involved acts that were not capital murder, and therefore might have led jury to believe that all
capital murder cases involved deliberate acts; claim held not novel because general language in
prior Supreme Court death penalty cases required juries to exercise informed discretion and
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Although the reasonable defense attorney - like the reasonable public
official - does not need a case directly on point to alert her to a potential
constitutional argument, the policies underlying the cause requirement do not
require that habeas petitioners forfeit valid constitutional claims simply because
their trial attorneys were not prescient enough to foresee such extensions of
prior case law.262 The attorney who is not quite so visionary is not flouting
state procedures or saving her best card to be played later, instead, she has
understandably failed to draw the link between the existing precedents and the
newly recognized claim. Moreover, she is probably not depriving the state
court of an opportunity to resolve the issue itself at an early stage of the
proceedings without federal interference: if the argument represents an
innovative extension of previous cases, the state court would most likely have
rejected it had the issue been raised.2 63
mandated that states narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 900 (1988); Johnson v. Blackburn, 778 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1985) (argument
challenging jury instruction that one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences
of her acts was "an entirely foreseeable extension of Winship" and thus available prior to
Supreme Court opinion prohibiting that instruction); McBee v. Grant, 763 F.2d 811, 816-17(6th Cir. 1985) (same); Dietz v. Solem, 677 F.2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1982) (same).
262. See Reed, 468 U.S. at 15, quoted supra at text accompanying note 83. Cf.
Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 632-33 (contrasting strict standard to which defense attorney is
held in default cases with the Court's application of the requirement that a prisoner fairly present
her claim to the state courts in order to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine; in the latter context, the
Court does not seem to require state courts to recognize the ramifications of Supreme Court
precedents in other factual contexts).
For examples of cases adopting a more realistic approach, see Hargrave v. Dugger, 832
F.2d 1528, 1531-33 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (prisoner's argument that instructions improp-
erly limited jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances at death penalty hearing was not
reasonably available prior to Supreme Court decision holding that jurors may not be precluded
from considering any relevant mitigating circumstances, whether or not they are specified in the
state's death penalty statute), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989); Adams v. Dugger, 816 F.2d
1493, 1497-1500 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (prisoner could not be faulted for failing to
anticipate Supreme Court decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi. 472 U.S. 320 (1985), which
prohibited prosecutorial statements suggesting that the jury is not really responsible for making
the sentencing decision in a capital case), rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 401 (1989). But
see Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1479 (11th Cir. 1988) (Hill, J., specially concurring)(CaIdwell did not represent a significant change in the law because in any suit- even, for ex-
ample, in a civil damages case - "an instruction or argument which led the jury to underestimate
its role in the decision making process would be error"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
263. A more realistic definition of novelty is particularly important because the Supreme
Court has decided that ignorance or inadvertence on the part of defense counsel that does not rise
to the level of ineffective assistance cannot satisfy the cause requirement. See Carrier, 477 U.S.
at 486-88. See also supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has also
suggested that an issue can be reasonably available at the time of the prisoner's trial - thereby
preventing the use of novelty to excuse a procedural default - but not so obvious that defense
counsel's failure to object contemporaneously will constitute proof of ineffective assistance.
Specifically, although Engle held that the constitutionality of requiring defendants to prove
affirmative defenses was not a novel question at the time of the prisoners' trials, the Court
acknowledged that not "every astute counsel" would have recognized the issue. 456 U.S. at
133. Similarly, the Court indicated that the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel "does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable consti-
tutional claim." Id. at 134. Moreover, an ineffective assistance claim involves examination of
defense counsel's "overall performance," Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 (1986),
and therefore typically requires proof of more than the one error involved in failing to preserve
the habeas claim. See Guttenberg, supra note 45, at713; Marcus, supra note 47, at 702 n.263.
But cf. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 (one isolated error can demonstrate ineffective assistance if it is
"sufficiently egregious"); Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 383-87 (finding representation inadequate
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D. Relevance of Other Sources of Law
A public official's violation of a legal obligation imposed by anything
other than the Constitution is irrelevant in deciding whether she is entitled to
qualified immunity. 2 64 The Supreme Court has hinted, however, that other
sources of law may be important in habeas cases when a prisoner seeks to
excuse a procedural default.
In Dugger v. Adams, 265 the prisoner relied on the Court's opinion in
Caldwell v. Mississippi2 66 to challenge the constitutionality of the trial judge's
comment that the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether to impose the
death penalty lay with him, rather than the jury. The Court did not address the
prisoner's contention that the novelty of the Caldwell argument excused his
failure to object to the remarks at trial. Even if the constitutional claim was
novel, the Court said, the cause requirement was not met because any remarks
by the judge that violated the eighth amendment were also inconsistent with
state law, and no excuse was proffered for the failure to object to the comments
on state law grounds. The Court justified its decision by relying on the policies
underlying the cause requirement: because the prisoner had failed to make an
when defense counsel failed to file timely suppression motion because he had conducted no pre-
trial discovery due to his mistaken belief that the prosecutor was required to disclose inculpatory
evidence to the defense).
Accordingly, the courts of appeals often reject a prisoner's dual attempt to satisfy the
cause requirement by arguing both novelty and, in the alternative, ineffective assistance. See,
e.g., Presnell v. Kemp, 835 F.2d 1567, 1581 (11th Cir. 1988) (refusing to excuse failure to
object to instruction creating rebuttable presumption that one intends the natural and probable
consequences of her acts; court rejects prisoner's arguments that attorney did not realize instruc-
tion violated seven-month-old Supreme Court decision striking down similar instruction creating
irrebuttable presumption and, in the alternative, that issue was novel until later Supreme Court
ruling barring rebuttable presumptions), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989); Leggins v.
Lockhart, 822 F.2d 764, 766-68 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim
although attorney failed to present a claim that court did not consider novel because it had been
recognized by a number of other courts and flowed from several Supreme Court decisions), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 907 (1988); McBee v. Grant, 763 F.2d 811, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1985) (relying
on Engle in refusing to find cause when attorney failed to object to instruction creating presump-
tion that one intends the natural and probable consequences of her acts; court concludes that
claim was not novel because Supreme Court had already held that prosecution must prove every
element of crime beyond a reasonable doubt and also rejects prisoner's claim of ineffective assis-
tance); Honeycutt v. Mahoney, 698 F.2d 213, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1983) (in case similar to Engle,
rejecting argument that attorney's ignorance of First Circuit opinion that recognized the constitu-
tional claim constitutes ineffective assistance); Henderson v. Jago, 681 F.2d 471, 474 (6th Cir.
1982) (similar to Engle).
Such cases have been defended on the theory that any other approach would nullify the
cause requirement: procedural defaults would be excused either because of novelty or because of
ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Jones v. Jago, 701 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 914 (1983). But, as one commentator observed, that argument is based on a "syllogism
[that] is fundamentally flawed" because in most cases one default will not constitute ineffective
assistance. Yackle, supra note 69, at 658 n.234. Thus, as the concepts of both novelty and
ineffective assistance become narrower and the middle ground between them expands, there is a
corresponding increase in the number of prisoners who are punished for defaults committed by
defense counsel who were marginally competent but not visionary enough to foresee future
developments in the law.
264. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
265. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
266. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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available objection, he had deprived the state court of the opportunity to correct
the error during trial.267
The Court did not hold that a defendant's failure to preserve one possible
objection will always bar subsequent habeas review of other claims arising
from the same conduct. The Court limited its decision to cases like Adams,
where the state law objection - that the judge's comments misinformed the
jury about its role in the capital sentencing process - was a "necessary ele-
ment" of the federal claim.26 But the Court's analysis of the relevant policies
does not seem limited to the context of related claims, and the Adams rule may
therefore be extended to cases where the challenge ultimately raised on habeas
is completely distinct from the state law objection.269
Nevertheless, the Court's policy arguments tend to support the approach
taken in Adams: defense attorneys, like public officials, can reasonably be
expected to be aware of precedents that are relevant to their responsibilities but.
are not constitutionally based. Obviously, however, the Adams rule should not
apply when defense counsel had no reason to know of the state law objection or
to believe any court would accept that claim.270 In those cases, the procedural
default does not evidence an intent to circumvent state procedures. Moreover,
the failure to object is not likely to deprive the state court of an opportunity to
correct the error and avoid the intrusion of federal review because the court
would probably have rejected the argument if it had been made.271
IV. DEFINING "NEW" RULES IN RETROACTIVITY CASES
Five Supreme Court opinions issued in the past two years have, without
ever mentioning the cause and prejudice requirement, substantially mooted the
argument that novelty can excuse a procedural default. These decisions -
Teague v. Lane272 and Penry v. Lynaugh,273 decided during the 1988 Term,
and Butler v. McKellar,274 Saffle v. Parks,275 and Sawyer v. Smith,276 decided
267. See Adams, 489 U.S. at 408.
268. Id. at 410. Nevertheless, the dissent pointed out that other defendants might seek
to establish a Caldwell violation by showing that the judge's comments unconstitutionally
downplayed the jury's responsibility in the sentencing process even though they were accurate
under state law. See id. at 422 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Hopkinson v.
Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1290 n.4 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3256
(1990); Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1285 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff d on other
grounds sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
269. See Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1073 n.29 (4th Cir.) (Murnaghan, J., dis-
senting) (pre-Adams opinion suggesting that failure to object on state law ground waives consti-
tutional objection, without limiting the waiver to related objections), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004
(1980).
270. Cf. Adams v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 1493, 1496 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(prisoner's failure to challenge judge's remarks on due process grounds, an argument already
rejected in prior similar cases, does not suggest that failure to challenge comments on eighth
amendment grounds in earlier habeas petition was the result of "intentional abandonment or
inexcusable neglect"), rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
271. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
272. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality).
273. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
274. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
275. 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990).
276. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
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last Term - have revolutionized the law governing retrospective application of
new constitutional rules in habeas cases.
The new approach came in response to Griffith v. Kentucky, which
mandated that even a Supreme Court opinion making "a 'clear break' with the
past" be applied retroactively to cases that were not yet final when the decision
was announced. 277 Griffith explained that applying new decisions to cases
pending on direct review is essential both to maintain the "integrity of judicial
review," which requires the Court to resolve all such cases "'in light of [its] best
understanding of governing constitutional principles,"' and to ensure that
similarly situated defendants are treated alike.278
Griffith represented yet another step in the Court's long search for an
appropriate retroactivity rule for criminal cases.279 Historically, new consti-
tutional rulings were given complete retrospective application, consistent with
the Blackstonian view that judicial decisions merely describe the law as it al-
ready exists.280 In Linkletter v. Walker, the Court rejected that notion, ob-
serving that courts do not simply "discover" the law, but actually "make it in-
terstitially."281 Concluding that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids
retrospective application of new constitutional rulings,2s2 Linkletter adopted a
three-pronged test for determining the retroactivity of new criminal procedure
rulings. The Linkletter test required examination of the purposes of the new
rule, the extent to which law enforcement authorities had relied on the prior
doctrine, and the effect of retroactive application on the administration of
justice.2W If these three factors required retroactive application, the new ruling
governed convictions that were already final as well as those still proceeding
through the trial and appellate process.28
In several separate opinions written at this time, Justice Harlan advocated
an alternative approach. He suggested that new constitutional decisions be
applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review when the new rule
277. 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
278. Id. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring in the judgment)).
279. The retroactivity rules applicable in criminal cases differ from those used in civil
cases. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court set out three factors rele-
vant in determining whether a decision in a civil case should apply retroactively. First, the
courts must apply the decision retroactively unless it "establish[ed] a new principle of law, either
by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied .... or by deciding an is-
sue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." Id. at 106 (citation
omitted). Second, the courts must examine the history, purpose, and effect of the new rule and
evaluate whether '"retrospective operation will further or retard its operation."' Id. at 107
(quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)). Finally, the courts must analyze any
unfairness resulting from retroactive application, declining to apply the rule retroactively if doing
so 'could produce substantial inequitable results."' Id. (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)).
280. See 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 119-20. For a general discus-
sion of the history of the Court's retroactivity rulings, see id. at 119-29; Hoffman, supra note
78, at 189-200.
281. 381 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1965).
282. See id. at629.
283. See ld. at636.
284. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-97, 300-01 (1967).
172 [VOL. 33
PREDICTING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
was announced. But he would not apply the new rule to any case that had
already become final. 5
In United States v. Johnson,86 the Court moved away from Linkletter
and accepted Harlan's approach, at least for some search and seizure cases.
Johnson held that a new fourth amendment rule would apply retroactively to all
cases pending on direct review at the time it was decided, unless the new
decision represented a "'clear break' with the past."28 7 The Court defined a
"clear break" case as one that "explicitly overrules a past precedent of this
Court, or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior
cases, or overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court
has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has
expressly approved." 28
In rejecting the clear break exception and extending Johnson beyond the
fourth amendment context, Griffith adopted Justice Harlan's approach with
respect to cases on direct appeal. The Supreme Court's five recent decisions
endorse the second half of Harlan's retroactivity theory, holding that cases al-
ready final when a new constitutional rule289 is articulated are not entitled to
the benefit of that rule, subject to two exceptions. The exceptions come into
play when the new rule prohibits the state290 from punishing certain types of
conduct or executing certain classes of persons,29 1 or when the new rule is
285. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677-95 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting).
286. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
287. Id. at 562, 558.
288. Id. at 551 (citations omitted). See also Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 58-59(1985) (extending Johnson to fifth amendment case).
289. All five retroactivity cases raised questions concerning the retrospective application
of constitutional rules, and some language in the Court's opinions suggests that the new retroac-
tivity doctrine is limited to such cases. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2826; Teague, 489 U.S. at
299, 309, 310. Other language, however, suggests that the Teague approach is applicable more
broadly to any new rule a prisoner attempts to invoke on habeas. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at
1216; Penry, 492 U.S. at 313. Nonetheless, some lower courts have limited the Teague
doctrine to constitutional issues. See Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir.
1989) (en bane) (applying the Teague doctrine itself retroactively because it is not a constitutional
rule, but is based on "an interpretation of the statutory scope of habeas corpus"), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 3256 (1990); Callanan v. United States, 881 F.2d 229, 232 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989)(limiting Teague to new constitutional rules of criminal procedure), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1816 (1990). Cf. Young v. Herring, 917 F.2d 858, 862 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990) (limiting Teague to
rules of criminal procedure). But cf. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1305 (5th Cir. 1989)
(King, J., dissenting) (suggesting, without discussing Teague's possible limitation to
constitutional rules, that Teague itself announced a new rule and therefore should not be applied
retroactively), affd on other grounds sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
290. Although all five of the recent Supreme Court cases involved habeas petitions filed
by state prisoners, at least one court of appeals judge has suggested that the Teague doctrine
apaplies equally to section 2255 motions filed by federal prisoners. See Dodson v. Zelez, 917
F2d 1250, 1265 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990) (Anderson, J., dissenting). Cf. Callanan v. United
States, 881 F.2d 229, 232 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989) (court ignores retroactivity question on the
ground that Teague applies only to new constitutional rules of criminal procedure without men-
tioning any distinction between state and federal prisoners), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1816
(1990). This suggestion is supported by Teague's definition of a new rule as one that "imposes
a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." 489 U.S. at 301.
291. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 329-30; Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. The Court found this
exception applicable to the prisoner's argument in Penry that executing mentally retarded persons
like himself violated the eighth amendment. See 492 U.S. at 330. Aside from death penalty
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'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' in the sense that the "likelihood of
obtaining an accurate conviction" is "seriously diminish[ed]" when it is not
applied.292
cases of this type, the first exception is apparently quite narrow because most criminal procedure
rulings do not render the defendant's conduct constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Butler, 110
S. Ct. at 1218 (defendant charged with murder cannot take advantage of this exception because
nothing bars the states from prohibiting such conduct); Wickham v. Dowd, 914 F.2d 1111,
1115-16 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding exception inapplicable to prisoner's argument that the ban on
cruel and unusual punishment prohibits a court from conditioning a known alcoholic's probation
on abstinence from alcohol and then revoking probation when he violates that condition). But
cf. 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 10 (Supp. 1990) (observing that Teague did
not address the possibility that the first exception also applies to rulings, like those interpreting
the double jeopardy clause, that deprive the state of authority to attempt to convict defendant).
292. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325(1937)). As examples of rules falling within this second exception, the Teague plurality listed
the right to counsel at trial, the prohibition on the prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony,
and the ban on confessions obtained by police brutality. See id. at 311-12, 313. But Teague ex-
pressly warned of the narrow scope of this exception, noting that it was "unlikely that many
such components of basic due process have yet to emerge." Id. at 313. But cf. Sawyer, 110 S.
Ct. at 2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[tihe majority cannot bind the future to present
constitutional understandings of what is essential to due process'). Finding the exception inap-
plicable to Teague's challenge to the composition of the jury, the plurality reasoned that "the
absence of a fair cross section on the jury venire does not undermine the fundamental fairness
that must underlie a conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate con-
viction," Teague, 489 U.S. at 315, despite the fact that in such a case the jury's "impartiality
might have been eroded by racial prejudice." Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in thejudgment). See also id. at 343 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court likewise found the second exception inapplicable to the prisoner's contention
in Saffle that an instruction warning the jury in a death penalty hearing to avoid any influence of
sympathy violated the eighth amendment. The prisoner's challenge was based on the theory that
the instruction in effect permitted the jury to disregard evidence of mitigating circumstances, and
"[r]ules ensuring the jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence.., are integral to the proper
functioning of the capital sentencing hearing" and to protection of the fundamental right to indi-
vidualized sentencing. Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1270 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that the second exception did not apply, explaining that "[t]he objectives of
fairness and accuracy are more likely to be threatened than promoted by a rule allowing the sen-
tence to turn... on whether the defendant can strike an emotional chord in a juror." 110 S. Ct
at 1264.
Similarly, the Court refused to apply the exception in Sawyer, where the prisoner chal-
lenged remarks made by the prosecutor during a capital sentencing hearing that minimized thejury's responsibility for the sentencing decision. Although the jury's understanding of its role in
a capital case is important in ensuring the reliability of thejury's decision, the Court held that the
second exception is not available simply because a new rule is intended to improve the accuracy
of the trial or sentencing process. All eighth amendment decisions would satisfy that criterion,
the Court reasoned. See 110 S. Ct. at 2831-32. Rather, the rule must not only be designed to
enhance accuracy, but must also constitute a "watershed rulel of fundamental fairness." Id. at
2831. The Court found the latter element missing in Sawyer. Specifically, it concluded that its
prior opinion holding similar statements barred by the eighth amendment because they created an
"unacceptable risk" of unreliable sentencing was not 'an absolute prerequisite to fundamental
fairness"' because the due process clause already prohibited any improper prosecutorial remarks
that in fact made a proceeding fundamentally unfair. Id. at 2832 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at
314). See also supra note 105 (describing Supreme Court opinion concluding that similar
comments by trial judge did not constitute a miscarriage of justice sufficient to excuse procedural
default).
For examples of other cases finding the second exception inapplicable, see Butler, 110
S. Ct. at 1218 ("a violation of... added restrictions on police investigatory procedures would
not seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination - indeed, it may in-
crease the likelihood"); Barker v. Estelle, 913 F.2d 1433, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1990) (exception
does not apply to prisoner's contention that he was entitled to confront witnesses at juvenile fit-
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Because a conviction is deemed "final" once the defendant has exhausted
the avenues of direct appeal in the state courts, and either the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari or the time for filing a petition for certiorari has
passed, 293 the Court's new approach means that "new rules will not be applied
or announced in cases on collateral review." 94 Therefore, the prisoner who
successfully explains her procedural default on the ground that her claim was
novel at the time of her trial now faces an additional barrier to habeas relief: if
the argument was truly a novel one, it almost certainly will involve application
of a new rule that is not available on habeas.295 If the court determines that the
prisoner is invoking a new rule, it will likely dismiss the habeas petition
without reaching the merits of the claim because even if the claim is a valid
one, it is not applicable on habeas.296 The procedural default cases discussing
novelty as cause, and the policy concerns underlying them, thus become
superfluous.
A. Evaluating the New Approach
The new approach was initially advocated by a plurality in Teague v.
Lane (although a majority of the Court seemed to agree with the plurality's
ness hearing; although confrontation rights are designed to ensure the accuracy of the factfinding
process, fitness hearing was not meant to be adversarial or to find facts, but only to determine
propriety of juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction over defendant); Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d
950, 986 (5th Cir. 1990) (exception inapplicable where prisoner challenged state's practice of
automatically affirming death sentence based on unconstitutional aggravating circumstance if thejury also based sentence on another, valid aggravating circumstance, even though the jury con-
sidered the invalid aggravating circumstance when balancing the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances and ultimately sentencing prisoner to death); Collins v. Zant, 892 F.2d 1502, 1512
(lth Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (similar to Butler); Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1294 (5th
Cir. 1989) (en banc) (second exception is not necessarily applicable simply because new rule
"implicates both the integrity of [the capital sentencing] procedure and the accuracy of the
determination"; rather, it must have an "overwhelming influence upon accuracy" or an "intimate
connection with factual innocence"), affd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
But see Swindler v. Lockhart, 110 S. Ct. 1938, 1940 n.* (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (argument that venue should not have been changed to place with small black
population comes within exception because reliability of conviction is "diminished when a
defendant is tried by a jury that has prejudged his case"); Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590,
594 (9th Cir. 1990) (exception applies where prisoner argues that he lacked mens rea necessary
to commit crime because he relied on prior lower court decision invalidating criminal statute he
allegedly violated; prisoner's argument goes to his "guilt or innocence" and thus to "the core of
the second exception"); Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724, 727 (9th Cir.) (Noonan, J.)(exception arguably applies to rule requiring appointment of psychiatrist to aid indigent defen-
dant's defense), motion to vacate denied, 110 S. Ct. 1799 (1990); Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d
1541, 1543 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990) (exception applies when prisoner challenges instructions that
shifted burden of proof).
293. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987). See also Penry, 492
U.S. at 314. But cf. Hoffman, The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 184 (describing ambiguity in the Court's recent
retroactivity cases concerning the stage of the criminal proceedings at which federal law becomes
"fixed" for purposes of habeas review).
294. Penry, 492 U.S. at 313.
295. See Friedman, supra note 69, at 301 n.286 (referring to this dilemma as "Catch-
2254").
296. This scenario is especially likely because the Court has suggested that the retroac-
tivity question is a threshold issue that should be resolved prior to consideration of the merits of
the underlying constitutional claim. See infra note 314.
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reasoning297), and ultimately was adopted by the majority in Penry v.
Lynaugh.298 The Court has articulated a number of policy concerns to justify
the distinction it has drawn between habeas petitions and cases on direct review:
(1) that equal treatment should be given to similarly situated defendants on
direct review, as well as to similarly situated prisoners who are collaterally
attacking their convictions;299 (2) that the goal of finalizing criminal
convictions outweighs the interest in making new rules available to habeas
petitioners;300 (3) that invoking new rules on habeas is particularly intrusive
"for it continually forces the States to marshall resources in order to keep in
prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing consti-
tutional standards";301 (4) that '[sitate courts are understandably frustrated
when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal
court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional com-
mands'"; 30 2 and (5) that requiring habeas courts to ensure that the prisoner's
trial was conducted according to then-prevailing constitutional standards will
sufficiently sensitize state courts to constitutional concerns. 30 3 None of these
policy interests is sufficiently compelling to justify the Court's reworking of the
retroactivity doctrine.
First, although the Court purports to share Griffith's goal of treating
similarly situated defendants alike,304 the principle of equal treatment is not
297. Although only three other Justices joined the retroactivity analysis in Justice
O'Connor's opinion, Justice Stevens' separate opinion, joined by Justice Blackmun, agreed
generally with the plurality's approach to retroactivity, though not with the narrow scope of the
second exception. See 489 U.S. at 319-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). In addition, Justice White thought that O'Connor's retroactivity discussion was
"an acceptable application" of the Court's prior decisions in Johnson and Griffith, with which
White still disagreed. See id. at 317 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
298. Penry also extended the Teague doctrine to habeas petitions challenging capital
sentencing procedures, reasoning that the finality concerns underlying Teague apply equally
when a prisoner collaterally attacks her sentence. See 492 U.S. at 313-14. The dissent, by con-
trast, found it "intolerable that the difference between life and death should turn on ... a fortuity
of timing, and beyond my comprehension that a majority of this Court will so blithely allow a
State to take a human life though the method by which sentence was determined violates our
Constitution." Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 304, 315-16.
300. See id. at 309-10. See also Penry, 492 U.S. at 314.
301. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (emphasis in original).
302. Id. (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 128 n.33).
303. See id. at 306. See also Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1260.
304. The Teague plurality observed that courts applying the new retroactivity approach
must "refus[e] to announce a new rule in a given case unless the rule would be applied retroac-
tively to the defendant in the case and to all others similarly situated." 489 U.S. at 316.
Moreover, Teague criticized the three-pronged Linkietter test, see supra text accompanying note
283, because at times its application had resulted in "disparate treatment of similarly situated
defendants on direct review." 489 U.S. at 303. Griffith, of course, had already resolved that
problem by mandating that all defendants whose cases were still pending on direct review were
entitled to the benefit of any new rules. See supra text accompanying note 278.
The Teague plurality also noted that Linldetter had resulted in unequal treatment of simi-
larly situated defendants on collateral review because the lower courts often disagreed about the
applicability of the relevant decisions on habeas. Until the Supreme Court resolved the issue,
habeas petitioners in different jurisdictions were treated differently. See 489 U.S. at 305. The
Court attributed this disparity to its own failure to deal with retroactivity questions as a threshold
matter, as well as Linkletter's "inability to account for the nature and function of collateral
review." Id. Given the Court's suggestion that according precedence to retroactivity issues
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served by denying retrospective application to any defendant whose appeal
process fortuitously ended the day before a new rule was announced. In fact,
some of these cases will not involve procedural defaults because the defendant
will have astutely raised the claim ultimately validated in the new decision, and
therefore will be no less deserving of a new trial than the defendant whose case
the Court happened to use as the vehicle for announcing the new rule.305 In
addition, as two of the four Justices making up the plurality in Teague noted in
their earlier dissent in Griffith, "'the Court's new approach equalizes nothing
except the numbers of defendants within the disparately treated classes'
because "'identically situated defendants may be subject to different
constitutional rules, depending on how long ago now-unconstitutional conduct
occurred and how quickly cases proceed through the criminal justice
system."'-3o6
Second, the Court's concerns about finality and state resources will al-
ways lead to cutbacks in habeas jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court does not
indicate why these interests trump the goal of ensuring error-free convictions
only on habeas and not on direct review, or as the Griffith dissent put it, why
granting a new trial is more acceptable on direct review than on habeas when
the disruption is the same in both cases. As Justice White noted in that dissent,
applying new rules on habeas rather than limiting their application to cases still
on direct review would be more burdensome "'in the aggregate,"' but likewise
"'it would be less burdensome to apply [new rules] retroactively to all cases
involving defendants whose last names begin with the letter 'S' than to make the
decision fully retroactive."' 307
would solve the first problem, see infra note 314, it is difficult to see why additional modi-
fications in the retroactivity doctrine were necessary to provide the lower courts with the
guidance necessary to avoid such conflicts.
305. For example, each of the claims Penry raised on habeas had been litigated in both
the trial court and the court of appeals. See 492 U.S. at 310-12. But because one of those argu-
ments involved the application of a new rule, it was barred on habeas. See infra note 324.
306. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 331-32 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Shea v. Louisiana,
470 U.S. 51, 62-64 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)). White's dissent in Griffith was joined by
Justice O'Connor, the author of the Teague plurality opinion, and by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who joined O'Connor's opinion in Teague. See also Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two
Perspectives, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11 (equality "can be achieved only by focusing steadily on
the time of the police conduct, without regard to the irrelevant rate of progress of cases through
our judicial system").
In his dissent in Butler, Justice Brennan described another inequity resulting from the
new approach to retroactivity: a prisoner whose trial did not conform to then-existing constitu-
tional standards is nevertheless unlikely to prevail on habeas if the federal court decides to issue
a new rule of law rejecting her constitutional claim. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1221 n.4
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1264 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(criticizing majority for applying new retroactivity rules to bar relief on claim litigated prior to
Teague). Cf. Hunt v. Vasquez, 899 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1990) (prisoner who received inef-
fective assistance of counsel on appeal is entitled to new appeal governed by current state law,
not by more favorable law that was in effect at time of his original appeal).
307. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 333-34 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Shea v.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 64 n.1 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)).
One commentator has argued that the finality costs are greater for habeas petitions raising
new law claims than for "almost any other category" of habeas petitions because a significant
percentage of successive habeas petitions raise new law claims and those cases are "the most
stale" and therefore the most difficult to retry. Hoffman, supra note 78, at 203. But he admits
that no available statistics measure what percentage of successive petitions consist of new law
claims. See id. Moreover, there is no necessary correlation between the number of habeas peti-
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Third, the Court does not explain why state courts are not equally
"frustrated" when the Supreme Court changes the rules of the game by im-
posing new constitutional requirements on direct review of state court convic-
tions. Moreover, even assuming that concern about state courts' hurt feelings
should ever outweigh the interest in remedying constitutional violations, the
new form of habeas review envisioned by the Teague line of cases may be more
insulting to state court judges. Focusing the habeas inquiry on the question
whether the' state court unreasonably interpreted then-existing precedent seems
like a more direct attack on the judge's decision, and therefore more likely to
engender bad feelings, than evaluating the current status of constitutional law,
which may have been impossible for the judge to foresee. 0
That leaves deterrence. Teague's reliance on deterrence concerns follows
from Justice Harlan's theory of retroactivity, but neither Harlan nor the current
members of the Court have cited any support in the habeas statutes or the
common law history of habeas for the view that the writ's purpose is to deter
state courts from ignoring constitutional commands. Nor has the Court
explained why the goal of encouraging state courts to comply with constitu-
tional norms dictates its current approach to retroactivity. For example, deter-
rence concerns might be adequately served by ensuring that the defendant
tions that a prisoner raising a new law claim previously filed and the amount of time since her
conviction. See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 333 n.2 (White, J., dissenting) (if the Court is concerned
about the difficulties of retrying old cases, "it could accomplish its purpose far more precisely by
applying new constitutional rules only to conduct of appropriately recent vintage"). Finally,
concerns about the burdens imposed by successive petitions have generally been overstated.
See, e.g., L. YACKLE, supra note 39, at 567; Guttenberg, supra note 45, at 678 & n.342(although approximately one-third of habeas petitioners file more than one petition, statistics
show a 60% decrease in number of petitions filed as a percentage of prison population between
1971 and 1981, as well as an overall decline in the total number filed). See generally supra note
79. But cf. infra note 315 (discussing recent efforts to enact legislation that would impose a
statute of limitations on habeas petitions in capital cases and would limit the number of petitions
that could be filed in such cases).
308. One commentator has raised a point similar to that made in Teague. See Hoffman,
supra note 78, at 204-06. He argues that the federal-state friction created by habeas petitions
does not arise simply because reversal is possible (a state appellate court is more likely than a
habeas court to overturn a trial court's ruling), or even because the reversal comes at the hands
of a federal court (there is always a remote possibility that the Supreme Court will reverse a
conviction on direct review). Id. at 204-05. Rather, habeas relief generates greater hostility
because of the manner in which reversal occurs. A trial judge who is reversed on appeal soon
after the trial ends probably perceives the process as fair because she had "the same opportunity
as the reviewing court to consider the relevant precedents" and simply made "an honest mis-
take." Id. at 205. On habeas, by contrast, the judge tends to feel "judged" because a reversal
"send[s] the state judge the implicit message that he or she has not 'toe[d] the constitutional
mark.'" Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment)). In cases involving new rules, habeas relief is especially likely to offend
the trial judge because the federal court has the advantage of "twenty-twenty hindsight." Id. at
206. Moreover, the state judge will probably believe that "his or her best attempt to make the
'right' choice, based on the materials and information available at the time, is unappreciated, and
impliedly if not expressly criticized by the federal habeas court." Id.
Nevertheless, as suggested in the text, reversing a judge's ruling on appeal when there
has been no intervening change in the law seems like the most direct challenge to the judge's
decision and therefore the most likely to create hurt feelings. In those cases, using the same
"materials and information" that were available to the trial judge, the appellate court decides that
she was simply wrong. The trial judge is less likely to feel 'judged" or "criticized" if a habeas
court reverses her decision based on some new development in constitutional law that she could
not have foreseen. It is difficult to imagine a more "honest mistake."
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received the benefit of the constitutional rules prevailing at the time of her
trial, rather than at the time her conviction became final.
The Court's single-minded focus on the deterrent purpose of habeas also
completely ignores its other function - to provide an independent federal
review of constitutional questions in order to vindicate constitutional rights.309
The Teague plurality may well be right in pointing out that comity and finality
concerns deserve recognition because "'[the Court never has defined the scope
of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure that an individual
accused of crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error."'310 But the
Court never again mentions the latter set of policies and instead focuses solely
on deterrence, finality, and comity.31' In fact, the Teague line of cases does
more than merely ignore the goal of safeguarding constitutional rights: by
recharacterizing habeas as essentially another form of appellate review that
applies a clearly erroneous standard,312 the Court actively undermines the
writ's traditional role as an independent, plenary review of constitutional issues.
Moreover, the Teague approach drastically limits the ability of the fed-
eral courts, including the Supreme Court, to develop constitutional principles in
criminal cases. If habeas effectively becomes another stage of the appeal
process, with the federal court asking only whether the state court's ruling was
clearly erroneous under the legal standards prevailing at the time, the federal
courts will be able to mold the constitutional principles governing criminal
cases only in state cases on direct review to the Supreme Court or in federal
criminal cases. Given the relative rarity of those opportunities,313 the Teague
doctrine is likely to stagnate the development of federal constitutional law.31 4
309. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
310. 489 U.S. at 308 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986)(plurality)) (emphasis added).
311. See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 332 n.1 (White, J., dissenting) ("'the majority offers no
reasons for its conclusion that finality should be the decisive factor') (quoting Shea v.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 64-65 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)); Hoffman, supra note 78, at 201
("where the two purposes [of habeas] diverge, ... nothing in the history or nature of federal
habeas suggests that the 'deterrence' purpose inevitably should prevail").
312. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1221 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
313. Compare NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1988, at 10 (1990) (in 1988, almost twelve million criminal
cases began in the state courts), with BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1989, at 480 (1990) (43,670
criminal cases were filed in the federal courts in 1988). See also supra notes 113 & 191 and
accompanying text.
314. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1226 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 1 W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 11 (Supp. 1990); Hoffman, supra note 78, at 214-15 (noting that de-
fendants cannot raise some kinds of constitutional claims on direct review; therefore, these
claims will not reach the federal courts except in the context of federal criminal prosecutions).
Constitutional principles are especially likely to stagnate because the Supreme Court has
characterized the retroactivity issue as a "threshold question" to be considered prior to the merits
of the prisoner's constitutional claim. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. See also Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at
2826; Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1259; Penry, 492 U.S. at 313. But see id. at 349 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "it is neither logical nor prudent to consider a
rule's retroactive application before the rule itself is articulated").
Commentators charge that the qualified immunity defense likewise hinders the develop-
ment of constitutional law. See, e.g., McCann, The Interrelationship of Immunity and the Prima
Facie Case in Section 1983 and Bivens Cases, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 117, 139-41 (1985-1986);
Nahmod, supra note 34, at 259; Rudovsky, supra note 31, at 53-55. Harlow did note that
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Thus, the recent retroactivity rulings cannot be justified as an attempt to
accommodate competing policies. The Court's emphasis on the reasonable
government official and the reasonable defense attorney in the qualified im-
munity and procedural default cases may represent, in the abstract, an appro-
priate balancing of the interests in vindicating constitutional rights and avoiding
disruption of state governmental processes. But the same cannot be said of the
retroactivity cases. These cases are designed to serve only the interests on one
side of the scale.315
The problems associated with the Teague doctrine do not necessarily
require, however, that the courts give all Supreme Court rulings complete
retroactive application. Absolute retroactivity would create enormous admin-
istrative difficulties for the criminal justice system, especially when the
Supreme Court issued an opinion that departed substantially from prior prac-
tice. In fact, the specter of those administrative problems might even discour-
age the Court from issuing such rulings. Perhaps the best solution is a step
backward: a return to the three-part Linkletter test.3 16 Although Griffith's
concerns - ensuring that cases on direct appeal are resolved in light of the
courts' "best understanding of governing constitutional principles" and treating
courts ruling on summary judgment motions raising a qualified immunity defense could analyze
the current status of the relevant constitutional law as well as the question whether that law was
clearly established when the defendant acted. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Nevertheless, the
Court also made it clear that ideally qualified immunity issues should be resolved prior to trial.
See id. at 815-16. See also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 n.2, 646 n.6; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at
526, 528. As a result, courts can dismiss section 1983 cases on immunity grounds without
evaluating whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights were infringed, leaving only suits against
municipalities and injunctive or declaratory judgment suits in which to develop the law in section
1983 cases. See supra notes 10 & 11. But cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95(1983) (requiring section 1983 plaintiffs who seek an injunction not only to satisfy the general
prerequisites for such relief, but also to prove a likelihood of future injury and to overcome the
federal courts' reluctance to intrude on state prerogatives); Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (requiring plaintiffs who seek to subject city to section 1983
liability to establish that constitutional violation was result of city's official policy or custom).
Resolving section 1983 suits in this way not only contributes to a stagnation of constitutional
standards, but also facilitates public officials' arguments in subsequent cases that the relevant
constitutional principles are unclear. Recognizing this potential problem, a few courts suggest
that the merits of a plaintiffs section 1983 claim be addressed prior to disposition of the
qualified immunity issue. See Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656 n.8 (10th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 722-23 (7th Cir.
1985); Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 314 n.27 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
918 (1983). But see Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 279 n.26 (7th Cir.) (criticizing that
approach as inconsistent with both Mitchell and Article III), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
315. Last year, Congress attempted to reform habeas procedures in capital cases. The
bill originally presented on the floor of the House would have overruled the Teague doctrine in
capital cases. See 136 Cong. Rec. H8769 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990). But, so long as the state
provided competent counsel in state postconviction proceedings, the bill would have imposed a
statute of limitations for habeas petitions in capital cases and in most cases would have allowed
only one stay of execution in order to permit the prisoner to file a habeas petition. The measures
ultimately passed in both the House and the Senate left the Teague doctrine intact but retained the
other features of the bill. See id. at H8876-78 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1990); id. at S10,190-91 (daily
ed. July 20, 1990). The conferees were unable to reach a compromise between the House and
Senate versions of the bill, however, and the habeas reform package therefore died at the end of
the session. See id. at S17,602 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond). A new
bill has been introduced in the Senate identical to the one the Senate passed last summer. S.
146, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Cong. Rec. S836 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991).
316. See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
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similarly situated defendants alike317 - would be compromised in some cases,
the Linkletter approach forces the courts to consider seriously the relevant
competing interests. In any event, the Teague doctrine is not the answer to the
Court's search for the optimal approach to retroactivity.
B. Applying the New Approach
Even if the Court's deterrence theory, or an effort to accommodate all
the relevant policies, supports adoption of the Teague approach in some form,
it justifies at best refusing to permit habeas petitioners to take advantage of
rules that are truly new - that is, those that a reasonable state judge would not
have recognized at the time the prisoner's conviction became final.
Unfortunately, the definition of "new rules" that the Court currently favors is
too expansive to enjoy any such justification. The Court has been much too
eager to forgive the state courts' erroneous constitutional interpretations,
especially when compared to the strict standard applied to defense attorneys in
procedural default cases. As a result, the retroactivity doctrine will not provide
a sufficient incentive for state courts to faithfully apply constitutional norms.
Teague and Penry indicated that a "case announces a new rule when it
breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
Government," in other words, when its "result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 318 A decision that
overrules past precedent obviously is not dictated by existing case law and thus
articulates a new rule.319 The Court therefore had no trouble concluding that
Teague was invoking a new rule by urging, contrary to statements the Court
had made in prior opinions, that the sixth amendment's requirement that the
jury venire be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community be extended to
the petit jury.320
Most Supreme Court opinions, however, apply and extend prior cases
rather than overruling them; determining whether such decisions announce a
new rule is more difficult.321 Penry was such a case. The Court held that
Penry was not seeking a new rule when arguing that the trial judge should have
given an instruction at his capital sentencing hearing to aid the jury's evaluation
of mitigating evidence concerning his mental retardation and abused
background. The Court noted that prior Supreme Court decisions had held that
capital sentencing juries could not be precluded from considering any relevant
317. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323; see supra note 278 and accompanying text.
318. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original). See also Penry, 492 U.S. at 314.
Teague gave two examples of recent Supreme Court decisions that announced new rules: Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), which struck down an evidentiary rule excluding all
hypnotically refreshed testimony as an infringement of the defendant's right to testify in her own
behalf; and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), which held that the eighth amendment
prohibits executing prisoners who are insane. But cf. Hoffman, supra note 293, at 182 (noting
that Rock "involved a relatively minor extension of long-standing federal constitutional prece-
dent," and "the only question" in Ford was whether a right recognized by "several centuries of
common law, as well as the statutes of virtually every state" was protected by the eighth amend-
ment as well).
319. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1216. But cf. infra note 382 and accompanying text
(describing Justice Harlan's contrary views).
320. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 292, 301 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538
(1975), and Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945)).
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mitigating evidence,322 and, in fact, had upheld the very death penalty statute at
issue in Penry based on assurances that it would permit consideration of any
mitigating circumstance the defendant could show.323 The Court concluded that
Penry was merely arguing that "[these] assurances were not fulfilled'in his
particular case because, without appropriate jury instructions, the jury could
not fully consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence."324
Last Term, in Butler v. McKellar, Saffle v. Parks, and Sawyer v. Smith,
the Court refined and seemingly broadened the concept of "new" rules,
adopting a "functional view" that denies habeas relief so long as the state courts
interpreted then-existing case law reasonably and in good faith.325 If the
constitutionality of the practice challenged by the prisoner was "susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds" at the time her conviction became final,326
such that a state court would not have "felt compelled by existing precedent to
conclude that the rule [she] seeks was required by the Constitution," 327 the rule
is a new one that will not be available on habeas. Even cases that make
"gradual developments in the law" will not be applied on habeas if reasonable
judges might have disagreed; only decisions that are "'predictable develop-
ment[s] in [the] law"' will be extended to habeas petitioners.328
Applying this standard, the Court decided in all three cases that the
prisoner was improperly seeking to take advantage of a new rule on habeas. In
Butler, the prisoner argued that the police had violated the Court's recent
decision in Arizona v. Roberson329 by continuing to question him after he had
asked for an attorney. Roberson involved an application of the Court's earlier
ruling in Edwards v. Arizona,330 which prohibits the police from interrogating
a suspect who invokes her right to counsel until she has an opportunity to
consult with an attorney. Roberson rejected the state's attempt "to craft an
exception" to the Edwards rule when the police conduct a second interrogation
involving a different crime after the initial questioning session ended with the
defendant's request for counsel.331 The Roberson Court characterized the
state's efforts to distinguish Edwards on the ground that the second
interrogation in Edwards had involved the same subject as an attempt to rely on
a factual difference with no "'legal significance for fifth amendment
purposes."' 332 Nevertheless, Butler held that "the fact that a court says that its
decision is within the 'logical compass' of an earlier decision, or indeed that it
321. See Butler, 110 S. CL at 1216.
322. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 318 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)).
323. See id. at 316 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272-73 (1976)).
324. Id. at 318 (emphasis deleted). Penry concluded, however, that the prisoner's
second claim - that executing a mentally retarded person like himself would violate the eighth
amendment - was a new rule because it was not dictated by precedent and would impose a new
obligation on the states. See id. at 2952.
325. Saffle, 110 S. CL at 1260. See also Butler, 110 S. CL at 1217.
326. Butler, 110 S. CL at 1217.
327. Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1260.
328. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827, 2828 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 8).
329. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
330. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
331. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677.
332. Id. at 678 (quoting State v. Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 97, 669 P.2d 68, 75 (1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984)).
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is 'controlled' by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of deciding
whether the current decision is a 'new rule' under Teague."333 Because the
result in Roberson was susceptible to reasonable debate, as evidenced by the
conflict among the lower courts, and because "[i]t would not have been an il-
logical or even a grudging application of Edwards to decide that it did not ex-
tend to the facts of Roberson," the Court concluded that Roberson announced a
new rule.334
Likewise, Saffle held that the prisoner was invoking a new rule when
arguing that an instruction in a capital case warning the jury to avoid any in-
fluence of sympathy violates the eighth amendment because in effect it tells the
jury to disregard the defendant's mitigating evidence. Although the Supreme
Court's prior decisions in Lockett v. Ohio335 and Eddings v. Oklahoma336 had
prohibited states from limiting the presentation and consideration of relevant
mitigating evidence in death penalty hearings, those cases, the Court said, "do
not speak directly, if at all," to the issue in Saffle: "[t]here is a simple and
logical difference between rules that govern what factors the jury must be
permitted to consider in making its sentencing decision, and rules that govern
how the State may guide the jury in considering and weighing those factors in
reaching a decision."337 Because the prisoner was complaining that the state
had "limited the manner in which his mitigating evidence may be considered,"
and not that it had "altogether prevented [the] jury from considering" that
evidence, his argument did not "come under the rule of Lockett and
Eddings."338 Even if those precedents "inform, or even control or govern, the
analysis of [this] claim," the Court concluded, "it does not follow that they
compel the rule that Parks seeks." 339 Therefore, the state and federal decisions
upholding antisympathy instructions after Lockett and Eddings could not be
considered unreasonable, and Parks was improperly seeking to assert a new
rule on habeas.
Finally, Sawyer concluded that the Court announced a new rule in
Caldwell v. Mississippi, when it held that the eighth amendment prohibits
prosecutorial statements that lead the jury in a capital case to believe that it does
not have responsibility for the sentencing decision.3 40 In characterizing this
holding as a new rule, Sawyer distinguished Caldwell from Donnelly v.
333. Butler, 110 S. CL at 1217.
334. Id. at 1217-18.
335. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
336. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
337. Saffle, 110 S. CL at 1261.
338. Id. at 1262. Saffle thus distinguished Penry on two grounds: that Penry alleged
that the state had completely barred the jury from considering his mitigating evidence; and that
resolution of Penry's claim did not involve application of the reasoning in Lockett and Eddings,
but simply required application of the Court's holding in Jurek v. Texas, see supra notes 322-24
and accompanying text. See Saffle, 110 S. CL at 1261-62. But see id. at 1267-69 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). But cf. Penry, 492 U.S. at 355 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (dissenting from Court's holding that Penry was not invoking a new rule, and distinguish-
ing Jurek's rule that the state must "render all mitigating circumstances relevant to the jury's
verdict" from Penry's claim concerning "the precise manner of their relevance - the precise
effect of their consideration") (emphasis deleted).
339. Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1261.
340. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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DeChristoforo,341 an earlier case involving improper prosecutorial comments,
on two grounds. First, Donnelly was not a capital case and was based on the
due process clause, rather than the eighth amendment.342 Second, Donnelly
refused to reverse a conviction when the prosecutor's remarks were only
"potentially" misleading,343 whereas Caldwell found that "the need for reliable
sentencing in capital cases" mandates reversal whenever "false prosecutorial
comments created an 'unacceptable risk"' of arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty.344 Sawyer admitted that earlier Supreme Court opinions provided
"general support" for the Caldwell ruling by stressing that the capital
sentencing process must be a reliable one and "must be carried out by jurors
who... view all of the relevant characteristics of the crime and the criminal,
and take their task as a serious one.'"345 Nevertheless, the Court dismissed those
precedents as too general to dictate Caldwell's result, noting that prior death
penalty cases had reversed capital sentences only when the statutory scheme was
unconstitutional or improper evidence was admitted. None of the previous
cases had involved inappropriate prosecutorial arguments. 46
As discussed above, the retroactivity cases - unlike the qualified im-
munity and procedural default cases - cannot be justified as an attempt to
balance competing policies. 347 Even if it were appropriate to focus the
retroactivity analysis on the reasonable state court judge, the Court has not
fairly applied that standard in defining what constitutes a new rule. In explain-
ing this conclusion, the discussion that follows evaluates the retroactivity cases
by examining the same four issues that arise when determining whether erro-
neous constitutional interpretations should be forgiven in qualified immunity
and procedural default cases.
1. Number, Weight, and Consistency of Precedents
The Court's seemingly broad definition of "new" rules parallels the ap-
proach some courts of appeals take in qualified immunity cases. Apparently
state courts need not respect a constitutional right unless a precedent directly on
point gives them no alternative.
The Supreme Court has not indicated whether a habeas petitioner is
seeking a new rule unless the Supreme Court has already recognized her claim,
or whether lower court rulings can establish "controlling" precedent. None of
the Court's recent cases directly raised that issue, but in evaluating whether the
prisoners were invoking new rules in those cases, the Court analyzed primarily
341. 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
342. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827.
343. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 641.
344. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827 (quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 343 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
345. Id. at 2828.
346. See id. See also Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 1989)(en banc) (in distinguishing Supreme Court cases stressing the need for reliability in capital sen-
tencing, court notes that "[a] command of that generality may justify any result the Supreme
Court wants to reach in a particular case, but it does not adequately describe or compel a result in
any specific matter") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3256 (1990). But cf. supra
notes 260-61 and accompanying text (describing cases that refuse to excuse procedural defaults
where defense attorneys failed to draw similar connection between general standards prescribed
in precedents and specific facts of a subsequent case).
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the extent to which the claims deviated from its own precedents.3 -8 Without
even mentioning the issue, however, several courts of appeals have suggested
that lower court decisions adopting a prisoner's constitutional argument help
establish that the claim asserted on habeas is not new.3 9
Nevertheless, in Sawyer v. Butler, the Fifth Circuit expressly refused to
decide whether a prisoner can cite state court opinions supporting her consti-
tutional claim to prove that she is not invoking a new rule.35 If a right is new
until it has been recognized in one of the relatively few Supreme Court
opinions, 35t the Teague doctrine limits the scope of habeas even more un-
justifiably. Like public officials and criminal defense attorneys, state judges
should be expected to familiarize themselves with constitutional principles that
have not yet received Supreme Court attention.
The Supreme Court's repeated use of the term "precedent" in the Teague
line of cases suggests that a prisoner may not be able to rely on case law from
other jurisdictions to help demonstrate that a constitutional principle is not
new.352 Again, the Court has not directly addressed that issue. In Wickham v.
Dowd, however, the Eighth Circuit dismissed two decisions from other
jurisdictions because they were "not binding in Missouri" and therefore could
not have "compelled" the state court to adopt the rule sought by the prisoner.353
Nevertheless, as one court of appeals judge recently observed, cases from
other jurisdictions should be relevant in determining whether a constitutional
principle is new because "[a]t a minimum," opinions issued by other courts
prior to a dispositive Supreme Court opinion "reveal[] the degree to which the
Court's [previous] jurisprudence compelled the result" the Court ultimately
347. See supra notes 297-315 and accompanying text.
348. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827-29; Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1260-63; Butler, 110 S.
C. at 1217; Penry, 492 U.S. at 315-19; Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. In Sawyer, however, the
Court distinguished a local state supreme court opinion discussing a similar constitutional claim
on its facts, suggesting perhaps that cases other than those decided by the Supreme Court are
relevant. See 110 S. Ct. at 2830.
349. See Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1254-59 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing prior Tenth
Circuit decisions, as well as opinions from other lower courts and statutory and administrative
materials, to support finding that prisoner was not seeking a new rule); Walton v. Caspari, 916
F.2d 1352, 1360 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing prior Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions to support
conclusion that prisoner was not seeking a new rule); Pens v. Bail, 902 F.2d 1464, 1466 (9th
Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (finding that prisoner was not invoking a new rule because his claim
followed from a "straightforward application" of a prior Ninth Circuit opinion as well as two
Supreme Court decisions). Cf. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding
that prisoner was invoking a new rule because he could not cite any authority to support his
constitutional claim and prior Ninth Circuit decisions had rejected the claim); Robinson v. Borg,
918 F.2d 1387, 1399 (9th Cir. 1990) (Trott, J., dissenting) (prior Ninth Circuit opinion estab-
lished a new rule because "it addressed an area ... for which this circuit had issued no defini-
tive prescription") (emphasis added); Barker v. Estelle, 913 F.2d 1433, 1441 (9th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that prisoner was invoking a new rule because neither the Supreme Court nor the
Ninth Circuit had previously recognized the claim).
350. 881 F.2d 1273, 1291 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), affd on other grounds sub nom.
Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
351. See supra notes 113 & 191 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2823; Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1260; Butler, 110 S.
CL at 1216; Penry, 492 U.S. at 314; Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
353. 914 F.2d 1111, 1114 n.9 (8th Cir. 1990).
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reached.3 54 In fact, in Dodson v. Zelez, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
prisoner was not seeking a new rule even though the Supreme Court had not
addressed the issue raised on habeas because opinions from other jurisdictions,
as well as statutory and administrative materials, supported the claim.3 55
It is very clear from the recent Supreme Court opinions, however, that
lower court decisions and rulings from other jurisdictions that reject a consti-
tutional claim help prove that the prisoner is attempting to take advantage of a
new rule.356 Apparently, state judges can uphold practices of questionable
constitutionality and insulate those convictions from habeas review when they
can cite other lower court opinions, of an unspecified number,357 that reached
the same result. If opinions from other jurisdictions support the reasonableness
of the state court's denial of a claim, contrary rulings from other courts should
likewise be considered evidence of the unreasonableness of the court's
decision.358
There is some evidence that the Court may not actually have intended to
be so forgiving of state courts' erroneous constitutional rulings. In both Butler
and Saffle, the lower courts had divided relatively evenly on the issue.359 Thus,
those cases do not necessarily mean that a state court can safely rule against the
defendant if it can find one other case that has done likewise. Nevertheless,
language in both opinions suggests that even a state court decision that stands
alone in rejecting a constitutional claim might be characterized as a reasonable
one - so long as its interpretation of Supreme Court precedent was not
"illogical" or "grudging." 360 And most recently, Sawyer concluded that a lone
state supreme court opinion rejecting the constitutional claim ultimately adopted
in Caldwell v. Mississippi suggested that prior Supreme Court opinions had not
"put other courts on notice that [the Constitution] compelled the.., result" in
Caldwell. 61
354. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1303 (5th Cir. 1989) (King, J., dissenting),
affd sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
355. 917 F.2d 1250, 1254-59 (10th Cir. 1990). See also Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d
1352, 1360 (8th Cir. 1990).
356. See Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1261; Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18.
357. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1221 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the majority's conclusion
that a result is reasonable if a certain number of courts support it is necessarily "ad hoc, both
because there appears to be no principled basis for choosing any particular number of courts
whose agreement is required before the result is deemed 'reasonable,' and because the criterion
ultimately rests on a bootstrap to the extent that the later courts reaching the result simply rely on
the earlier courts' having done the same").
358. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2836 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[s]tate decisions
cannot be deemed relevant to the Teague inquiry only to the extent they disprove the rootedness
of a constitutional right') (emphasis in original). See also supra notes 139-41 and accompany-
ing text (making similar argument in qualified immunity context).
359. See Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1261 (citing six decisions rejecting prisoner's claim); id.
at 1265 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing two cases in addition to the court below that had
accepted prisoner's claim); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 657, 679 n.3 (1988) (citing six
cases on each side of the issue).
360. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218. See also Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1260 (requiring only rea-
sonable, good faith interpretation of existing case law).
361. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2828-29. The Court reached this conclusion despite numer-
ous opinions from other state courts upholding similar challenges under state law. See id. at
2929-30. See also infra notes 406-09 and accompanying text.
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Permitting one opinion from another jurisdiction to demonstrate the rea-
sonableness of a decision adverse to the defendant is only a short step away
from saying that the decision rejecting the prisoner's claim in this very case, or
even a dissenting opinion in another jurisdiction, likewise indicates that the
issue is "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."3 62 In fact, in
concluding that the Court announced a new rule in Caldwell, Sawyer relied in
part on the dissenting opinion in that case, where three Justices complained that
there was a "'lack of authority"' for the majority's decision.3 63
Even a relatively even split, like that found in Butler and Saffle, should
not conclusively establish that the constitutional principle is new. As Justice
Brennan noted in his dissent in Butler, "10 egregiously wrong decisions can be
no more reasonable than 1."364 Nevertheless, the majority seems satisfied to
blindly follow the "safety in numbers" approach, seeing no need to consider
whether one of the conflicting positions adopted by the lower courts might have
been based on an unreasonable interpretation of Supreme Court case law.365
Given that "some courts will misconstrue [Supreme Court] precedents
notwithstanding their clarity," the Court's approach permits the state courts to
ignore its decisions and "simultaneously limit the reach of those decisions as a
matter of federal law."366
2. Timing of Precedents
Neither the recent retroactivity opinions issued by the Supreme Court
nor the few court of appeals decisions interpreting those rulings mention any
questions of timing: they do not discuss whether some time lapse is necessary
before state courts can reasonably be expected to implement a new constitu-
tional rule. The absence of any such discussion may mean that the state courts
are presumed to be aware of any previously issued opinion, so that a prisoner is
not invoking a new rule so long as the relevant decisions were issued before her
conviction became final.
This presumption is probably inaccurate as a factual matter, especially if
lower court rulings are taken into account in determining whether a rule is new
for retroactivity purposes. Moreover, the presumption is inconsistent with the
Court's emphasis on deterrence: even a state judge who faithfully applies
constitutional principles may act contrary to a newly issued decision that has not
yet filtered down to her chambers.
362. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217.
363. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2828 (quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
364. Butler, 110 S. CL at 1221 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
365. Butler contained no analysis whatsoever of the reasonableness of the view that the
Edwards doctrine was limited to cases where both interrogations involved the same subject
matter. The Court merely made the conclusory statement that refusing to apply Edwards to sec-
ond interrogations involving different crimes "would not have been an illogical or even a grudg-
ing application of Edwards." 110 S. CL at 1217-18. The Court then based its finding that
Roberson had announced a new rule entirely on the difference of opinion among the lower
courts. See id. Likewise, although Saffle and Sawyer spent some time distinguishing the pris-
oners' habeas claims from the questions at issue in prior related cases, the Court did not explain
in either case why the supposed distinctions should reasonably have made any difference. See
Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2827-29; Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1261-63.
366. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2835 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Nevertheless, the approach may be a reasonable one. On direct review,
the Supreme Court decides cases in light of its "'best understanding of
governing constitutional principles,"' 367 even though reversing a lower court
for failing to follow a new ruling that the court could not reasonably have been
aware of will not deter similar errors in the future. The procedure followed
on habeas should not differ.
Moreover, the justifications for allowing an interval of time for new de-
cisions to trickle down to public officials and defense counsel in the qualified
immunity and procedural default cases do not apply in the retroactivity context.
In the former cases, unfamiliarity with a new constitutional principle leads to
the loss of valuable rights: in section 1983 suits, the government official is
liable for damages, and in procedural default cases, the defendant forfeits her
constitutional claims. Imposing these sanctions on one who could not
reasonably be expected to be aware of a newly issued decision is unfair. On the
other hand, the state judge who fails to recognize a recently articulated
constitutional right is not punished in the same sense for her mistake. The
prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief and perhaps a new trial, but that
remedy does not unfairly impose a penalty on the judge who erred. Given the
difference in impact, it makes sense to allow a prisoner to take advantage of a
new rule so long as it was announced prior to the time her conviction became
final. Although finality interests are somewhat affected, finality by itself does
not constitute "a sufficient reason for federal courts to compromise their pro-
tection of constitutional rights under § 2254."368
3. Similarity of Precedents
The language used by the Court in defining "new" rules suggests that
state courts are expected only to follow precedent that is directly on point and
need not even apply established constitutional principles to analogous cases. A
state court's decision to reject a constitutional claim is not deemed unreasonable
unless the contrary result was "dictated" 369 or "compelled"370 by precedent; the
existing case law must "speak directly"371 to that issue. The state court can rule
against the defendant and foreclose habeas review even though prior cases
supporting recognition of the constitutional claim "inform" or even "control"
or "govern" the case in question.372 So long as they do not "compel" adoption
of the defendant's argument, the state court can reject it.373
The Court's application of these standards last Term implies that any
factual difference between the governing precedents and the pending case
renders the state court's refusal to adhere to those precedents a reasonable,
good faith interpretation that cannot be disturbed on habeas. Butler character-
ized Roberson as a new rule even though the state itself acknowledged in
Roberson that it was seeking an "exception" to the Court's earlier ruling in
367. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in thejudgment)).
368. Reed, 468 U.S. at 15.
369. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
370. Saffle, 110 S. CL at 1260.
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Edwards. Moreover, nothing in Edwards suggested that the Court's decision
turned on the fact that both interrogations involved the same subject matter.374
Likewise, in Saffle, the majority drew a forced distinction between rules that
prevent the jury in a capital sentencing hearing from considering the
defendant's mitigating evidence and those that merely limit the manner in which
that evidence may be considered. 375 Finally, in Sawyer, the Court distinguished
Caldwell from prior related opinions because they were grounded on different
provisions in the Constitution, applied a different standard of review, and
condemned statutes, not prosecutorial remarks, that threatened the reliability of
the capital sentencing process. 376 Given the relative ease of finding some slight
distinction between any two cases, and the fact that the Supreme Court usually
does not agree to hear cases merely to correct lower court errors in applying
settled law,377 every Supreme Court decision could potentially be considered a
new rule.378
This generous notion of what constitutes a reasonable state court ruling
cannot be justified by even Teague's narrow deterrent-driven view of habeas.
Defining new rules as broadly as the Court appears to have done gives state
courts little incentive to enforce constitutional principles in criminal cases.
Instead, they will learn that, absent precedent directly on point, "their interpre-
tations of federal constitutional guarantees - no matter how cramped and
unfaithful to the principles underlying existing precedent - will no longer be
subject to oversight through the federal habeas system." 379 Although rea-
374. Cf. 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 47, at 9 (Supp. 1990) (case does not
announce a new rule where "the logic" of earlier precedents "clearly would extend to the situa-
tion now before the Court, and the only uncertainty was as to whether the Court might back
away from that logic after seeing its full ramifications').
375. As Justice Brennan observed in dissent, the Court's approach would permit a state
legislature to pass a statute "requiring the jury to discount the weight of all.., mitigating fac-
tors" - a statute with "obvious preclusive effect" - "so long as the majority could describe the
statute as relating to the 'manner' in which the jury considers the evidence." Saffle, 110 S. Ct.
at 1268 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
376. The Court also distinguished a state court opinion that disapproved of a prosecu-
tor's comment that might have led the jury to feel less responsible for the capital sentencing
decision because the comment there referred to pardon rather than appellate review. See
Sawyer, 110 S. CL at 2830.
377. See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 221. But cf.
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Court is will-
ing to take the "unusual" step of granting review in order to correct state court error "when it
becomes transfixed by the specter of a drug courier escaping the punishment that is his due").
378. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Few decisions on appeal
or collateral attack are 'dictated' by what came before. Most such cases involve a question of
law that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge to resolve the case in more than one
way.') (emphasis omitted).
379. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1222 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Sawyer, 110 S.
CL at 2840 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's ruling that Caldwell established a
new rule by imposing a lesser burden on defendants who challenged improper prosecutorial
comments in the capital sentencing context than that previously applied in noncapital cases, be-
cause "the State's claimed interest in having its intentional misconduct reviewed under a less
demanding standard is hardly worth crediting"). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,
561 (1982) (applying fourth amendment decisions that "resolv[ed] unsettled Fourth Amendment
questions" prospectively would 'encourage police or other courts to disregard the plain import
of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided approach"'; "[o]fficial awareness of
the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by official certainty that, so
long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through the
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sonable state judges, like reasonable public officials, may well be surprised by
Supreme Court decisions that work substantial changes in constitutional doc-
trine, they should be expected to apply established constitutional principles to
similar cases. As the Butler dissent noted, "[it is one thing to preclude federal
habeas petitioners from asserting claims based on legal principles contrary to or
at least significantly dissimilar from those in existence at the time their
convictions became final," but "[ilt is a far different thing to say that concerns
for repose and resource scarcity justify . . . protect[ing] States from the
consequences of retrying or resentencing defendants whose trials and appeals
did not conform to then-existing constitutional standards but are viewed as
suffering from only 'reasonable' defects." 380
The apparent breadth of the Court's concept of new rules is not even
faithful to the view taken by Justice Harlan, the original advocate of the Court's
new retroactivity theory. Harlan distinguished cases that articulated new rules
from those that "simply applied a well-settled constitutional principle" to
analogous circumstances. 38 ' According to Harlan, even a Supreme Court
opinion that overruled past precedent should apply retroactively on habeas if
prior cases had foreshadowed the demise of the earlier decision.38 2 Thus, in
Harlan's view, a rule was new only if one could say with "assurance" that the
Court would have ruled differently - that is, that it would have rejected the
constitutional claim - at the time the petitioner's conviction became fmal.383
Although the Court endorsed Harlan's approach not long ago,384 most recently
it seems to take the opposite view, characterizing a rule like Roberson as a new
one because it could not say with assurance that it would have reached the same
result - that is, that it would have accepted the constitutional claim - before
the prisoner's conviction became final.38 5
The federal courts have yet to fully digest the recent retroactivity cases,
but the early returns suggest that they are not all following the Supreme Court's
broad definition of new rules. In Walton v. Caspari,38 6 for example, the Eighth
Circuit held that its prior decision in Garrett v. Morris38 7 had not articulated a
questionable practice would be excluded only in the one case definitively resolving the unsettled
question") (quoting Desist, 394 U.S at 277 (Fortas, J., dissenting)).
380. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1226 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). See also
Desist, 394 U.S. at 268 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (prisoner is entitled "to have his case judged by
the constitutional standards dominant at the time of his conviction").
381. Desist, 394 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
382. See id. at 264-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As evidenced by the majority's deci-
sion, however, this opinion was not universally held. See id. at 247-48.
383. Id. at 264 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
384. See Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211,216-17 (1988); United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 549 (1982). But cf. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646, 647 (1984) (using
Linkletter standards, the Court refuses to apply Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
retroactively to habeas cases because Edwards resolved conflict among the lower courts and the
police could not be faulted for failing to anticipate it, even though the Court admits that Edwards
"established a bright-line rule to safeguard pre-existing rights, not a new substantive require-
ment" and that prior opinions had "'strongly indicated"' that some additional safeguards might
be necessary) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484).
385. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1223-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Sawyer,
110 S. CL at 2827-28 (suggesting that state courts can be expected only to follow "predictable"
developments and not "gradual" developments in the law).
386. 916 F.2d 1352, 1359 (8th Cir. 1990).
387. 815 F.2d 509, 511-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987).
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new rule. Garrett had refused to apply the Supreme Court's holding in Swain
v. Alabama388 that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges is presumed
lawful unless the defendant can establish a systematic exclusion of blacks from
other juries because the prosecution in Garrett had explained its reasons for
striking the black members of the venire. In Walton, the Eighth Circuit
explained that Garrett followed from Swain's holding that purposefully
excluding blacks from juries violates the equal protection clause and therefore
"merely applied extant principles to a different factual situation." 389
Similarly, in Pens v. Bail,390 the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief to a
prisoner who argued that sentencing a defendant in a noncapital case based on
statements made during postconviction, court-ordered confidential therapy
sessions violated the fifth amendment. The court explained that its decision was
merely a "straightforward application" of In re Gault's general rule that the
applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination "turn[s] upon... the
nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites,"391 of
Estelle v. Smith's decision that the fifth amendment prohibits use during a
capital sentencing hearing of statements the defendant made in a court-ordered
pretrial competency examination, 392 and of a prior Ninth Circuit holding that
the defendant's fifth amendment rights were infringed when his sentence was
partly based on his admission to a probation officer that he had committed
other crimes. 393
Finally, in Hill v. McMackin, 94 the Sixth Circuit held that the Supreme
Court did not announce a new rule in Harris v. Reed when it required the state
courts to indicate clearly that they were rejecting a defendant's claim on pro-
cedural grounds in order to trigger application of the default rules on
habeas.395 The court of appeals reasoned that Harris merely clarified how the
"plain statement" rule originally adopted in Michigan v. Long396 applied to
habeas cases.397
388. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
389. Walton, 916 F.2d at 1359-60.
390. 902 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
391. 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
392. 451 U.S. 454, 461-69 (1981).
393. Jones v. Caldwell, 686 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1982); see Pens, 902 F.2d at
1465-66. The court thus rejected the state's attempt to limitJones to confessions of additional
crimes, as distinguished from admissions of deviant behavior and other statements not amount-
ing to a confession. See id.
394. 893 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1989).
395. 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). If the state court rules on the merits of a defaulted
claim, the prisoner can raise the issue on habeas without first satisfying the cause and prejudice
test. See supra note 40.
396. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (holding that a state court must state plainly that
its decision is based on an independent and adequate state ground in order to avoid direct review
in the Supreme Court).
397. See Hill, 893 F.2d at 814. Cf. Young v. Herring, 917 F.2d 858, 862 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1990) (holding that Teague does not bar retrospective application of Harris v. Reed because
Harris did not articulate a rule of criminal procedure). But cf. supra notes 44 & 47 (describing
controversy concerning whether adequate state ground analysis applies on habeas). For exam-
ples of other cases applying a narrower definition of new rules, see Mallett v. Missouri, 110 S.
Ct. 1308, 1310 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (habeas petitioner was
not seeking new rule in challenging change of venue to a place with insubstantial minority popu-
lation because argument "flow[ed] necessarily" from earlier Supreme Court decision striking
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Nevertheless, other court of appeals decisions are seemingly applying a
broader definition of new rules. In Collins v. Zant,398 for example, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court announced a new rule in
Michigan v. Jackson39 when it reversed two convictions because police had
questioned the defendants after they had asked the arraigning magistrate to
appoint counsel to represent them. In reaching this conclusion, Jackson relied
on Edwards v. Arizona, which prohibits the police from continuing to inter-
rogate a suspect after she requests an attorney.40 0 Jackson applied the Edwards
rule even though the defendants in Jackson were asserting a sixth amendment
right to counsel, whereas Edwards involved the fifth amendment right to
counsel. The Court explained that "the reasons for prohibiting the in-
terrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer
are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense than
before," and thus "the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment
interrogation requires at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right
to counsel at any custodial interrogation. 401 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit
held that Jackson established a new rule because it was not dictated by prior
precedent and it imposed a new obligation on the police' 02
Likewise, in Jackson v. Ylst,403 the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner's
request for a state-appointed expert witness to testify concerning the dangers of
eyewitness testimony required creation of a new rule. The prisoner relied on
the Supreme Court's opinion in Ake v. Oklahoma, which had interpreted the
due process clause to guarantee indigent defendants access to the "'basic tools of
an adequate defense"' and therefore had required the state to appoint a
psychiatrist to assist a defendant who wished to raise an insanity defense.404
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Jackson was invoking a new rule
because "[n]o issue was presented to the Supreme Court in Ake concerning the
right... to the appointment of an expert on eyewitness identification." 405
down purposeful discrimination injury selection); Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1333
(8th Cir. 1989) (habeas petitioner's argument that statutory aggravating circumstance was un-
constitutionally vague was dictated by precedent, and therefore he was not invoking a new rule;
Supreme Court opinion decided after his conviction became final was merely an application, not
an extension, of prior cases), cert. denied, 110 S. CL 3301 (1990).
398. 892 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
399. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
400. 451 U.S. at 484-85; see supra text accompanying note 330.
401. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631, 632 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that its
"settled approach to questions of waiver requires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, inter-
pretation to a defendant's request for counsel." Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
402. Collins, 892 F.2d at 1512.
403. 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990).
404. 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227
(1971)).
405. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 886. See also Wickham v. Dowd, 914 F.2d 1111, 1113-15(8th Cir. 1990) (prisoner invoked a new rule by arguing that the ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment prevents a court from conditioning a known alcoholic's probation on abstinence from
alcohol and then revoking probation when he violates that condition, even though "well-settled
rules" established the standard to be applied in eighth amendment cases and prohibited punishing
defendants because of their status as alcoholics); Epps v. State, 901 F.2d 1481, 1483 (8th Cir.
1990) (prisoner raising equal protection challenge to trial court's decision to change venue to
place with no real minority population sought new rule because court was unaware of any
authority supporting claim). Cf. Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1399 (9th Cir. 1990)(Trott J., dissenting) (arguing that all decisions implementing the Miranda doctrine articulate
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4. Relevance of Other Sources of Law
Like the qualified immunity cases, and unlike the procedural default
cases, the retroactivity cases apparently ignore other sources of law in de-
termining whether the state court that denied the prisoner's claim reasonably
interpreted existing case law.
In holding that the Court announced a new rule in Caldwell v.
Mississippi, Sawyer rejected as irrelevant the prisoner's contention that state
law had long prohibited the type of prosecutorial arguments proscribed by
Caldwell.4°6 In Caldwell, the Court observed that legal authorities "almost
uniformly [had] strongly condemned" such remarks, and that almost all of the
state supreme courts to consider the issue had reached the same conclusion 40 7
Moreover, the supreme court in the state that convicted Sawyer had expressly
said that Caldwell "did not change our previous case law." 408 Nevertheless,
Sawyer concluded that Caldwell established a new rule, reasoning that "'the
availability of a claim under state law does not of itself establish that a claim
was available under the United States Constitution."' 409 Although Caldwell
therefore imposed no additional obligation on the prosecution beyond that
already required by state law, the Court refused to apply the decision on habeas
because it announced new federal law.
Thus, state judges, like public officials defending section 1983 suits, are
apparently forgiven for violating their own state rules - even when they
uphold a practice that the reasonable state court judge would realize contra-
vened established state law principles. Although this result is consistent with
the Court's emphasis on deterring constitutional violations, barring habeas re-
view when the state courts acted contrary to settled state law is not necessary to
protect either the feelings of responsible state judges or legitimate state
processes.
new rules; prophylactic rules like Miranda are "transient" and "less permanent" than constitu-
tional requirements because they 'reflect the federal judiciary's judgment of what is necessary to
protect those rights"); Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724,726 (9th Cir.) (Noonan, J.) (describing
as a debatable issue the question whether the Supreme Court announced a new rule when it
interpreted prior decisions guaranteeing defendants the basic tools of an adequate defense to
require assistance of expert psychiatrist in preparing insanity defense), motion to vacate denied,
110 S. Ct. 1799 (1990); Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205, 1217 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989) (Clark,
CJ., specially concurring) (characterizing as a "substantial question" the issue whether subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Court's holding that members of the jury venire
may not be excused because they express conscientious objections to the death penalty "so clari-
fled [that holding] as to announce a 'new rule").
406. See Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2829-30.
407. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333.
408. State ex rel. Busby v. Butler, 538 So. 2d 164, 173 (La. 1988).
409. Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2830 (quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 409(1989)). Sawyer also reasoned that the Court had previously indicated that Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986), announced a new rule by holding that the eighth amendment prohibits
executing the insane even though a number of state statutes had prohibited such executions prior
to Ford. See 110 S. Ct. at 2830 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 329).
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V. THE VARYING SHADES OF CRYSTAL BALLS
Although the Court observed years ago that "[d]efendants can no more be
charged with anticipating [new] decision[s] than can the States,"410 today it
applies vastly different standards to state judges in retroactivity cases than it
applies to defense attorneys in procedural default cases. 411 Defense attorneys
are expected to make an objection based on a constitutional principle raised in a
different context by a few defendants in other states (or by a few law
professors), even though the courts have soundly rejected the argument. Statejudges, on the other hand, are asked only to follow precedent - perhaps only
Supreme Court case law - that is directly on point. Under the procedural
default cases, a prisoner is deprived of a hearing on her habeas claim if she was
not fortunate enough to find an attorney with a crystal ball that clearly forecast
future developments in the law. Under the recent retroactivity cases, she also
loses her federal forum even if the crystal ball the state court consulted in
denying her constitutional claim was extremely unreliable.
One commentator has suggested a justification for this discrepancy: he
maintains that the definition of novelty used in the procedural default context
should not apply in defining new law for retroactivity purposes because of the
"difference between the kinds of claims we reasonably expect a defendant's
attorney to be able to make, and the kinds of claims we reasonably expect a
state judge to adopt as part of the governing law."412 Admittedly, the rea-
sonable defense attorney will make arguments on behalf of a client that,
although not frivolous, the reasonable state judge is unlikely to accept. But that
observation suggests only that a standard requiring attorneys in default cases
and judges in retroactivity cases to exercise a reasonable amount of diligence
given their own circumstances will not necessarily lead to precisely the same
results. In some cases, the reasonable defense attorney will react differently to
a legal argument than will the reasonable state court judge. This difference
does not, however, justify the great disparity in predictive capabilities currently
attributed to defense attorneys and state judges. Nor does it explain why the
default cases have adopted a definition of "novel" claims that is much too
limited, requiring defense counsel to be unnecessarily perceptive, while the
retroactivity cases have applied a concept of "new" rules that is much too
broad, expecting too little from state court judges. If, as the Court has
suggested, both the procedural default rules and the new retroactivity doctrine
are aimed at deterrence (of sandbagging by defense attorneys and insensitivity
to constitutional rights by state courts), the foresight and reasoning ability
expected of the reasonable defense attorney and the reasonable state court judge
- both of whom are lawyers presumably familiar with the constitutional
principles applicable in criminal cases - should be much more similar.
410. O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 93 (1966) (per curiam).
411. But cf. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc)(arguing that "there is far more ground for congruence than for distinction" in the definition of
novel claims used in procedural default and retroactivity cases), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3256(1990).
412. Hoffman, supra note 78, at 212 n.126. See also Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d
1273, 1291 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), affd on other grounds sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
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In fact, the current disparity may be tilted in the wrong direction: if a
different concept of novelty is to be used in the two situations, perhaps the
more demanding standard should apply to judges in retroactivity cases. The
defense attorney who misinterprets the law and fails to raise an objection at
trial thereby forfeits her client's constitutional claims on habeas. The client,
rather than the guilty party, pays for the mistake. The state judge who errs in
rejecting a constitutional claim may be compelled to preside over a second trial
or hear a second appeal, but she is not personally subjected to sanction in the
same sense. Moreover, the maximum punishment in the retroactivity cases is
an unnecessary trial 13 whereas in the default cases, the maximum penalty is
loss of a constitutional claim that might establish the prisoner's innocene. 4 14
The harsher consequences flowing from error in the procedural default context
therefore suggest that state judges should be held to the higher standard.
Where does qualified immunity fit into this picture? As currently inter-
preted by some courts, the standard applied in the immunity context is similar
to that used in the retroactivity cases, penalizing only those interpretations of
constitutional norms that were clearly contrary to precedent directly on point
from the actor's own jurisdiction.4 15 In fact, if a case announces a new rule
unless Supreme Court precedent compelled the result, the retroactivity doctrine
may be even more lenient than the qualified immunity defense - most courts
consider a right clearly established for immunity purposes when there is
sufficient lower court support, even in the absence of a Supreme Court deci-
siona1 6
Treating state judges more leniently than other public officials is not ap-
propriate. Many public officials have no legal training and therefore cannot be
assumed to have the familiarity with constitutional principles that can be ex-
pected of state judges. In addition, public officials who are denied immunity
are liable for any damages caused by a constitutional violation. The qualified
413. In some cases, the prisoner may ultimately go free because the prosecutor is no
longer able to present sufficient evidence to convict. Nevertheless, in most circumstances the
prosecutor will be able to use the testimony given at the previous trial even if the witnesses are
no longer available, see Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 250 (1973) (Marshall, J. dissent-
ing), and if the loss of evidence is attributable to the constitutional violation, the prosecutor
should never have had the advantage of that evidence in the first place. Even if some prisoners
are unjustifiably released, the number is not likely to be great, see J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
Supreme Court Review, supra note 76, at 1633, and that danger is outweighed by the risk that
otherwise some prisoners may be unconstitutionally incarcerated. Cf. Winship, 397 U.S. at 372(Harlan, J., concurring) ("it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free").
414. This danger is mitigated somewhat by the court's ability to consider a defaulted
claim on habeas even in the absence of cause and prejudice when necessary to avoid a miscar-
riage of justice. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. But as currently applied, the mis-
carriage of justice exception to the Sykes doctrine has not proven particularly useful. See supra
note 105 and accompanying text.
415. In fact, Sawyer explicitly drew the parallel, citing a qualified immunity case to sup-
port the proposition that the Teague doctrine would be "meaningless" if it was inapplicable
whenever the prisoner's claim was generally supported by prior cases articulating a broad consti-
tutional principle. 110 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639). Cf. Peery v. Brakke,
826 F.2d 740, 744 (8th Cir. 1987) (simultaneously analyzing qualified immunity and retroactiv-
ity of Supreme Court's decision in civil case because both turn in part on whether the decision
changed clearly established law); Nahmod, supra note 34, at 253 (observing that Supreme
Court's immunity cases are similar to retroactivity doctrine applied in civil cases).
416. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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immunity defense is therefore designed to ensure that the fear of damages does
not deter them from independently exercising their discretion. The retro-
activity doctrine also serves a deterrent function, but the risk of overde-
terrence poses a greater threat to the public interest in the qualified immunity
context. State court judges who wish to minimize the number of prisoners
entitled to habeas relief will have an incentive to bend over backwards to ensure
that criminal defendants receive error-free trials - not such a terrible
result.417 On the other hand, public officials who wish to avoid damages
liability may shade their decisions in ways that do not serve the public interest.
Accordingly, the standard to which judges are held in retroactivity cases
should, if anything, be higher than that imposed on public officials in qualified
immunity cases.418
CONCLUSION
Although legitimate policy considerations cannot justify requiring crimi-
nal defense attorneys to predict future developments in the law with much
greater accuracy than is expected of public officials or state judges, the courts
have used the common framework of foreseeability to lead to precisely that
result. While coming to inconsistent conclusions, the qualified immunity, pro-
cedural default, and retroactivity cases have nevertheless sounded a common
theme: in the interest of protecting state courts and state officials, the federal
courts have closed their doors to those who have suffered a deprivation of
constitutional rights. In each case, concerns about federalism and state pre-
rogatives have trumped the interests in safeguarding constitutional rights and
providing a remedy for constitutional violations.
The courts, many of which denounce judicial activism in other con-
texts,4 19 have seemingly lost sight of the habeas and civil rights statutes that
created a remedy and provided for federal jurisdiction while saying nothing
about qualified immunity defenses, cause and prejudice requirements, or lim-
ited application of new rules. Apparently, the courts have forgotten the lesson
Justice Frankfurter tried to teach almost forty years ago: "[u]nder the guise of
417. Cf. Harris, 489 U.S. at 267 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concerns about "overly
expansive interpretations of federally protected rights" are "necessarily secondary to the federal
courts' principal role as protector of federally secured rights").
418. Cf. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(opposing extension of good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in case where police rea-
sonably relied on statute authorizing warrantless search, and noting that although "fairness to the
defendant, as well as public policy, dictates that individual government officers ought not be
subjected to damages suits for arguable constitutional violations," "[t]he need for a rule so diffi-
cult of application outside the civil damages context is, in my view, dubious"). But cf.
Rudovsky, supra note 31, at 79 (arguing that governmental interests are sufficiently safeguarded
if qualified immunity is limited to suits where a civil case would not be applied retroactively;
public officials are thereby protected from "changes in the law and other unpredictable develop-
ments," but are liable if the constitutional right is "likely to be recognized," even if not yet clearly
established).
419. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 497-98 (1990) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3064-67 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment). Cf. New York Times, July 24, 1990, § A, at
18, col. 1 (President Bush praises Supreme Court nominee David Souter as a judge "committed
to interpreting, not making the law," who "recognizes the proper role of judges in upholding the
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fashioning a procedural rule, we are not justified in wiping out the practical ef-
ficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District Courts."420 The
only explanation for the discrepancies among the three sets of cases is one
Justice Brennan recently offered: "Result, not reason, propels the Court
today." 421
democratic choices of the people through their elected representatives, with constitutional con-
straints').
420. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498-99 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See
also Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1224-25, 1226-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carrier, 477 U.S. at
518-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
421. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

